10.5.3  Identity Protection Program (Cont. 1)

10.5.3.2 
IMF identity Theft Procedures

10.5.3.2.10 
IMF Identity Theft Worked by Certain Functions

10.5.3.2.10.2  (01-16-2014)
Identity Theft Identified by Criminal Investigation

  1. TC 971 AC 506 is applied to a taxpayer's account when Criminal Investigation (CI) identifies identity theft incidents that have tax administration effect. Such incidents can occur when a taxpayer's identity is stolen via phishing or refund schemes verified by CI.

  2. CI refers cases to Return Integrity Correspondence Service (RICS) AM Taxpayer Assurance Program (TAP) to input TC 971 AC 506 on an account regardless of the existence of any other identity theft indicator code (AC 501, 504, or 505) that may be present on the account.

  3. See IRM 10.5.3.2.11, IRS-Identified Identity Theft Affecting Tax Administration - TC 971 AC 506 and Exhibits 10.5.3-10 and 10.5.3-11 for more information about this identity theft indicator.

10.5.3.2.10.3  (01-16-2014)
Identity Theft Identified by Accounts Management

  1. Accounts Management inputs a TC 971 AC 501 when resolving taxpayer initiated identity theft supported by taxpayer documentation.

  2. Accounts Management closes an identity theft issue by inputting TC 971 AC 506 on the account of the "determined owner" of an SSN, following procedures for TIN-related problem cases. Specifically, Accounts Management (AM) conducts research to determine the owner of the SSN. If ownership is determined and research indicates that intentional misuse of the SSN is involved, AM inputs a TC 971 AC 506. See IRM 10.5.3.2.11, IRS-Identified Identity Theft Affecting Tax Administration - TC 971 AC 506 and Exhibits 10.5.3-10 and 10.5.3-11 for more information about this identity theft indicator.

  3. Additional guidance for procedures used by AM employees is located in the following IRMs:

    • IRM 21.6.2, Adjusting TIN-Related Problems

    • IRM 21.9.2, Accounts Management Identity Theft

10.5.3.2.10.4  (01-16-2014)
Return Integrity and Correspondence (RICS) Services. Identity Theft Identified by: Integrity & Verification Operations (IVO) formerly Accounts Management Taxpayer Assurance Program (AM TAP) and the Taxpayer Protection Program (TPP)

  1. Effective October 11, 2009, the Accounts Management Taxpayer Assurance Program (AM TAP) was established to handle Questionable Refund Program processes that migrated from the Criminal Investigation Scheme Development Centers. AM TAP handled identity theft account work processes and conducted research to verify the validity of tax return information. In 2011, AM TAP moved from Accounts management to Return Integrity & Correspondence Services (RICS). In January 2013, AMTAP was renamed Integrity & Verification Operations (IVO). IVO handles identity theft account work processes and conducts research to verify the validity of tax return information. Specifically, IVO inputs a TC 971 AC 506 identity theft indicator on a taxpayer’s account when a false tax return has been identified by the IRS, and the tax return was not filed by the valid taxpayer. See IRM 25.25, Revenue Protection, for additional procedures.

  2. The Taxpayer Protection Program (TPP) is responsible for handling potential ID Theft cases that are scored by a set of ID Theft models in DDb or selected through a query in EFDS. Once a potential ID Theft case is identified the return will not post, DDb will input a TC 971/121 to flag the account and either a Letter 4883C , Letter 5071C , or CP 01B will be sent to the taxpayer for verification. TPP will handle taxpayer correspondence to the 4883C, 5071C letter, or CP01B, including phone calls and call request received from the taxpayer. Refer to IRM 25.25.6.4, Taxpayer Protection Program Phone Procedures . for additional information.

    Note:

    When both an IVO indicator (posted TC 971 AC 134) and an unreversed TPP indicator (posted TC 971 AC 121 with no TC 972 AC 121, UPC 126 ) are present on the same tax module, CSRs will handle taxpayer inquiries and account work using TPP procedures.

  3. RICS Taxpayer Protection Program (TPP) may issue a taxpayer a Letter 4904 C when identity theft is suspected. See IRM 25.25.6.6.3 , Case Resolution Single Posted Good Return and IRM 25.25.7.3 Taxpayer Correspondence.

10.5.3.2.10.4.1  (01-16-2014)
Returns Selected by ID Theft Filters - Taxpayers Visiting the TAC

  1. The Taxpayer Protection Program (TPP), is responsible for handling potential ID Theft cases. Returns are scored using a defined set of ID Theft attributes in DDb or selected through a query in EFDS. Once a return is identified as “potential” identity theft, the return is prevented from posting and either a Letter 4883C or Letter 5071C is sent to the taxpayer for verification. For additional information, refer to IRM 25.25.6, Taxpayer Protection Program.

  2. Taxpayers who visit the TAC after receiving a Letter 4883C or 5071C will be required to authenticate their identity. A Form 14039 is NOT required.
    Authentication of Identity – 2 Forms of identification are required: The taxpayer MUST present a valid U.S. federal or state government issued form of picture identification such as:

    • A driver’s license

    • State identification card

    • Passport


    AND At least one from the following from an Adult and at least 2 for a minor under the age 14:

    • Social security card

    • Mortgage statement

    • Lease agreement for apartment

    • Car title

    • Voter Registration card

      Note:

      Excludes the voter registration application.

    • Utility bill matching address on ID

    • Birth Certificate Name at Birth, Date of birth, City of birth (optional), Country of birth

      Exception:

      Minors under 14 years of age may not have documentation with a photograph.

    • School Records (Under the age of 14 and/or Students Only up to the age 24)

      Note:

      For students aged 14-24 they must still meet the photo criteria for supporting documentation.

      Note:

      DO NOT accept a combination of these documents for an adult. An adult must present documentation that contains a photo.

      Note:

      IRS no longer accepts Puerto Rican birth certificates issued before July, 2010, due to new laws by the Government of Puerto Rico. Taxpayers with birth certificates issued before this date must get new documentation from the Puerto Rico Vital Statistics Record Office.

  3. If taxpayer has already come to the TAC and they do not authenticate 2 or more times, the TAC will provide the "Taxpayer Cannot Authenticate" Letter 5216.

    Note:

    Refer to the following IRMs for additional guidance IRM 3.21.263.5.3.4.2, Reviewing Supporting Identification Documentation IRM 3.21.263-9, General Procedures for Detecting Questionable Documents.

10.5.3.2.10.5  (01-16-2014)
Identity Theft Identified by Submission Processing

  1. Submission Processing (SP) inputs TC 971 AC 506 identity theft indicator on the account of a taxpayer, with an unreversed TC 971 AC 501, when the unpostable resolution meets certain conditions. See IRM 10.5.3.2.9.1, Actions Taken After TC 971 AC 501 Placed on Account .

  2. Additional guidance for procedures used by Submission Processing can be found in the following IRMs:

    • IRM 3.12.37.14.15, Unpostable Code 147 Reason Code 0

    • IRM 3.12.37.14.16, Unpostable Code 147 RC 1 and Unpostable Code 147 RC 3

    • IRM 3.12.179.43.1, UPC 147 RC 1 - Possible Identification Theft Procedures

    • IRM 3.13.5.65.1 , UPC 147 RCs 0 and 1 Correspondence/Corrections

    • IRM 3.28.4, Identity Theft Returns for Submission Processing

    • Document 6209, Section 8, Unpostable Code - IMF

  3. See Exhibits 10.5.3-10 and 10.5.3-11 for more information about this identity theft indicator.

  4. SP will edit paper tax returns containing a Form 14039 with a Special Processing Code (SPC) 8. The SPC 8 systemically generates a TC 971 AC 522 indicating receipt of an identity theft claim. SP will issue Letter 5073 C to the taxpayer confirming receipt of the Form 14039. Refer to IRM 3.21.3-1, Attachment Guide, for additional information.

10.5.3.2.11  (01-16-2014)
IRS-Identified Identity Theft Affecting Tax Administration - TC 971 AC 506

  1. TC 971 AC 506 is applied to a taxpayer's account when the IRS identifies identity theft incidents that affect tax administration. Such incidents can result from any of the following:

    • phishing

    • refund schemes

    • verified false returns

    • mixed entity research

    • certain unpostable returns

    • an audit investigation before the victim becomes aware of identity theft

  2. Prior to marking the taxpayer's account with a TC 971 AC 506 the function MUST ensure all corrective actions have been taken which includes:

    1. Verifying and updating the taxpayer's address on ENMOD, as applicable.

      Note:

      Marking the account with AC 506 prior to correcting the victim's address may result in negative consequences for the victim. Letters and notices regarding the IP PIN may be directed to an incorrect address.

    2. Advising the taxpayer of actions taken.

    3. Issuing the taxpayer's correct refund.

    4. Adjusting the account to the taxpayer's figures.


    Refer to IRM 21.6.2.4.2. Multiple Individuals Using the Same TIN.

  3. TC 971 AC 506 is limited and reserved for use by the following functions:

    • Criminal Investigation (CI);

    • Accounts Management (AM);

    • Integrity & Verification Operations (IVO);

    • Submission Processing (SP);

    • Field and Campus Exam;

    • Field Collection;

    • Automated Underreporter (AUR);

    • Automated Collection System (ACS);

    • Compliance Services Collection Operation (CSCO); and

    • Return Integrity Correspondence Services (RICS).

    The TC 971 AC 506 indicator is visible on ENMOD and IMFOLE. For input instruction see IRM 10.5.3-11.

    Caution:

    The following BODS are NOT profiled for TC 971 AC 506: Appeals, TAS, LB&I and IT.

    Note:

    When TC 971 AC 506 is input on an account, IRS does not ask for or require identity theft supporting documentation.

  4. The function that inputs the TC 971 AC 506 will notify the taxpayer (victim), by letter, that someone may have attempted to use his or her SSN. This victim notification letter will include:

    • Information about identity theft prevention

    • Information about identity theft related resources

    • Information about the identity theft indicator placed on his or her account.

    Note:

    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    Exception:

    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  5. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    Any tax return that is identified through the filtering process as potentially fraudulent will become unpostable, i.e., removed from the posting process. This unpostable return is systemically routed to Submission Processing for screening to determine whether the return is legitimate.

  6. In some instances, it may be necessary to manually reverse TC 971 AC 506. If reversal (TC 972 AC 506) is indicated, see Exhibit 10.5.3-11 for a description of reasons for the reversal.

10.5.3.2.11.1  (01-16-2014)
Closing Cases Involving IRS-Identified Identity Theft Affecting Tax Administration - TC 971 AC 506

  1. To indicate resolution of an IRS-Identified Identity Theft Case involving tax administration, mark the victim's account using Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from ENMOD to input a TC 971 AC 506 reflecting an appropriate Tax Administration Source Code depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case along with the tax year of the identity theft incident. The AC 506 is applied to a taxpayer's account when all of the following occur:

    1. All corrective actions have been taken. This includes verifying and updating the taxpayer's address on ENMOD, as applicable (excludes back-end work, see IRM 10.5.3.2.8, Closing Identity Theft Issues). Refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.11 IRS-Identified Identity Theft Affecting Tax Administration - TC 971 AC 506.

      Caution:

      If you do not have a valid address for the taxpayer, use the Service Center address to prevent an IP PIN from going to incorrect taxpayer.

    2. The taxpayer's identity theft affects tax administration.

    3. Perform case closure analysis to ensure all identity theft related issues have been addressed and resolved. See IRM 10.5.3.2.9, Closing Identity Theft Issues.

  2. The input of the TC 506 will not, in every case, coincide with the closing of the control base. There may be additional back-end work to be completed before the control base can be closed. Do not wait until all the additional back-end work is completed before inputting the protective TC 971 AC 506 on the taxpayer's account. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.8, Closing Identity Theft Issues.
    The following rules must be adhered to:

    • The TC 506 cannot be input until the taxpayer is no longer harmed by identity theft impacting tax administration.

    • Verifying and updating the taxpayer's address MUST be done before inputting the TC 971 AC 506.

      Caution:

      The importance of updating the address prior to inputting the TC 971 AC 506 cannot be stressed enough. If the address is not updated appropriately, the victim notification letter will go to the wrong address. In addition, failure to follow the appropriate sequence could result in the Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN) being sent to the ID thief instead of the ID theft victim.

    • A case control must be maintained until all back-end work is completed.

    Reminder:

    The procedural guidance for your functional area must be followed as to when the TC 971 AC 506 should be input. Your procedural guidance, however, must adhere to the guidelines provided in this subsection.

  3. Input of a TC 971 AC 506 does not generate a systemic notification to the taxpayer. To notify the taxpayer of actions taken to resolve identity theft issues, the Letter 4310 C may be used.

  4. See IRM 10.5.3-10 and IRM 10.5.3-11 for additional guidance.

10.5.3.2.11.2  (01-16-2014)
Manually Reversing TC 971 AC 506

  1. In some instances, it may be necessary to manually reverse TC 971 AC 506. Reversal may be necessary because of any of the following reasons:

    1. TPRQ-The taxpayer requests reversal.

    2. IRSERR-There was a keying or internal error in the input of the TC 971 AC 506.

    3. FALSE-The original identity theft claim was fraudulent.

    4. IRSADM-The TC 971 AC 506 has an internally identified negative affect on the taxpayer.

    5. OTHER-There are other reasonable circumstances not listed above.

      Note:

      Be sure to select the correct code. If codes a-d above are not applicable, use OTHER.

  2. Actions needed prior to manually reversing an identity theft marker at the taxpayer’s request:

    1. If this is a telephonic request, be certain that you are speaking with the taxpayer. Inadequate authentication of the identity of a caller could result in an unauthorized disclosure of return or return information. Refer to IRM 21.1.3.2.3, Required Taxpayer Authentication and IRM 21.1.3.2.4, Additional Taxpayer Authentication.

    2. Ask probing questions to determine why the taxpayer is requesting indicator removal and document AMS or the case history if you do not have access to AMS with the taxpayer’s response. For example, can you provide the reason why you would like this protection removed from your account?

  3. Explain to the taxpayer the indicator will:
    Help prevent future identity theft incidents;
    Ensure any returns filed are reviewed for identity theft indications; and
    Include the issuance of an IP PIN for as long as the indicator remains active.

  4. If the taxpayer insists on removal of the identity theft indicator after you have explained the benefits, review the account to determine if the identity theft issue is open in another function. If there is an open identity theft case, refer the case to that function using your normal referral procedures. Do not take actions on identity theft cases being worked by another function. If there is no open IDRS control, review the Miscellaneous Field Code to determine what function applied the AC 506. Refer the case using your normal procedures to that function. The function that applied the AC 506 will determine if the 506 will be reversed.

    Note:

    When referring a case to another function for AC 506 removal be sure to inform the taxpayer that the case is being referred to another function using your normal procedures for case referral.

10.5.3.2.12  ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  1. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    Exception:

    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  2. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  3. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    1. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

      Note:

      ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡


      ≡ ≡ ≡

    2. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

      ≡ ≡ ≡
      ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
      ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
      ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

      ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
      ≡ ≡ ≡

  4. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

10.5.3.2.13  (01-16-2014)
Locking Decedent Accounts - TC 971 AC 524

  1. The TC 971 AC 524 is an identity theft indicator used to lock the account of deceased taxpayers. It prevents a deceased taxpayer's TIN (SSN or ITIN) from being used as the primary or secondary TIN on a current or subsequent year federal income tax return. Account locks can be applied both manually and systemically using internal or external information. However, input of the TC 971 AC 524 is limited and reserved for use by Privacy, Governmental Liaison and Disclosure (PGLD) Identity Protection Program (IP) and RICS Taxpayer Protection Program (RICS TPP).

  2. TC 971 AC 524 can be viewed on the taxpayer’s entity using command codes ENMOD or IMFOLE.

  3. The identification, development, and implementation of specific population categories for the TC 971 AC 524 will be phased in by PGLD with the goal of creating a comprehensive list of taxpayers who do not have a filing requirement. Account locks may be initiated either manually or systemically.
    Manually: A manual lock is placed on a deceased taxpayer's account when a date of death (DOD) is present on the tax module and the account is identified by CI or Integrity & Verification Operations (IVO) as fraudulent.
    Systemically: A systemic lock is placed on a deceased taxpayer's account when we process a final return with a DOD.

  4. Systemic Locking of Deceased Taxpayer accounts occurs when all of the following are true:

    • A date of death is present on the tax module; and

    • A personal representative has filed a final return; and

    • Computer Condition Code A, B or 9 is placed on the account as indicated in the table below:

    A final return is filed with CCC: Then a TC 971 AC 524 is applied to
    F The primary taxpayer
    9 The secondary taxpayer only
    A Both Taxpayers

    Note:

    Refer to IRM 3.11.3.10 Computer Condition Codes for Decedent Returns and IRM 3.13.5.143 Computer Condition Codes (CCCs)for additional information.

  5. Manual Locking occurs when individual accounts are identified by a business function and provided to PGLD or RICS for input using a systemic tool.

  6. Returns filed on decedent accounts containing an unreversed TC 971 AC 524 DECD, will be prevented from processing.
    Electronically filed returns

    If the taxpayer is And the source code is Then
    Primary DECD Taxpayer will receive a reject code IND 901
    Secondary DECD Taxpayer will receive a reject code IND 941


    Paper Filed Returns

    If the taxpayer is And the source code is Then
    Primary or Secondary DECD
    1. Return will unpost as UPC 147 RC 4

    2. Return will be auto- archived

    3. CP 01H We are Unable to Process Your Return – Identity Theft Lock is mailed to the taxpayer

10.5.3.2.14  (01-16-2014)
Manually Reversing TC 971 AC 524

  1. Input of a TC 972 AC 524 will reverse a TC 971 AC 524 and will “unlock” the account. Input of the TC 972 AC 524 is limited and reserved for:

    • Privacy, Governmental Liaison and Disclosure (PGLD) Identity Protection Program (IP)

    • RICS Taxpayer Protection Unit (RICS TPP)

    • Submission Processing Entity

  2. To unlock a decedent account, a taxpayer must provide information to support their request.

  3. If a taxpayer contacts IRS relating to a locked account and there is a Date of Death (DOD) on the account and an unreversed TC 971 AC 524 DECD is present, ALL of the following documentation MUST be provided by the taxpayer:

    1. A copy of the Letter SSA 2458 from the Social Security Administration showing the correction to the date of death;

    2. A photocopy of at least one of the following:

    • Passport or Driver's License

    • Social Security Card

    • Other valid US Federal or State Government issued identification;


    A copy of their tax return with an original signature(s);

    Exception:

    If the request is not related to a rejected return but is being made solely to perfect the date of death, the taxpayer does not need to provide a copy of a tax return.


    Instruct the taxpayer to send all of the above information to the same service center the taxpayer used to file his or her original tax return.

  4. If a taxpayer contacts IRS relating to a locked account and there is no longer a Date of Death (DOD) on the account and an unreversed TC 971 AC 524 DECD is present on the entity, refer the case to Submission Processing Entity (no taxpayer documentation is required).
    See IRM 3.13.5 for additional information.
    See IRM 10.5.3-17, TC 972 AC 524 – Reversal of TC 971 AC 524 for additional information

  5. Once a correction has been made removing the DOD, Entity will notify the PGLD IP Analyst to reverse the AC 524.

10.5.3.2.15  (01-16-2014)
Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN)

  1. In January 2011, the IRS initiated a pilot program to issue an Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN) to select taxpayers with an active identity theft indicator (TC 971 AC 501, TC 971 AC 504, and some TC 971 AC 506) on their account. The IP PIN is a single use identification number.

    Note:

    If a taxpayer receives an IP PIN and claims they do not have a filing requirement, inform the taxpayer that the IP PIN protects them from mis-use of their SSN for filing a tax return, even if they do not have a need to file a return.

  2. The Identity Protection PIN is used to validate a taxpayer's identity and for security purposes, a new IP PIN is issued each year in December. If a taxpayer loses or misplaces the IP PIN, the IRS may provide a replacement IP PIN. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.15.1, Lost, Misplaced or Non-Receipt of IP PIN.

    Note:

    The latest IP PIN issued to the taxpayer is the valid IP PIN for the processing year and any delinquent prior year returns.

  3. Electronic Filing - Taxpayers filing electronically will be prompted by their software to input their IP PIN. The input of the IP PIN varies with different software. When filing a joint return, either the primary or spouse or both must input their IP PIN if they were assigned one by IRS or elected to received one. If a taxpayer was issued an IP PIN and does not use the IP PIN, or the IP PIN input is incorrect, the e-filed return will reject.

    Note:

    For tax years prior to 2013, only the primary taxpayer needs to input their IP PIN if they received one.

    Caution:

    If a taxpayer states that they cannot locate where to input their IP PIN using their tax software, they should contact the help desk for the specific software that they are using. IRS cannot provide assistance on individual software.

  4. Filing on Paper - Taxpayers filing Individual Income Tax paper returns (Form 1040, 1040A, and 1040EZ), will place the IP PIN into the 6 boxes just to the right of the spouse’s occupation labeled “Identity Protection PIN”. Paper returns that require an IP PIN but are filed with a missing or incorrect IP PIN, will unpost for manual review to validate the taxpayer’s identity prior to acceptance.

  5. Tax year 2012 and 2013 Returns

    1. In mid December, the IRS issues a CP 01A notice providing the six digit IP PIN and filing instructions to select taxpayers meeting specific criteria.

    2. The CP 01A notice is issued systemically and cannot be reissued if not received by the taxpayer. CP 01A notices are not forwarded by the US Postal Service and are returned as undeliverable to the IRS. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.15.1, Lost, Misplaced or Non-Receipt of IP PIN.

    3. To determine if a taxpayer’s account was selected for an IP PIN, review CC IMFOLE for an IP PIN indicator: IMFOLE line 14 will display:
      "IP PIN:1" if an IP PIN was generated to the taxpayer
      "IP PIN:0" if no IP PIN was issued

      Note:

      Refer to IRM 2.3.51-13, Command Code IMFOL Output Display — Entity for additional information.

      Example:

      NYPTA: FMS CD: PDC-ID: ID THEFT 1:2 ID THEFT 2:0 IP PIN:1 VODV:0

    Caution:

    If IMFOLE reflects "IP PIN: 0" , an IP PIN was not issued to the taxpayer. Do not issue a replacement IP PIN.

    Reminder:

    Taxpayers selected for the IP PIN program will be sent a new IP PIN every year (prior to the start of the next tax season) for as long as the identity theft indicator remains active on their account.

  6. Tax Year 2013 returns only: In Tax Year 2013, IRS will provide an IP PIN to two select groups of taxpayers.

    1. Taxpayers who have an unreversed identity theft indicator on their account (TC 971 AC 501 AND some 504/506) will receive a CP01A in December containing their IP PIN just as they did for TY 2012.

    2. In early February, 2014 IRS will issue a CP 01F notice to selected taxpayers who may voluntarily apply for an IP PIN by using an online application on IRS.gov. There is no requirement for these taxpayers to be identity theft victims prior to participating in the voluntary IP PIN program.

      Note:

      If a taxpayer voluntarily receives an IP PIN by using the IRS.gov application, the IP PIN must be present and correct on the return. If the taxpayer does not apply for an IP PIN using the online application they may file their return normally without the IP PIN

  7. Tax Year 2011 Returns:For tax year 2011, taxpayers received their IP PIN using a Letter 4869 CS. The issuance of an IP PIN for TY 2011 can be verified by the posting of a TC 971 AC 522 with a source code of OTHER in December of 2011. The TC 971 AC 522 is visible on ENMOD and IMFOLE.

    Example:

    PGLD issued an IP PIN to the taxpayer in December of 2011 for use on the 2011 tax return. ENMOD reflects the following: TC 971 AC 522 PPDS OPIP OTHER.

10.5.3.2.15.1  (01-16-2014)
Lost, Misplaced or Non-Receipt of IP PIN

  1. A replacement IP PIN is a unique 6 digit number that is supplied to a taxpayer when they have been issued an IP PIN for the current tax year and that IP PIN has been lost, misplaced, or was never received.

  2. IP PIN Replacement Eligibility: Taxpayers who received an IP PIN can be identified using cc IMFOLE, which will display IP PIN:1 when an IP PIN was generated to the taxpayer.

    Note:

    If IMFOLE does not display IP PIN: 1, inform the taxpayer that there is no record of IRS issuing an IP PIN and to file their return without the IP PIN.

  3. Authorization to receive an IP PIN: A replacement IP PIN may only be issued to taxpayers and authorized representatives as defined in IRM 21.3.7.5, Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative and Form 8821, Taxpayer Information Authorization Overview.
    Third Party Designee: A third party designee is NOT an authorized POA and is not authorized to obtain a replacement IP PIN on behalf of a taxpayer.
    Deceased Taxpayers: If the taxpayer is deceased, and the spouse has filed a joint return for the previous tax year, the spouse may request the IP PIN for the purpose of filing a final joint return. See IRM 11.3.2.4.11, Deceased Individuals, for additional information on decedents.

    Caution:

    Inadequate authentication of the identity of a caller could result in an unauthorized disclosure of return or return information. Refer to IRM 21.1.3.2.3, Required Taxpayer Authentication and IRM 21.1.3.2.4, Additional Taxpayer Authentication, prior to providing a replacement IP PIN.


    Authorized POA: An authorized POA may only request a replacement IP PIN for one taxpayer per call. The POA must be active and applicable for the tax year for which the IP PIN is related. See IRM 21.1.3.3, Third Party (POA/TIA/F706) Authentication, for further clarification of Form 2848

  4. Issuance of the Replacement IP PIN: Before issuing a replacement IP PIN, notify the taxpayer that they may retrieve their original IP PIN by using the online application at www.irs.gov/getanippin.

    Caution:

    The taxpayer will be required to have an E-mail address in order to use the online application. In situations where 2012 tax return was affected by identity theft in 2013, the online authentication program may not be available due to potential account validation issues. Csr will compare the address indicated on the Return Transaction File (RTF) with the taxpayer’s address. If the addresses are NOT the same, provide the taxpayer a replacement IP PIN shown in the table below.

    If the taxpayer is unwilling or unable to obtain their original IP PIN using the on-line application, use the table below to provide the taxpayer a replacement IP PIN. Remind the taxpayer that using a replacement IP PIN means the processing of their return may be delayed because IRS will have to manually review their return to validate their identity prior to issuing any refund that might be due them. The Replacement IP PIN Table below is valid for issuing the Replacement IP PIN beginning January 1, 2014 (applies to tax years 2013, 2012, and 2011, if IP PINs were issued for these years).

    Note:

    The replacement IP PIN should only be used if the original IP PIN is not obtainable.

    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡

    Caution:

    Replacement IP PINs are time sensitive for e-file purposes. The IP PIN number is based on when the replacement request was made, and each has a set expiration date. Failure to e-file a return using the replacement IP PIN by the expiration date will cause e-filed returns to reject. When this occurs, taxpayer will need to obtain another IP PIN in order to e-file their returns.

  5. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "


    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  6. Use of the Replacement PINs: The replacement IP PIN should be used in the same manner as the original IP PIN.

  7. If a taxpayer receives a replacement IP PIN, but locates their original IP PIN before filing their return, they should use the original IP PIN.

    Caution:

    Once an e-filed return is accepted by IRS, the replacement IP PIN cannot be changed.

10.5.3.2.16  ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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  1. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  2. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    Caution:

    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

10.5.3.2.17  (01-16-2014)
IRS Data Loss Incidents - TC 971 AC 505

  1. Input of TC 971 AC 505 is limited and reserved for use by PGLD employees. However, this indicator will be visible and available for reference on the individual’s account. See Exhibits 10.5.3-8 and 10.5.3-9 for more information about this indicator.

    Note:

    When a TC 971 AC 505 is input on an account, PGLD does not ask for or require identity theft supporting documentation, as identity theft may not have occurred as of the date of the input of this action code.

  2. TC 971 AC 505 is applied to a taxpayer’s account when all of the following occur:

    1. A taxpayer’s PII was lost, breached, disclosed, or stolen.

    2. The incident risk assessment results in a high risk of harm to the potentially impacted taxpayer.

    3. The IRS notifies the taxpayer of this data loss incident.

    Example:

    Taxpayer case files containing PII were lost while being shipped from one location to another. Since the incident risk assessment resulted in a high risk of harm, the Incident Management Program will send notification letters to the potentially impacted taxpayers.

  3. The taxpayer will receive a data loss notification Letter 4281 C, (IM Breach Notification Letter), from the IRS advising him/her that information controlled by the IRS may have been disclosed to unauthorized individuals. The notification letter contains information related to identity protection and free credit monitoring products arranged for the taxpayer by the IRS. Refer to IRM 21.9.2.7.1,Notification 4281C Letter to Impacted Individuals for additional information.

    Note:

    The taxpayer must call the credit-monitoring agency in order to sign up for the services. .

  4. PGLD inputs TC 971 AC 505 on an account even when another identity theft indicator code (AC 501, 504, or 506) is present on the account. In some instances, it may be necessary for PGLD personnel to manually reverse the TC 971 AC 505 with a TC 972 AC 505.

  5. The AC 505 is used to track breach incidents. For information on the Incident Management Program see IRM 10.5.4.4, Responding: The Incident Management Breach Process, IRM 10.5.4, Incident Management Program. For information on the IRS data loss process, see that same IRM section, or view the Incident Management Breach Process flow chart.

10.5.3.2.18  (01-16-2014)
IMF TC 971 AC 504

  1. In FY 2014, the TC 971 AC 504 was expanded for other than non-tax related identity theft allegations. ,. And to mark taxpayer accounts when certain conditions apply, refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.18.2, TC 971 AC 504 - Miscellaneous Field Code SPCL1, SPCL2, RPM, and EAFAIL.

  2. The IPSU will continue to use TC 971 AC 504 with Miscellaneous Field Codes ACCT, BOTH, INCOME or NKI for taxpayer allegations of identity theft that do not affect tax administration, refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.18.1, TC 971 AC 504 with Miscellaneous Field Codes ACCT, BOTH, INCOME or NKI.

  3. Others BOD/Functions will use TC 971 AC 504 with Miscellaneous Field Codes SPCL1, SPCL2, RPM, and EAFAILto mark taxpayer accounts when certain conditions apply, refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.18.2, TC 971 AC 504 - Miscellaneous Field Code SPCL1, SPCL2, RPM, and EAFAIL.

10.5.3.2.18.1  (01-16-2014)
TC 971 AC 504 with Miscellaneous Field Codes ACCT, BOTH, INCOME or NKI

  1. Input of TC 971 AC 504 with Miscellaneous Field Codes ACCT, BOTH, INCOME or NKI are reserved for use by IPSU employees.

  2. IPSU applies TC 971 AC 504 with Miscellaneous Field Codes ACCT, BOTH, INCOME or NKI when the taxpayer contacts the IRS claiming that he or she is a victim of identity theft, and there is no known affect to tax administration.

    Example:

    A taxpayer lost his or her wallet on the subway and is concerned the loss may lead to identity theft in the future, or has noticed recent questionable credit card activity on one or more accounts.

  3. The IPSU is comprised of two key functions:

    1. IPSU, 1-800-908-4490 - a unit established specifically to receive identity theft-related calls. By contacting this unit, the taxpayer will be able to access automated messages as well as customer service representatives (CSRs). This toll-free number enables individuals who have experienced identity theft, but do not have a current tax-related issue, to report the incident to the IRS.

    2. Specialized identity theft caseworkers - employees who will process standard identity theft documentation and input the TC 971 AC 504 incident tracking indicator. Caseworkers will obtain identity theft supporting documentation as referenced in IRM 10.5.3.2.6, Identity Theft Supporting Documentation.

    Note:

    See IRM 21.9.2.2, Identity Theft-Expanded Procedures, for additional information regarding the duties and responsibilities of the IPSU.

  4. If IRS employees are contacted by a taxpayer indicating a non-tax related identity theft, see IRM 21.9.2.3, Identity Theft - Telephone Overview and IRM 21.9.2.4, Identity Theft - Paper Overview. .

    Exception:

    Field Assistance employees should refer to their IRM 21.3.4.30.4, Non-Tax Related Identity Theft Issues for procedures on how to assist taxpayers who walk into a Field Assistance Office with a non-tax related identity theft issue.

10.5.3.2.18.2  ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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  1. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    Note:

    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  2. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  3. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  4. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  5. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

10.5.3.2.18.3  (01-16-2014)
Manually Reversing TC 971 AC 504

  1. In some instances, it may be necessary to manually reverse TC 971 AC 504. If reversal is indicated (TC 972 AC 504), see Exhibit 10.5.3-7 for a description of reasons for the reversal.

  2. Taxpayer requests: In situations where the taxpayer is requesting you reverse the TC 971 AC 504, the taxpayer MUST pass high risk disclosure prior to your making any account adjustments. Refer to IRM 21.1.3.2.3, Required Taxpayer Authentication and IRM 21.1.3.2.4, Additional Taxpayer Authentication for additional information.

  3. The taxpayer must provide a reasonable explanation as to why the TC 971 AC 504 marker should be removed.

    Example:

    The taxpayer states identity theft did not occur. The taxpayer thought a package containing PII was stolen, but the package was returned to the taxpayer in its original sealed condition.

    Note:

    Reversals of the AC 504 with any of the Miscellaneous codes in the table below is not limited to IPSU and can be done by any employee once the request has been validated.

    If AND THEN
    The taxpayer passes high risk disclosure The Miscellaneous Field on the TC 971 AC 504 contains any of the following:
    • ACCT

    • BOTH

    • EMPLOYER

    • NKI

    Reverse the TC 971 AC 504 as directed in IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-7, TC 972 AC 504 — Reversal of TC 971 AC 504 using TPRQ in the Miscellaneous field
  4. If you determine the TC 971 AC 504 should be reversed for other than a taxpayer request, refer to the table in IRM 10.5.3-7 for a list of valid Miscellaneous Field Codes.

  5. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    Note:

    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

10.5.3.2.19  ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  1. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    1. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    2. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

      Note:

      ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

      Caution:

      ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  2. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    Example:

    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    Note:

    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  3. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  4. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

10.5.3.2.19.1  ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  1. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    Note:

    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  2. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    • ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

      Reminder:

      ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  3. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  4. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  5. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ " ≡ ≡

10.5.3.3  (01-16-2014)
BMF Identity Theft Procedures

  1. This subsection of IRM 10.5.3 is specific to resolving Business Masterfile (BMF) accounts. BMF Identity Theft can affect an active (an operating business entity) or an inactive business (a closed business entity). Additionally, BMF Identity Theft can involve the use of an individual's PII to obtain an EIN which is used to file false BMF tax returns and income documents.

  2. BMF accounts includes the following entity types: corporation, partnership, estate, trust, exempt organization, or government entity.

10.5.3.3.1  (01-16-2014)
Definition of Business Identity Theft

  1. BMF ID theft is defined as creating, using, or attempting to use business’ identifying information without authority to obtain tax benefits:

    Example:

    An identity thief files a business tax return (Form 1120, Form 720, etc.), using the Employer Identification Number (EIN) of an active or inactive business without the permission or knowledge of the EIN’s owner, to obtain a fraudulent refund.

    Example:

    An identity thief, using the Employer Identification Number (EIN) of an active or inactive business without the permission or knowledge of the EIN’s owner, files bogus Forms 941 and/or W-2s to support bogus Form(s) 1040 claiming a fraudulent refund.

    Example:

    An identity thief obtains an EIN, using the name and Social Security Number of another individual as the responsible party (fraudulently obtained EIN), without their approval or knowledge, to file fraudulent tax returns (Form 941, Form 1120, Form 1041, etc.), avoid paying taxes, obtain a refund, or further perpetuate individual identity theft or refund fraud.

10.5.3.3.2  (01-16-2014)
Identity Protection Program Servicewide Identity Theft Guidance - BMF

  1. Prior to validating BMF identity theft, extensive research MUST be performed to support that determination. BMF identity theft cases are extremely complex in nature and may require research and analysis of both business and individual accounts. Cases frequently involve multiple BOD/Functions. Refer to 10.5.3.3.3 Preliminary BMF Research, for additional information.

  2. Generally, IMF identity theft victims contact IRS as they are waiting for their income tax refunds. BMF taxpayers are often not aware their identities have been compromised until a notice or bill is received from the IRS. Taxpayers may contact IRS when they receive an unexpected notice regarding an inactive EIN or a levy notice related to an EIN that they have no knowledge about.

  3. In some instances, taxpayers must provide documentation to establish that they are identity theft victims. Refer to IRM 10.3.3.6 Taxpayer Supporting Documentation - Form 14039-B. The Form 14039-B is not available on-line to taxpayers. If a Form 10439-B is needed to validate a claim of identity theft, you must send the Form 14039-B to the taxpayer.

  4. Identity theft often leaves its victims feeling helpless and distraught. Service employees should exercise empathy in dealing with victims.

  5. Identity theft cases will be prioritized and worked expeditiously and within established time frames.

  6. Identity theft can affect tax administration in several ways, for example (the following list is NOT all inclusive):

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10.5.3.3.3  (01-16-2014)
Preliminary BMF Research

  1. Preliminary Research must be performed prior to reaching a determination of identity theft. You will need to research all related IMF and BMF accounts prior to reaching a determination of identity theft. When the Service establishes an EIN, BMFOLE will reflect an XREF TIN/ITIN or SSN for the individual or entity requesting the EIN assignment. Preliminary research will include reviewing all cross-reference TINs, ITINs, and SSNs.

  2. You will need to complete extensive research prior to making a determination of identity theft.
    Research IDRS using Command Codes (CC) BMFOL, IRPTR, BRTVU, NAMEE, NAMEI, TXMOD, IMFOL, TRDBV, PMFOL, FINDE, and RTVUE.
    Research Systems such as AMS/CIS, EUP, RGS, and ACCURINT.

    Caution:

    Consult your functional IRM for additional research requirements when resolving identity theft cases.

  3. You will need to perform this research to rule out a mixed entity or successor corporation, and to locate any possible cross-reference TIN. Refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-24, BMF Identity Theft Research Requirement to assist you with case building.
    Never Assume Identity Theft

    1. Research the EIN (both the Entity and TXMOD/BMFOL) and look for any cross reference SSN, business relationships. Research using CC NAME, FINDE for a business with a similar name at a different address, etc. to determine if there was a mixed entity or successor corporation.

    2. Internet Research should include Google Maps to identify the business location and Google for the business entity.

    3. Research any payments to assist in determining if the return in question was a result of a mixed entity situation. Generally, identity thieves do not make payments.

    4. Review the returns via on-line resources prior to ordering the documents. Conduct research of all returns involved using CC TRDBV or MeF. If unable to review the needed documents, requesting the document may be necessary. Request all returns for the year(s) involved (including returns filed at other sites AND electronic filed returns). When applicable, utilize SCFTR Service Center Control File (SCCF) as a part of your research.

    5. If the tax period involved is the result of an audit, request the exam administration file.

    6. Search returns, schedules, and forms for a different TIN, address, or name.

    7. Compare all documents and account information for:
      Name
      EIN
      Address
      Type of Business
      Signatures (when available)
      Similar tax data
      Date Entity Established
      Filing requirements
      Filing history
      Payment history
      Tax preparer information
      Type of return filed (business with 1120S filing requirement now filing Form 1120 without explanation)

    8. Every business entity required to file a federal tax return must have, or be assigned an EIN. Refer to IRM 21.7.13.2.1, When an EIN is Required for additional information.

    9. Carefully review any documentation the taxpayer has provided in support of their claim.

    10. Review SSNs associated with the business entity for indication of identity theft or fraud.

    11. Review the research detailed in IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-24, BMF Identity Theft Research Requirement to ensure you have completed all required research.

  4. Upon receipt/assignment of an identity theft case, an initial cursory review must be performed to identify all taxpayer issues. Identifying issues at the beginning of the case provides a higher level of customer service and reduces the potential for unresolved problems.

    Reminder:

    If there is an unpaid balance due, suspend collection and notice activity until the identity theft issue is resolved. Refer to functional IRMs for additional guidance.

10.5.3.3.4  (01-16-2014)
Tracking And Reporting Identity Theft cases - BMF

  1. Identity theft cases can be found in virtually any BOD/Function inventory.

  2. Once research has been completed to rule out a potential mixed entity situation, you will need to mark the TXMOD of the compromised EIN with an Identity Theft Indicator.

  3. PGLD established BMF identity theft indicators for use in all BMF ID theft cases. The new codes will become available on January 2, 2014.

10.5.3.3.4.1  (01-16-2014)
BMF Identity Theft Tracking Indicators

  1. In situations where the taxpayer makes an allegation of identity theft or when the IRS initially suspects that identity theft may have occurred, the IRS function will apply an identity theft indicator. The identity theft tracking indicator alerts others that a claim of identity theft has been reported and provides the Service with a method to quantify the scope of BMF Identity Theft. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.3.4.1, BMF Identity theft Tracking Indicators for additional information.

    Caution:

    BMF identity theft indicators (unlike some of those used on IMF accounts) do NOT systemically generate any systemic notices to the taxpayer. All taxpayer notifications are manual.

  2. Each indicator is input as a Transaction Code (TC) 971 with Action Code (AC) 522 using command code REQ77 on the TXMOD of the account affected by identity theft. Use IDRS CC TXMODA or BMFOLT to view the posted transactions.

  3. BMF Identity theft tracking indicators, unlike those used for IMF, are applied to the MFT and Tax Period affected by identity theft. PGLD established three distinctive new Tax Administration Source Codes for BMF accounts.

    • Initial Allegation or Suspicion of Identity Theft, TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM with the Tax Administration Source Code designated for your function. Refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-18, BMF Acronyms & Definitions and IRM Exhibit 10.5.3 -19, BMF ID Theft Indicators -TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM - Initial Allegation or Suspicion of BMF Identity Theft, for information for complete input directions.

    • Taxpayer Provided Documentation Received, TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC with the Tax Administration Source Code designated for your function. Refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-19, and IRM Exhibit 10.5.3 -20, BMF ID Theft Indicators -TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC - BMF Documents Accepted.

      Note:

      If documentation was not provided by the taxpayer, do not use TC 971 AC 522 with Tax Administration Source Code IDTDOC.

    • BMF Indicator Case Resolved, TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT with the Tax Administration Source Code designated for your function. Refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-18, BMF Acronyms & Definitions and IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-21, BMF Indicator - TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT - Closed and Confirmed as BMF ID Theft, for complete input directions.

      Note:

      TC 971 AC 522 with Tax Administration Source Code CLSIDT is applied only when all ID theft issues are fully resolved. Do not input if closing control and transferring case to another area.

  4. If after the account has been marked with a BMF Identity Theft Indicator, the employee determines identity theft did not occur, the BMF ID theft tracking indicator will be reversed by the employee assigned. This removes the case from identity theft inventory. See IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-22, Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators - TC 972 AC 522 for additional information. All other non-identity theft issues will be resolved using normal procedures.

10.5.3.3.5  (01-16-2014)
Allegation or Suspicion of BMF Identity Theft - TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM

  1. Prior to marking a taxpayer's account with a BMF identity theft indicator, all required preliminary research must be completed to rule out a possible mixed entity. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.3.3, Preliminary BMF Research for additional information.

  2. Once a possible mixed entity has been ruled out, place an identity theft indicator on the MFT and tax year affected to ensure the account is moved into the appropriate research, analysis, and treatment stream. The identity theft indicator is input whether the taxpayer asserts BMF identity theft or the IRS suspects BMF identity theft may have occurred.

  3. To mark the taxpayer's account suspected of involving BMF identity theft, use Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from TXMOD to input a TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM with the Tax Administration Code designated for your function. Refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-18, BMF Acronyms & Definitions.
    The Secondary Date field will reflect the IRS received date of the taxpayer's inquiry. If the identity theft issue was internally identified, use the date you recognized the taxpayer was a victim of identity theft.
    The MISC> field will reflect your BOD and Program name as indicated in IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-18, BMF Acronyms & Definitions and IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-19, BMF ID Theft Indicators -TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM - Initial Allegation or Suspicion of BMF Identity Theft.

    Caution:

    If the account is already flagged with a TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM, do not input a second code for the same MFT and Tax Year even if the initial TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM reflects another BOD/Program.

  4. Taxpayer identified BMF identity theft claims will be controlled by the receiving function using the date of taxpayer's inquiry. Internally identified BMF identity theft accounts will be controlled by the initiating function using date when preliminary research was completed. Refer to your functional IRM for information regarding account controls.

    Note:

    Because of the high probability of mixed entity, employees MUST perform research to rule out a mixed entity or other non-identity theft related situation. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.3.3, Preliminary BMF Research, for additional information.

    IF And Then
    You are unable to determine if BMF ID theft occurred And you have performed all preliminary research as required in IRM 10.5.3.3.3, BMF Preliminary Research
    • Control and assign the case

    • Send the taxpayer a Form 14039-B and request a response in 30 days

    • Suspend any collection activity

    • Input TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM on the affected tax year and MFT

    • Suspend the case for 45 days. If the taxpayer does not respond, reverse the ID theft marker with a TC 972 AC 522, close the case, release collection holds and work any remaining issues using your normal procedures

    Note:

    Provide an additional 15 days for responses from entities with foreign addresses.

  5. If the employee later determines identity theft did not occur, the BMF ID theft tracking indicator will be reversed by the employee assigned. This removes the case from identity theft inventory. All other non-identity theft issues will be resolved using normal procedures. See IRM Exhibit 10.5.3.5-22, BMF Identity Theft Indicator - Reversal of Initial Claim, for additional information.

10.5.3.3.5.1  (01-16-2014)
Controlling BMF Identity Theft Cases

  1. All BMF identity theft cases MUST be controlled. The case controls will remain in effect until all issues are resolved and the taxpayer is notified of actions taken.

    Note:

    Refer to guidance in your function's IRM to determine your function's methods used to track, control, and monitor BMF identity theft cases.

  2. The function receiving the taxpayer claim or making the initial discovery of BMF identity theft will retain control of the case from receipt to closure. All required account actions will be coordinated through the function with the open control.

  3. Accounts affected by BMF identity theft are often complex and cross functional lines. When this occurs, the controlling function will refer that portion of the case needing action by another function. The Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral was developed for that purpose but its use is not mandatory.. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.3.7.1, Referral for Out of Scope Issues for additional information. The originating function will put their IDRS control into "B" status to designate the case as suspended pending the referral completion.

  4. The controlling function is responsible for:

    • Issuing acknowledgment, interim, and closing letters

    • Suspending collection activity, as appropriate

    • Securing Form 14039-B, as appropriate

    • Ensuring all issues are resolved and adjustments are posted prior to case closure. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.3.13, Closing BMF Identity Theft Issues - TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT.

    Note:

    The list above is not all inclusive

10.5.3.3.6  (01-16-2014)
Taxpayer Supporting Documentation - Form 14039-B

  1. Request supporting documentation from the taxpayer only when you cannot make the identity theft determination based solely on internal research. Supporting documentation consists of the following three items: Evidence of Identity Theft, Authentication of Identity, and Evidence of Business Operation.

  2. Form 14039-B , IRS BMF Identity Theft Affidavit is an internal form sent to the taxpayer by the service to gather taxpayer information vital to making an identity theft determination.

    Reminder:

    Form 14039-B is sent to a taxpayer ONLY in situations where identity theft cannot be validated using internal research.

    1. Evidence of Identity Theft - a copy of a police report or Form 14039-B , Business Identity Theft Affidavit. Form 14039–B is available electronically only to IRS employees.

      Note:

      The Form 14039-B must be signed and notarized to be considered complete.

    2. Authentication of Identity - a copy of a valid U.S. federal or state government issued form of identification (examples include a driver’s license, state identification card, social security card, or passport).

    3. Evidence of Business Operation - a copy of a utility bill, invoice, mortgage/rent receipt or other documentation.

      Note:

      If the claimant did not request an EIN and has no knowledge of the EIN, they will not need to provide evidence of business operations.

      Note:

      The Business Identity Theft Affidavit, Form 14039-B , is accepted from taxpayers in support of an allegation of identity theft. This form collects only the information necessary for taxpayers to attest to the IRS that they have experienced BMF identity theft. IRS only accepts the IRS affidavit or a police report for substantiation purposes.

  3. If the taxpayer does not provide supporting documentation within the requested time period and you cannot make a determination regarding BMF ID theft, you will close the identity theft issue by reversing the BMF Identity Theft Indicator and proceed with normal case resolution assuming the taxpayer is not an identity theft victim.

    Reminder:

    If the taxpayer does not respond to the request for information and you are closing the identity theft issue, you MUST reverse all BMF Identity Theft Indicators.

  4. Supporting documentation can be accepted from the taxpayer or someone who has power of attorney for the taxpayer (e.g., Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative emphasis).

  5. Documents must be secured and handled in the same manner as other sensitive taxpayer information. The documents must be retained and filed with the resolved case.

  6. The business unit function that is assigned the identity theft case (relevant open control) or issued the notice/letter relating to the identity theft (CP 504 Balance Due Notice, Audit Notice, etc.) is responsible for collecting supporting documentation in a timely, accurate, and secure manner.

  7. After the receipt of the taxpayer's documentation, you will need to research the case to verify the taxpayer's claim. If it is later determined that identity theft did not occur, reverse the TC 971 AC 522 (see IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-22 Reversing BMF Indicators - TC 972 AC 522).

  8. Within 30 days of receipt of taxpayer identity theft supporting documents, verify the documentation provided is complete and legible and notify the taxpayer the documents were received. refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-25, Suggested Language When Acknowledging Receipt of Form 14039-B for additional information.

    Caution:

    Receipt of documentation from the taxpayer does not validate an identity theft claim. Proper research MUST be performed prior to reaching an identity theft determination.

  9. The Form 14039-B is not available to the general public. If you have completed preliminary research and ruled out mixed entity but are unable to determine if BMF identity theft occurred, print and mail Form 14039-B to the taxpayer.

    If the taxpayer alleges identity theft And Then request the taxpayer complete form 14039-B and provide the following
    Claims to have no knowledge of applying for an EIN Research indicates this is not a mixed entity situation but you are unable to determine if BMF identity theft occurred
    A clear copy of one of the following documents:
    • Valid state issued driver's license

    • Valid passport

    • Other valid U.S. Federal or State government issued identification (For example - Visa)

    Has an active or inactive sole proprietorship Research indicates this is not a mixed entity situation or successor corporation issue but you are unable to determine if BMF identity theft occurred
    A clear copy of one of the following documents:
    • Valid state issued driver's license

    • Valid passport

    • Other valid U.S. Federal or State government issued identification (For example - Visa)


    AND if the taxpayer is an active sole proprietorship, the taxpayer must provide a clear copy of one of the following documents:
    • Utility bill

    • Mortgage/Rent Statement

    • Other documentation to support business operations

    Has an active or inactive Corporation, Partnership LLC, Exempt Organization, or Trust Research indicates this is not a mixed entity situation or successor corporation issue but you are unable to determine if BMF identity theft occurred Send one document from the list below and a Copy of CP 575 Notice of EIN Assignment, if the claimant has a copy available.
    • Articles of incorporation

    • A written statement by the officer or director on corporate letterhead stationery, to the effect that he/she has authority to legally bind the corporation

    • Articles of organization

    • Trust or estate document

10.5.3.3.6.1  (01-16-2014)
Complete and Legible Documents

  1. When a taxpayer submits Form 14039-B, the Form 14039-B and associated document(s) must be reviewed to determine if they are legible and complete.

    Note:

    A Form 14039-B that is not signed or notarized is considered incomplete.

  2. A document is considered legible when the copies provided are clear and easily read. Once you have determined the documentation provided is complete and legible, initiate taxpayer contact to notify the taxpayer the information requested has been received.

    Caution:

    Acknowledgement of receipt of the Form 14039-B is required within 30 days of receipt unless the document is received face to face.

  3. When the documentation is NOT legible/complete:

    Note:

    If the documentation provided is not complete or legible but you can make a determination through the use of internal research, resolve the identity theft issue. Once all issues are resolved, input of the TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT. Refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3.3-21 BMF ID Theft Indicators - TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT - Closed and Confirmed as BMF ID Theft, for additional information.

    IF And THEN
    You have completed preliminary research and suspect the taxpayer is a victim of BMF identity theft and:
    • There is no identity theft indicator on TXMOD or BMFOLT, Or

    • the indicators have been reversed

    No other relevant controls in another function
    1. Input TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM indicating an initial allegation of identity theft has been made by the taxpayer. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.3.5, Allegation or Suspicion of BMF Identity Theft - TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM.

    2. You will suspend the case and request the taxpayer provide legible and complete documentation within 30 days and place the case in suspense for 45 days.

    3. If you do not receive a taxpayer response within 45 days from the date of request, close identity theft issue and resolve/address remaining issues as appropriate.

    Note:

    Provide an additional 15 days for responses from entities with foreign addresses.

    There is already a TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM identity theft indicator on TXMOD or BMFOLT The is an IDRS control in another function with an earlier IRS received date
    1. Forward the taxpayer documents to the function with the open control.

    2. The employee in the function with the open control will suspend the case and request the taxpayer provide legible and complete documentation within 30 days and place the case in suspend for 45 days.

    3. If the receiving function does not secure a taxpayer response within 45 days, close identity theft issue and resolve/address remaining issues as appropriate

    Note:

    Provide an additional 15 days for responses from entities with foreign addresses.

    Note:

    If only one or two digits or letters are not clear on the taxpayer provided documents, calling the taxpayer to verify information is acceptable.

  4. Once documents have been verified as complete and legible, you will mark the account with a TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC and the Tax Administration Code designated for your BOD/Program. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.3.6.2, Marking Taxpayer Accounts When Accepting Identity Theft Supporting Documentation TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC for additional information.

10.5.3.3.6.2  (01-16-2014)
Marking Taxpayer Accounts When Accepting Identity Theft Supporting Documentation TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC

  1. After verifying the Form 14039-B and associated taxpayer documents are complete and legible, you will need to mark the taxpayer's account to reflect IRS receipt.

  2. From TXMOD, use Command Code (CC) REQ77 to input a TC 971 AC 522.
    The Secondary Date: field will reflect the IRS received date of the taxpayer's documents
    The MISC>: field will be input to reflect your BOD and Program. Refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-18 BMF Acronyms and Definitions and to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-20 , BMF ID Theft Indicators - TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC - BMF ID Theft Documents Accepted, for additional information.

10.5.3.3.6.3  (01-16-2014)
Reversing Pending Identity Theft Claims - TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY or NOIDT

  1. There may be situations when it is necessary to reverse a pending identity theft claim.

    Example:

    Additional research reveals no identity theft occurred.

  2. A pending identity theft claim is an account with an unreversed TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM and no subsequent TC 971 AC 522 CLSDT (indicating a closed BMF identity theft issue).

  3. NORPLY: In situations where the taxpayer alleges ID theft but has not provided the supporting documentation and internal research can not substantiate the claim, mark the account using Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from TXMODA to input a TC 972 AC 522 reflecting a Tax Administration Source Code NORPLY. Refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-22, for additional information.

  4. NOIDT: If you determine identity theft is NOT a factor in the case, use identity theft reversal code NOIDT to reverse the identity theft indicator. Refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-22 Reversing BMF ID Theft Indicators- TC 971 AC 522 , for additional information.

10.5.3.3.7  (01-16-2014)
BMF Identity Theft Liaisons

  1. BMF ID theft liaisons play an important role in resolving complex cases that cross functional lines.

  2. BMF ID Theft liaisons act as their respective BOD/Function's key point of contact for BMF ID theft issues.

  3. The BMF ID theft liaisons will:

    • Serve as the contact point for their BOD/Function on matters outside the scope of the referring functions

    • Review BMF ID theft referrals to and from their employees to ensure all required research has been completed and documented on either the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral or other approved referral process. If the liaison determines additional research or documentation is required, the BMF ID Theft liaison will return the referral to the originator within 3 workdays of receipt

    • Acknowledge receipt of the referral within 3 business days and assign to the appropriate function for resolution

    • Serve as the first contact point for their respective function when functions cannot agree about case assignment or resolution.

  4. The BMF ID Theft Liaison list is available on SERP under the IRM Supplements tab on the Identity Theft Page for BMF.

10.5.3.3.7.1  (01-16-2014)
Referral of Out of Scope Issues

  1. BMF Identity Theft cases can be located in any IRS function. Due to the complex nature of these cases, it is highly likely that a single case will cross functional lines and require the technical skill and systems access of another function. In these situations, a referral to that function will be required. The originating function will retain control of the case throughout the referral process.

  2. PGLD developed Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral to assist employees in capturing required data when a referral to another function is needed. While Form 14566 is not mandatory, use of the form will facilitate case processing.

  3. When a referral is required, the originating function will complete the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral or use an alternative method that captures required information and send it to the designated Identity Theft Liaison for processing via secure E-mail providing a 30 day completion time frame. Refer to IRM Exhibit 21.5.3-23 BMF Identity Theft Referral. The BMF Identity Theft referral can be done via secure E-mail or by fax to the appropriate BMF ID theft liaison.

    Note:

    If you are not using Form 14566 to make the referral, ensure you include all of the following information on your referral:

    • BMF ID Theft Liaison Information

    • Business information; business name, address, and EIN

    • Taxpayer information; taxpayer name, address, SSN

    • Tax returns and tax periods affected by identity theft

    • Detailed list of completed research

    • Detailed explanation of requested actions

    • Your contact information; name, telephone number, and fax number

  4. The BMF Identity Theft Liaison will acknowledge receipt of the referral within 3 business days.

  5. The receiving functional employee will take requested actions and return the BMF Identity Theft Referral via secure E-mail to the originator within 30 days of receipt.

    Note:

    If the originating and receiving functions disagree over the requested action or the timeframe for completion, they will elevate to their BMF ID Theft Liaison. If the Liaisons are unable to work through their differences, the liaison will elevate through their management chains for resolution.

  6. Once all requested actions have been taken, the functional employee will return the BMF Identity Theft Referral via secure E-mail or by fax to the originator and the BMF ID Theft liaison. The functional employee will document all of the actions taken on the BMF Identity Theft Referral Form.

10.5.3.3.8  (01-16-2014)
BMF ID Theft Referrals and Fictitious EINS

  1. A fictitious EIN is an EIN that was established for the sole purpose of defrauding the government through the filing of false refund returns or income documents.

  2. You will need to perform all research detailed in IRM 10.5.3.3.3, Preliminary Research and IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-24, BMF Identity Theft Research Requirements to assist you in determining the validity of the EIN.

    Note:

    Research includes contacting the cross-reference SSN on ENMOD/BMFOLE to determine if that individual has any knowledge of the EIN cross-referencing their SSN.

  3. Research IRPTRI to determine if the BMF entity filed Forms W-2. It will be also necessary to research the IMF accounts if Forms W-2 were filed to determine if:

    • the recipients of the Forms W-2 filed tax returns reporting that income?

    • there is any evidence of identity theft on the accounts of the W-2 recipients?

    This information is necessary to determine if a referral is needed to be made for further research of the IMF filings and actions taken on the IMF accounts.

    Note:

    Include this information on the referral.

  4. If you identify potential IMF implications, you must notify CI and the Entity Fabrication (EF)Team in RICs. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.3.9, Referrals to Return Integrity and Correspondence Services (RICs) and IRM 10.5.3.3.10, Referrals to Criminal Investigation (CI) for additional information on the types of issues that can be referred to these functions.

    1. Document all of your findings on the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral.

    2. Send the completed referral form to your BMF Identity Theft liaison for referral to the Entity Fabrication (EF)Team in RICS per IRM 10.5.3.3.9, Referrals to Return Integrity and Correspondence Services (RICS). Be certain to include the referral form with all appropriate research completed.

    3. Send the completed referral form to your BMF Identity Theft liaison for referral to CI per IRM 10.5.3.3.10, Referrals to Criminal Investigation (CI). Be certain to include the referral form with all appropriate research completed.

    4. Send the completed referral form to your BMF Identity Theft liaison for referral to Submission Processing Entity requesting input of TC 020 to shut down the EIN. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.3.12., Referrals to Submission Processing - Entity Requests to Close an EIN Deemed Fictitious. Be certain to include the referral form with all appropriate research completed.

      Caution:

      Do NOT delete EIN filing requirements per IRM 10.5.3.3.10, Referrals to Criminal Investigation (CI)

    Reminder:

    Incomplete referrals will be returned to the originating liaison.

10.5.3.3.9  (01-16-2014)
Referrals to Return Integrity and Correspondence Services (RICS)

  1. The RICS organization maintains a database of abused, bogus and fabricated EINs as they relate to IMF/BMF filings. After exhausting all BMF and IMF research and a determination cannot be made as to the authentication of the EIN, it may be necessary to request RICS check the EIN and related SSNs against their database. The Form , BMF ID Theft Action Request will be used for this purpose.

  2. Referrals to RICS for this purpose will be limited to situations where additional information is needed to confirm the existence of BMF ID Theft. For example:

    Example:

    You have thoroughly researched XYZ company and have found the following characteristics but are unable to determine if XYZ company is non-compliant or fictitious:
    Employment tax returns were filed but no payments wee made for XYZ company.
    BMFOLU indicates Forms W-2 were filed with SSA for 20 employees.
    The employees filing Forms 1040 with the W-2 issued by XYZ do not reflect identity theft indicators.

  3. After documenting all of your findings and research on the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral, or other referral method as determined by your function, forward the referral to your BMF ID Theft Liaison. The liaison will review the form and if the form is complete, the liaison will send it to RICs using secure E-mail to: *W&I EF Referrals. In the Actions Needed Section of the Form, request RICS provide information confirming if this EIN was used to file fraudulent returns or if they have already flagged this EIN as fabricated, bogus or abused.

  4. The Entity Fabrication (EF) Team will review your referral and respond within 30 days by returning the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Request via secure E-mail. The EF team will respond that the account has been added to their scheme list or rejected as not involving BMF ID theft.

  5. If there are questionable IMF returns filed under what has been determined to be a fabricated EIN, complete the referral form with all information pertaining to the EIN to RICS. They will initiate research into the IMF accounts.

10.5.3.3.10  (01-16-2014)
Referrals to Criminal Investigation (CI)

  1. CI will receive BMF ID Theft referrals under the following circumstances:

    • A request that CI research their scheme listing for a particular entity

      Note:

      CI maintains a database of IMF/BMF accounts under investigation. You may request CI check the EIN and related SSNs against their database after you've exhausted all BMF and IMF research options and still cannot authenticate the EIN. The Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral will be used for this purpose.

    • Notify CI that you have made a BMF identity theft determination

      Example:

      You have thoroughly researched XYZ company and have found the following characteristics but are unable to determine if XYZ company is non-compliant or fictitious:
      Employment tax returns were filed but no payments were made for XYZ company.
      BMFOLU indicates Forms W-2 were filed with SSA for 20 employees.
      The employees filing Forms 1040 with the W-2 issued by XYZ do not reflect identity theft indicators.

    Note:

    Do NOT delete filing requirements without CI approval.

  2. After documenting all of your findings and research on the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral or other referral method as determined by your function, forward the referral to your BMF ID Theft Liaison. The liaison will review the form and if the form is complete, the liaison will send it to the CI liaison.

    Note:

    In the Actions Needed Section of the referral form, document the type of referral: A search request of CI's scheme database or notification of a BMF ID Theft determination.

  3. CI will review your referral to determine if there is an open investigation related to the EIN and respond within 30 days by returning the referral form via secure E-mail with the appropriate response

    Reminder:

    Incomplete referrals will be returned to the originating BMF ID Theft Liaison.

10.5.3.3.11  (01-16-2014)
Referrals to Combined Annual Wage Reporting (CAWR)

  1. In situations where identity thieves filed false income documents, you will need to contact the CAWR function to alert them to the false income documents.

  2. Document all of your findings and research on the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral or other method as determined by your function and forward it to your BMF ID Theft Liaison. The your BMF Liaison will forward the referral to the CAWR Liaison using secure E-mail.

  3. CAWR will acknowledge receipt of your referral within 30 days by returning the BMF ID Theft Referral Form, via secure E-mail.

10.5.3.3.12  (01-16-2014)
Referrals to Submission Processing - Entity Requests to Close an EIN Deemed Fictitious

  1. After determining an EIN is fictitious, refer the EIN to the Entity Function in Cincinnati Campus using the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral or other method as determined by your function, to request a TC 020 be applied to the EIN. A TC 020 will cause newly filed subsequent returns to unpost. Refer to IRM 3.13.2.9.22, BMF Identity Theft Issues for additional information.

  2. On the referral, request that "Identity Theft" be added to the second name line of the entity. If a return does attempt to post to the account, the account will be marked as ID theft.

10.5.3.3.13  (01-16-2014)
Closing BMF Identity Theft Issues - TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT

  1. Case Closure Analysis: Perform case closure analysis to ensure all identity theft related issues have been addressed and resolved. This includes but is not limited to:

    • Review both prior (a minimum of three prior years) and subsequent years for apparent evidence of unresolved identity theft issues

    • Release notice or enforcement holds as appropriate

    • Ensure the victim received their appropriate refund if one is due

    • Verify and update the taxpayer's address

    • Close down fictitious EINs by referring to SP Entity

    • If the EIN is not active, close down filing requirements

  2. Other outstanding account issues identified during case closure analysis should ONLY be referred to another function when the case can not be resolved within your function.

  3. The employee assigned the case will close the identity theft issue by marking the account with a TC 971 AC 522 with the Tax Administration Source Code for their BOD and Program. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.3.4.1 , BMF Identity Theft Tracking Indicators.

10.5.3.3.14  (01-16-2014)
Manually Reversing TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM, IDTDOC, or CIDT

  1. In some instances, it may be necessary to manually reverse TC 971 AC 522. Reversal may be necessary because of any of the following reasons:

    • IRSERR -There was a keying or internal error in the input of the TC 971 AC 522.

    • IRSADM -The TC 971 AC 522 has an internally identified negative effect on the taxpayer

    • OTHER-There are other reasonable circumstances not listed above.


    Refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3.3-22, Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators - TC 972 AC 522 for additional information.

Exhibit 10.5.3-1 
Glossary of Identity Protection Terms and Definitions

Access - The ability or opportunity to gain knowledge of personally identifiable information.
Breach - The loss of control, disclosure, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, unauthorized access, or any similar term referring to situations where persons other than authorized users and for other than authorized purpose have access or potential access to personally identifiable information, whether physical or electronic.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) - An independent agency of the United States government, established in 1914 by the Federal Trade Commission Act, with the principal mission of promoting "consumer protection" and the elimination and prevention of what regulators perceive to be "anti-competitive" business practices.
Harm - Includes any of the following effects of a breach of confidentiality, integrity, availability, or fiduciary responsibility:
   a) Potential for blackmail;
   b) Disclosure of private facts;
   c) Mental pain and emotional distress;
   d) Potential for secondary uses of the information that could result in fear or uncertainty, or the unwarranted exposure leading to humiliation or loss of self-esteem;
   e) Identity theft; or
  f) Financial loss.
Identity Theft - A fraud that is committed or attempted, using a person's identifying information without authority.
Identity Theft Advisory Council (IDTAC) - The IDT AC was chartered by the Identity Theft Executive Steering Committee to oversee the implementation of the Identity Theft Assessment and Action Group (ITAAG) recommendations and advise the Committee on new and ongoing initiatives to enhance the IRS identity theft programs. The primary objectives of the IDT AC are to promote a collaborative vehicle for addressing and overseeing enterprise-wide identity theft matters; and to monitor and report on the status of related IDT initiatives.  
Identity Theft Liaison - A listing of individuals in the business units that are the contacts for the W&I AM IPSU, when IPSU sends Form 14027-B, Identity Theft Case Referral for monitoring account activity on cases with open controls. A current listing of "ID Theft Liaisons (Functional)" can be found on SERP under the Who/Where tab.  
Identity Theft Assistance Request (ITAR) Liaison - A listing of individuals in the business units that are the contacts for the W&I AM IPSU. IPSU sends Form 14103, Identity Theft Assistance Request for account resolution and monitors the business units account activity on cases with open controls. A current listing of "ID Theft Liaisons (Functional)" can be found on SERP under the Who/Where tab.  
Incident - For the purpose of this IRM the term “incident” refers to an occurrence or event involving identity theft as it applies to a specific tax year(s) as reported by the taxpayer.  
Incident Management - The process of managing incidents involving the loss or disclosure of data.
Information Technology - Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information by an executive agency.
Loss - Any event where an item is misplaced and/or neither the official owner nor the intended recipient has possession of the item in the expected time frame. A loss may involve an IRS-owned physical asset such as a laptop, blackberry, cell phone, and/or other portable media, or electronic or hard copy data that may contain Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) data or Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such as paper or electronic taxpayer records, personnel records, or other identifying data, or a combination of a physical asset and electronic and/or hard copy data.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) - A cabinet-level office that oversees the activities of federal agencies and monitors the adherence of their assigned federal programs to presidential policies.
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) - The term “personally identifiable information” refers to information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc. Please see OMB 07-16. For further information about PII, see the PGLD web page called PII - What is personally identifiable information?
Risk - The level of impact on agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, or individuals resulting from the operation of an information system given the potential impact of a threat and the likelihood of that threat occurring.
Risk Assessment - The process of identifying risks to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, or individuals by determining the probability of occurrence, the resulting impact, and additional security and privacy controls that would mitigate this impact.
Safeguards - Protective measures prescribed to meet the privacy requirements specified for an information system.
Technical Working Group (TWG) for Identity Theft Victim Assistance - A cross-functional group that meets periodically to provide a forum for developing recommendations on how processes and procedures can be improved to address and reduce the burden on taxpayers who are victims of identity theft.  
Unpostable - A transaction which cannot be posted to a taxpayer's account because the transaction failed certain Master File validation checks.  

Exhibit 10.5.3-2 
References

The Identity Protection Program was established to ensure Servicewide implementation of federal directives to protect citizens and government employees . The following are the principal documents involving the Identity Protection Program:


OMB Memoranda

OMB Memoranda are available at Office of Management and Budget at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda.

Other Federal Guidance

  1. Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan, The President’s Identity Theft Task Force Report, April 2007

  2. Combating Identity Theft, Volume II: Supplemental Information, The President’s Identity Theft Task Force Report, April 2007

  3. President’s Identity Theft Task Force Report Summary of Interim Recommendations, September 2006


The President’s Identity Theft Task Force documents are available at http://www.idtheft.gov/

PGLD Internal Revenue Manuals

  • IRM 10.5.1, Privacy, Information Protection & Data Security Policy and Guidance

  • IRM 10.5.3, Identity Protection Program

  • IRM 10.5.4, Incident Management Program

Exhibit 10.5.3-3 
Acronyms and Definitions

The following tables describe the terms and acronyms used for the TC 971 AC 501, 504, and 506 identity theft indicator codes. The three tables are: 1) BOD/Function, 2) Program Name, and 3) Tax Administration Source. Not all Tax Administration Source Codes are available to all BOD/Functions. For specific BOD/Function information, refer to the applicable Exhibit for the Action Code, for example TC 971 AC 501 or AC 506.

  1. BOD/Function

    Term/Acronym Description
    AP Appeals
    CI Criminal Investigation
    LBI Large Business & International
    IT Information Technology
    OS Operations Support
    PPDS Privacy, Governmental Liaison & Disclosure
    SBSE Small Business / Self-Employed
    TAS Taxpayer Advocate Service
    WI Wage & Investment

  2. Program Name

    Term/Acronym Description
    ACS Automated Collection System
    AM Accounts Management (IRS-identified identity theft)
    AMADJ Accounts Management (TP-identified identity theft)
    AMTAP Integrity & Verification Operations (IVO) formerly Accounts Management Taxpayer Assurance Program (AMTAP)
    AP Appeals
    ASFR Automated Substitute for Return
    AUR Automated Underreporter
    CA TAS Case Advocate
    CFBALDUE SB/SE: Field Collection - Taxpayer Delinquency Accounts
    CFDELRET SB/SE: Field Collection - Taxpayer Delinquency Investigations
    CONGINQ Congressional Inquiry
    CORR SB/SE Correspondence Exam
    CSCO Compliance Services Collection Operations
    CSIRC Computer Security Incident Response Center
    EXAM W&I Correspondence Exam
    FA Field Assistance
    FO Field Office
    FLDEXAM Field Exam
    FLDADV Field Advisory
    FLDINSLV Field Insolvency
    LBI Large Business & International
    OPIP Office of Privacy & Information Protection
    PHSH Phishing
    PREREF Pre-Refund Program
    RC Refund Crimes
    RFND Refund Scheme
    RICS Return Integrity & Correspondence Services
    SP Submission Processing
    TDI Tax Delinquency Investigation
    WHC Withholding Compliance

  3. Tax Administration Source

    Term/Acronym Description
    DECD Taxpayer is deceased
    INCOME Identity theft identified and substantiated due to an underreporting of income
    MULTFL Identity theft identified and substantiated due to two or more tax returns filed for one taxpayer
    INCMUL Identity theft identified and substantiated due to both underreporting of income and multiple filings
    NOFR Substantiated identity theft incidents where the victim does not have a filing requirement
    OTHER Identity theft which cannot be identified as related to any existing Tax Administration Source types
    RFND Identity theft identified by the filing of a false return in order to obtain a refund
    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
    PRISNR Taxpayer is incarcerated

Exhibit 10.5.3-4 
IMF Only TC 971 AC 501 — Taxpayer Initiated Identity Theft Case Closure (Tax-Related) - TC 971 AC 501

The exhibit below demonstrates how AUR inputs a TC 971 AC 501 when the identity theft involved an underreporting of income.

Input instructions for TC 971 AC 501 are as follows:

  1. Obtain the following information:

    • Entity - SSN;

    • Business Operating Division (BOD)/Function (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);

    • Program Name (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);

    • Tax Administration Source (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3); and

    • Tax Year affected by identity theft (Secondary-DT Field).

      Note:

      The tax year affected by the identity theft cannot be the current year. For example, the taxpayer gave you supporting documentation during the current year ( 2012), for a 2005 tax year issue. You have resolved the issues, verified and updated the address. You will input TC 971 AC 501 for tax year 2005 by entering 12-31-2005 in the Secondary-DT field on FRM77

  2. The tables provided below display the available Tax Administration Source Codes by BOD/Function(Program). Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function (Program).

  3. Navigate to FRM77

    • Sign into IDRS;

    • Enter ENMOD (SSN), then press ENTER;

    • Enter REQ77:

    • FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.

  4. Enter the TC 971 AC 501

    • Enter the TC with 971;

    • TRANS-DT is auto populated with the current date;

    • Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year affected by the identity theft incident in the format MM-DD-YYYY);

    • Enter MISC (enter your specific BOD/Function, Program Name, and Tax Administration Source, see Exhibit 10.5.3-3); and

    • After REMARKS, enter "IDENTITY THEFT" .

  5. Tax Administration Source Codes for use with TC 971 AC 501 - Taxpayer Identified Case Closure

    Tax Administration Source Code Definition of Tax Administration Source Code
    INCOME Identity theft identified and substantiated due to an underreporting of income
    MULTFL Identity theft identified and substantiated due to two or more tax returns filed for one taxpayer
    INCMUL Identity theft identified and substantiated due to both underreporting of income and multiple filings
    OTHER Identity theft which cannot be identified as related to any existing Tax Administration Source types
    NOFR Identity theft identified by the filing of a false return in order to obtain a refund and the victim does not have a filing requirement
    DECD Deceased taxpayer
    PRISNR Incarcerated Taxpayer

  6. Do not attempt to use a Tax Administration Source Code that your BOD/Program (Function) is not profiled to use. The following table identifies the BOD/Programs and applicable Tax Administration Source Codes. Refer to IRM 10.5.3–3, Acronyms and Definitions, for definitions of the Program Name codes.

  7. Appeals is profiled to use the following codes:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code
    AP AP INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, and DECD

  8. Criminal Investigation is profiled to use the following codes:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code
    CI FO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    CI RC INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD

  9. Large Business & International is profiled to use the following codes:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code
    LBI LBI INCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and, DECD

  10. IT is profiled to use the following codes:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code
    MITS CSIRC DECD, OTHER, NOFR, and PRISNR

  11. PGLD is profiled to use the following codes:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code
    PPDS CONGINQ INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    PPDS OPIP INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD

  12. SBSE is profiled to use the following codes:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code
    SBSE ACS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE ASFR INCOME, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and, DECD
    SBSE AUR INCOME, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and, DECD
    SBSE CFBALDUE INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE CFDELRET INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE CSCO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE CORR INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE FLDEXAM INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE FLDADV INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, and DECD
    SBSE FLDINSLV INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, and DECD
    SBSE TDI INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD

  13. TAS is profiled with the following codes:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code
    TAS CA INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD

  14. W&I is profiled with the following codes:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code
    WI ACS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    WI AMADJ INCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, OTHER, NOFR, ITIN, and DECD,
    WI ASFR INCOME, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    WI AUR INCOME, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    WI CSCO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    WI EXAM INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    WI PREREF INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    WI TDI INCOME, MULTFL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    WI WHC INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD

Exhibit 10.5.3-5 
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

The exhibit below demonstrates how ACS inputs a TC 972 AC 501 when they determine identity theft was indicated by IRS in error.

There is currently no description available for this image. For help with this image, please call the IRS.gov Helpdesk at 1-800-876-1715.

Input instructions for TC 972 AC 501 are as follows:

  1. Obtain the following information:

    • Entity - SSN;

    • BOD/Function (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);

    • Program Name (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);

    • Tax Year of the TC 971 AC 501 being reversed; and

      Note:

      The tax year must match the tax year of the TC 971 AC 501 that is being reversed.

    • Transaction date of the TC 971 AC 501 being reversed.

  2. Navigate to FRM77

    • Sign into IDRS;

    • Enter ENMOD SSN, then press ENTER;

    • Enter REQ77;

    • FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.

  3. Enter the TC 972 AC 501

    • Enter the TC with 972;

    • Enter TRANS-DT (enter the transaction date of the TC 971 AC 501 being reversed);

    • Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year of the TC 971 AC 501 being reversed in the MM-DD-YYYY format);

    • Enter MISC (Modify the Reason Code field with the reason for the reversal). Select the Reason code that reflects the reason for the reversal from the options below; and

    • Enter REMARKS (enter your remarks).

    Note:

    The exhibit above demonstrates

  4. Tax Administration Source Codes for use with TC 972 AC 501 - Reversal of TC 971 AC 501 - are as follows:

    TC 972 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code Definition
    TPRQ The taxpayer requests the 971 be reversed.
    IRSERR The 971 was due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake.
    IRSADM The 971 is causing a negative impact on another internal process or system, and should be reversed to discontinue the negative impact.
    FALSE The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be fraudulent.
    OTHER The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the reason descriptions above.

  5. The following tables describe the TC 972 AC 501 reason codes by BOD/Function and Program. Refer to IRM 10.5.3-3, Acronyms and Definitions, for definitions of the Program Name codes.

    Note:

    Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.

  6. Appeals is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501
    Tax Administration Source Code
    AP AP TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER

  7. Criminal Investigation is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501
    Tax Administration Source Code
    CI FO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    CI RC TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER

  8. Large Business & International (LB&I) is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501
    Tax Administration Source Code
    LBI LBI TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER

  9. IT is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501
    Tax Administration Source Code
    MITS CSIRC TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER

  10. The Privacy Office is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501
    Tax Administration Source Code
    PPDS CONGINQ TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    PPDS OPIP TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER

  11. Small Business Self Employed (SBSE) is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501
    Tax Administration Source Code
    SBSE ACS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE ASFR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE AUR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE CFBALDUE TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE CFDELRET TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE CSCO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE CORR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE FLDEXAM TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE FLDADV TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE FLDINSLV TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE TDI TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER

  12. Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501
    Tax Administration Source Code
    TAS TAS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER

  13. Wage & Investment (WI) is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501
    Tax Administration Source Code
    WI ACS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI AM TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI AMADJ TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI ASFR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI AUR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI CSCO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI EXAM TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI PREREF TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI RICS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI TDI TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI WHC TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER

Exhibit 10.5.3-6 
IMF Only TC 971 AC 504

Important: Input of Action Code 504 for non-tax related identity theft purposes is limited and reserved for use by the Identity Protection Specialized Unit (IPSU) in W&I, Accounts Management and will reflect one of the following Miscellaneous Field Codes:

  • ACCT

  • BOTH

  • NKI

  • EMPL

The following Miscellaneous Field Codes are not limited to input by IPSU employees:

  • SPCL1

  • SPCL2

  • EAFAIL

  • RPM

TC 971 AC 504 is displayed on IDRS command code ENMOD and consists of the following data elements:

TRANS-DT SECONDARY-DT MISC REMARKS
Input date of TC 971 AC 504 Date identity theft occurred (per taxpayer). BOD and taxpayer impact. (See the Impact to Taxpayer table below.) Comments

Secondary Date Field is required on input of all TC 971 AC 504. Some taxpayers provide an incomplete incident date or no incident date at all. In these situations, follow as outlined below:

If Form 14039 THEN
Specifies an incident date that is complete Use the date provided on Form 14039.

Example:

The taxpayer indicates the ID theft occurred on October 15, 2013, the secondary date will reflect 10152013.

Indicates an incident date of only a month and year Use the first day of the month provided by the taxpayer on Form 14039.

Example:

The taxpayer indicates the ID theft occurred on October 2013, the secondary date will reflect 10012013.

Does not include an incident date. Use the IRS received date of the Form 14039.

Example:

The Form 14039 was received April 29, 2012, secondary date will reflect 04292012.

Impact to Taxpayer
Miscellaneous Field Codes Description
ACCT IPSU use only - Non-tax related issues: One or more personal accounts have been opened under the victim's identity or the victim reported questionable account activity.
BOTH IPSU use only - Non-tax related issues: Both EMPL and ACCT.
EMPL IPSU use only - Non-tax related issues: Victim's SSN Used for Employment.
NKI IPSU use only - Non-tax related issues: No known impact has been identified by the taxpayer.
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

Note:

≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

Note:

≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

≡ ≡ Used by AM and Compliance functions to flag Return Preparer Misconduct cases. Employees will notify these taxpayers that the Service will provide identity protection via the IP PIN as they are vulnerable because of their dealings with a bad preparer.

Note:

These taxpayers will be issued an IP PIN.

≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

Note:

≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

Exhibit 10.5.3-7 
IMF Only TC 972 AC 504 — Reversal of TC 971 AC 504

The miscellaneous field for TC 972 AC 504 reflects the reason for the reversal of TC 971 AC 504. See the TC 972 AC 504 Miscellaneous Field chart below for the reasons and values for the MISC field.

TC 972 AC 504 Miscellaneous Field
Reason Description Value
Taxpayer Request The taxpayer requests the 971 be reversed. TPRQ
Keying or Internal Error The 971 was due to a typographical mistake or other internal mistake. IRSERR
Internally Identified Negative Impact The 971 is causing a negative impact on another internal process or system, and should be reversed to discontinue the negative impact. IRSADM
False Identity Theft Claim The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be fraudulent. FALSE
Other The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the reason descriptions above. OTHER

Exhibit 10.5.3-8 
IMF Only TC 971 AC 505 — IRS Data Loss Incidents

Important: Input of Action Code 505 is limited and reserved for use by the Office of Privacy, Information Protection & Data Security personnel.

TC 971 AC 505 is displayed on IDRS command code ENMOD and consists of the following data elements:

TRANS-DT SECONDARY-DT MISC
TC 971 AC 505 input date Date the data loss incident occurred. Incident Reference Code number assigned to the data loss case. This number begins with the literal "IR" and is followed by 11 numeric digits. For example: IR20080211034

Exhibit 10.5.3-9 
IMF Only TC 972 AC 505 — Reversal of TC 971 AC 505

The miscellaneous field for TC 972 AC 505 reflects the reason for the reversal of TC 971 AC 505. See the following chart for reasons and values for the MISC field:

TC 972 AC 505 Miscellaneous Field
Reason Description Value
Keying or Internal Error The 971 was due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake. IRSERR
Internally Identified Negative Impact The 971 is causing a negative impact on another internal process or system, and should be reversed to discontinue the negative impact. IRSADM
Other The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the above reason descriptions. OTHER

Exhibit 10.5.3-10 
IMF Only TC 971 AC 506 — IRS-Identified Tax-Related Identity Theft Case Closure

The exhibit below demonstrates how SP inputs a TC 971 AC 506 when resolving IRS-identified identity theft issue involving an unpostable.

Input instructions for TC 971 AC 506 are as follows:

  1. Obtain the following information:

    • Entity - SSN;

    • Business Operating Division (BOD)/Function (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);

    • Program Name (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);

    • Tax Administration Source (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3); and

    • Tax Year affected by identity theft.

      Note:

      The tax year affected by the identity theft cannot be the current year. For example, the taxpayer gives you supporting documentation during the current year, e.g., 2013, for a 2005 tax year issue. Input TC 971 AC 506 on tax year 2005 only and not on 2013.

  2. The tables provided below display the available Tax Administration Source Codes by BOD/Function(Program). Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function (Program).

  3. Navigate to FRM77

    • Sign into IDRS;

    • Enter ENMOD (SSN), then press ENTER;

    • Enter REQ77;

    • FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.

  4. Enter the TC 971 AC 506

    • Enter the TC with 971;

    • TRANS-DT is auto populated with the current date;

    • Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year affected by the identity theft incident in the format MM-DD-YYYY);

    • Enter MISC (enter your specific BOD/Function, Program Name, and Tax Administration Source; see the BOD/Function tables below); and

    • After REMARKS, enter "IDENTITY THEFT" .

    Note:

    See the illustration above, demonstrating how SP inputs a TC 971 AC 506 after resolving an unpostable 147 RC1 case.

  5. Tax Administration Source Codes for use with TC 971 AC 506 - IRS Identified Case Closure

    TC 971 AC 506 Tax Administration Codes Definition of Tax Administration Source Code
    INCOME Identity theft identified and substantiated due to an underreporting of income
    MULTFL Identity theft identified and substantiated due to two or more tax returns filed for one taxpayer
    INCMUL Identity theft identified and substantiated due to both underreporting of income and multiple filings
    OTHER Identity theft which cannot be identified as related to any existing Tax Administration Source types
    OTHER1 Used by Rics to identify an SSN where there is at least one good return filed with a valid address
    NOFR Identity theft identified by the filing of a false return in order to obtain a refund
    DECD Deceased taxpayer
    PRISNR Incarcerated Taxpayer
    NKI Used by RICS Pre-Refund for CI cases with no known impact on taxpayer account
    IDT Used by RICS Pre-Refund for CI Cases where a bad return was filed under the taxpayer’s SSN
    DDb Used by RICS Pre-Refund for cases selected by DDb filter and identified as an ID Theft return
    SSA Used by RICS Pre-Refund for cases identified by SSA filters, but are confirmed ID Theft cases
    OMM Used by RICS Pre-Refund for cases selected by DDb Filter that are OMM Cases
    UPCMUL Input on true SSN owner’s account when a non-legitimate unpostable return with UPC147 RC 1 has been filed using the taxpayer’s SSN as identified and determined by SP
    UPC147 Input on the identified IRSN corresponding to the non-legitimate unpostable return with UPC147 RC 1 as identified and determined by SP
    OMMGB Valid return filed by the legitimate taxpayer who was previously identified as OMM
    ERC027 Primary Taxpayer under 14 years old

  6. Do not attempt to use a Tax Administration Source Code that your BOD/Program (Function) is not profiled to use. The following table identifies the BOD/Programs and applicable Tax Administration Source Codes. Refer to IRM 10.5.3–3, Acronyms and Definitions, for definitions of the Program Name codes.

  7. The following BODS are not profiled to use TC 971 AC 506: Appeals, TAS, LB&I, and IT. Important: Input of Action Code 506 is limited and reserved for use by designated functions. The BOD Tables below illustrate only those Functions/Programs authorized to use TC 971 AC 506.

    Note:

    At present, W&I Field Assistance (FA) is not profiled for AC 506. Until further notice when resolving IRS identified cases, W&I FA will use the following:
    BOD: WI
    Program: AM
    Tax Administration Source Codes: INCOME, and OTHER.

  8. Criminal Investigation is profiled to use TC 971 AC 506 as follows:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 506 Tax Administration Source Code
    CI PHSH Field intentionally left blank
    CI RFND Field intentionally left blank
    CI OTHER Field intentionally left blank
    CI RC OMM
    CI RC PRISNR
    CI RC DECD

  9. SBSE is profiled to use the following codes:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 506 Tax Administration Source Code
    SBSE ACS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE AUR INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE CFBALDUE INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE CFDELRET INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE CORR INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE CSCO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE FLDEXAM INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE FLDADV INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    SBSE FLDINSLV INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD

  10. W&I is profiled with the following codes:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 506 Tax Administration Source Code
    WI ACS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    WI AM INCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, DECD, OTHER, and NOFR
    WI AMTAP OMM, OMMGB, RFND, OTHER, DECD, and PRISNR
    WI AUR INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    WI CSCO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    WI PRP INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, NOFR, NKI, DDb, IDT, OMM, SSA, OTHER, DECD and PRISNR
    WI RICS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
    WI SP INCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, OTHER, and NOFR, DECD, PRISNR, ERC027, UPC147, and UPCMUL

Exhibit 10.5.3-11 
IMF Only TC 972 AC 506 Tax-Related, Reversal of Identity Theft Case Closure, No Taxpayer Provided Documents

The illustration below demonstrates how Accounts Management reverses a TC 971 AC 506 using a TC 972 AC 506.

Input instructions for TC 972 AC 506 are as follows:

  1. Obtain the following information:

    • Entity - SSN;

    • BOD/Function (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);

    • Program Name (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);

    • Tax Year of the TC 971 AC 506 being reversed; and

      Note:

      The tax year must match the tax year of the TC 971 AC 506 that is being reversed.

    • Transaction date of the TC 971 AC 506 being reversed.

  2. Navigate to FRM77

    • Sign into IDRS;

    • Enter ENMOD SSN, then press ENTER;

    • Enter REQ77;

    • FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.

  3. Enter the TC 972 AC 506

    • Enter the TC with 972;

    • Enter TRANS-DT (enter the transaction date of the TC 971 AC 506 being reversed);

    • Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year of the TC 971 AC 506 being reversed in the MM-DD-YYYY format);

    • Enter MISC (Modify the Reason Code field with the reason for the reversal). Select the Reason code that reflects the reason for the reversal from the options below; and

    • Enter REMARKS (enter your remarks).

    Note:

    Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.

  4. Tax Administration Source Code is entered into the Miscellaneous field and displays the reason for the reversal. See TC 972 AC 506 Miscellaneous Field chart below for reasons and values for the MISC field:

    TC 972 AC 506 Tax Administration Source Code Definition
    TPRQ The taxpayer requests the 971 be reversed.
    IRSERR The 971 was due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake.
    IRSADM The 971 is causing a negative impact on another internal process or system, and should be reversed to discontinue the negative impact.
    FALSE The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be fraudulent.
    OTHER The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the reason descriptions above.

  5. The following BODS are not profiled to use TC 972 AC 506: Appeals, TAS, LB&I, and IT.

  6. The following tables describe the TC 972 AC 506 reason codes by BOD/Function and Program. Refer to IRM 10.5.3-3, Acronyms and Definitions, for definitions of the Program Name codes.

    Note:

    Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.

  7. Criminal Investigation is profiled to use TC 972 AC 506 as follows:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 506
    Tax Administration Source Code
    CI OTHER TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    CI PHSH TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    CI RC TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    CI RFND TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER

  8. Operations Support (OS) is profiled to use TC 972 AC 506 as follows:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 506
    Tax Administration Source Code
    OS PIPDS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER

  9. Small Business Self Employed (SBSE) is profiled to use TC 972 AC 506 as follows:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 506
    Tax Administration Source Code
    SBSE ACS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE AUR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE CFBALDUE TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE CFDELRET TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE CORR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE CSCO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    SBSE FLDEXAM TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, OTHER, and FALSE
    SBSE FLDADV TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, OTHER, and FALSE
    SBSE FLDINSLV TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, OTHER, and FALSE

  10. Wage & Investment (WI) is profiled to use TC 972 AC 506 as follows:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 506
    Tax Administration Source Code
    WI ACS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI AM TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI AMTAP TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI AUR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI CSCO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI RICS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
    WI SP TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, and FALSE

Exhibit 10.5.3-12 
IMF Only TC 971 AC 522 Tax-Related Identity Theft, Case Status (Initial Claim/Suspicion and Supporting Documents)

The exhibit demonstrates how AUR inputs a TC 971 AC 522 when the taxpayer initially asserts identity theft.

There is currently no description available for this image. For help with this image, please call the IRS.gov Helpdesk at 1-800-876-1715.

Input instructions for TC 971 AC 522 are as follows:

  1. Obtain the following information:

    • Entity - SSN;

    • BOD/Function (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);

    • Program Name (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);

    • Tax Administration Source (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3); and

    • Tax Year affected by identity theft.

      Note:

      The tax year affected by the identity theft cannot be the current year. For example, the taxpayer gives you supporting documentation during the current year, e.g., 2010, for a 2005 tax year issue. Input TC 971 AC 522 on tax year 2005 only and not on 2010.

  2. The tables provided below display the available Tax Administration Source Codes by BOD/Function (Program). Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function (Program).

  3. Navigate to FRM77

    • Sign into IDRS;

    • Enter ENMOD SSN, then press ENTER;

    • Enter REQ77;

    • FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.

  4. Enter the TC 971 AC 522

    • TC> Enter the TC with 971;

    • TC971/151-CD> Enter 522

    • TRANS-DT is auto-populated with the current date;

    • Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year affected by the identity theft incident in the format MM-DD-YYYY);

    • Enter MISC (enter your specific BOD/Function, Program Name, and Tax Administration Source) see IRM 10.5.3-3, Acronyms and Definitions, and

    • After REMARKS, enter "IDENTITY THEFT" .

  5. Tax Administration Source codes for use with TC 971 AC 522 – Identity Theft Account Status:

    TC 971 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Code Definition
    INCOME Clear and legible documentation provided, Income reported under TPs SSN without their consent or knowledge
    MULTFL Clear and legible documentation provided, two or more tax returns filed for one taxpayer
    INCMUL Clear and legible documentation provided, both underreporting of income and multiple filings
    OTHER Clear and legible documentation provided, identity theft which cannot be identified as related to any existing Tax Administration Source types
    NOFR Clear and legible documentation provided, Victim does not have filing requirements
    PNDCLM The taxpayer makes a claim of identity theft. The taxpayer has not yet provided supporting documentation
    IRSID During the normal course of business, the IRS suspects identity theft may have occurred and the case is not yet resolved.
    NODCRQ The taxpayer claims identity theft and there is a posted TC 971 AC 501 or 506. Taxpayers are not required to provide supporting documentation

    Caution:

    Accounts included in the TC 971 AC 525 Pilot Program will be marked with TC 971 AC 522 NODCRQ. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.19.1 for additional information.

    UNWORK A case was internally identified as a potential identity theft incident but was not worked by the selecting function.

    Note:

    ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  6. The tables provided below display the available Tax Administration Source Codes by BOD/Function and Program. Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.

  7. Appeals (AP) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522
    Tax Administration Source Code
    AP AP INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK

  8. Criminal Investigation (CI) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522
    Tax Administration Source Code
    CI FO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, and NOFR
    CI RC DECD, INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, IRSID, OTHER, NOFR, and UNWORK

  9. Large Business & International (LB&I) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522
    Tax Administration Source Code
    LBI LBI INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID and UNWORK

  10. IT is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522
    Tax Administration Source Code
    MITS CSIRC NOFR and OTHER

  11. Operations Support (OS) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522
    Tax Administration Source Code
    OS PHSH IRSID, NODCRQ, and UNWORK

  12. The Privacy Office (PGLD) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522
    Tax Administration Source Code
    PPDS CONGINQ INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, IRSID, PNDCLM, and UNWORK
    PPDS OPIP INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, IRSID, PNDCLM, and UNWORK

  13. Small Business Self Employed (SBSE) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522
    Tax Administration Source Code
    SBSE ACS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK
    SBSE ASFR INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK
    SBSE AUR INCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, IRSID, PNDCLM, and, UNWORK
    SBSE CFBALDUE INCOME, INCMUL, IRSID, OTHER, MULTFL, NODCRQ, NOFR, UNWORK,and PNDCLM
    SBSE CFDELRET INCOME, INCMUL, IRSID, OTHER, MULTFL, NODCRQ, NOFR, UNWORK, and PNDCLM
    SBSE CORR INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK
    SBSE CSCO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, and UNWORK
    SBSE FLDADV INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK
    SBSE FLDEXAM INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK
    SBSE FLDINSLV INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK
    SBSE TDI INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK

  14. Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522
    Tax Administration Source Code
    TAS CA INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK

  15. Wage & Investment (WI) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:

    BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522
    Tax Administration Source Code
    WI ACS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK
    WI AMADJ INCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, IRSID, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, and, UNWORK
    WI AMTAP INCOME, IRSID, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, OMM, and UNWORK
    WI ASFR INCMUL, MULTFL, INCOME, NOFR, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and, UNWORK
    WI AUR INCMUL, MULTFL, INCOME, IRSID, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and, UNWORK
    WI CSCO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, and UNWORK
    WI EXAM INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK
    WI FA INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK
    WI PREREF INCOME, IRSID, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, and UNWORK
    WI RICS INCOME, IRSID, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, and UNWORK
    WI SP INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, NODCRQ, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK
    WI TDI INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK
    WI WHC INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK

Exhibit 10.5.3-13 
IMF Only TC 972 AC 522 - Reversal of TC 971 AC 522

The exhibit demonstrates how AUR inputs a TC 971 AC 522 when no identity theft occurred.

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  1. Obtain the following information:

    • Entity - SSN;

    • BOD/Function (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);

    • Program Name (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);

    • Tax Year of the TC 971 AC 522 being reversed; and

      Note:

      The tax year must match the tax year of the TC 971 AC 522 that is being reversed.

    • Transaction date of the TC 971 AC 522 being reversed.

  2. Navigate to FRM77

    • Sign into IDRS;

    • Enter ENMOD SSN, then press ENTER;

    • Enter REQ77;

    • FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.

  3. Enter the TC 972 AC 522

    • Enter the TC with 972;

    • Enter TRANS-DT (enter the transaction date of the TC 971 AC 522 being reversed);

    • Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year of the TC 971 AC 522 being reversed in the MM-DD-YYYY format);

    • Enter MISC (Modify the Reason Code field with the reason for the reversal). Select the Reason code that reflects the reason for the reversal from the options below; and

    • Enter REMARKS (enter your remarks).

  4. The following tables describe the TC 972 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Codes by BOD/Function and Program.

    Note:

    Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.

TC 972 AC 522 Miscellaneous Field
Reason Description Tax Administration Source Code
Identity Theft has NOT occurred In the course of resolving an identity theft issue, the employee assigned determines no identity theft occurred. NOIDT
The taxpayer did not provide supporting documents This code is used to close a suspended case when the taxpayer fails to provide the requested supporting documentation within the time specified by the employee assigned. NORPLY
Taxpayer Request The taxpayer requests the 971 be reversed. TPRQ
Keying or Internal Error The 971 was due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake. IRSERR
Internally Identified Negative Impact The 971 is causing a negative impact on another internal process or system, and should be reversed to discontinue the negative impact. IRSADM
False Identity Theft Claim The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be fraudulent. FALSE
Other The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the above reason descriptions. OTHER

The following tables describe the TC 972 AC 522 reason codes by BOD/Function and Program. Refer to IRM 10.5.3-3, Acronyms and Definitions, for definitions of the Program Name codes.

Note:

Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.

Appeals is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:

BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 522
Tax Administration Source Code
AP AP TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER

CI is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:

BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 522
Tax Administration Source Code
CI FO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
CI RC TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER

LB&I is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:

BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 522
Tax Administration Source Code
LBI LBI TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, and OTHER

IT is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:

BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 522
Tax Administration Source Code
MITS CSIRC TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER

Operations Support is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:

BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 522
Tax Administration Source Code
OS PHSH TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER

PGLD is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:

BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 522
Tax Administration Source Code
PPDS CONGINQ TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
PPDS OPIP TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER

SBSE is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:

BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 522
Tax Administration Source Code
SBSE ACS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
SBSE ASFR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
SBSE AUR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
SBSE CFBALDUE TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
SBSE CFDELRET TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
SBSE CORR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
SBSE CSCO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
SBSE FLDADV TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
SBSE FLDEXAM TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
SBSE FLDINSLV TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
SBSE TDI TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER

TAS is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:

BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 522
Tax Administration Source Code
TAS TAS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER

WI is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:

BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 522
Tax Administration Source Code
WI ACS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
WI AMADJ TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
WI ASFR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
WI AUR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
WI CSCO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
WI EXAM TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
WI FA TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
WI PREREF TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
WI RICS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
WI SP TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, OTHER, NOIDT and NORPLY
WI TDI TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER
WI WHC TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER

Exhibit 10.5.3-14 
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Exhibit 10.5.3-15 
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Exhibit 10.5.3-16 
TC 971 AC 524 – Locking SSNs - Applies to IMF Accounts Only

Important: Input of TC 971 AC 524 is limited and reserved for use by the Office of Privacy, Information Protection & Data Security and RICS.

The TC 971 AC 524 is displayed on IDRS command code ENMOD and consists of the following data elements:

TRANS-DT SECONDARY-DT MISC
Input date of TC 971 AC 524 Tax year of date of death BOD, Function, and Program that input the TC 971 AC 524. (See the Miscellaneous Field table below.)
TC 971 AC 524 Miscellaneous Field
Description BOD / Function Program Name Tax Administration Source
Deceased Taxpayer PPDS OPIP DECD
Deceased Taxpayer WI PREREF DECD

Exhibit 10.5.3-17 
TC 972 AC 524 – Reversal of TC 971 AC 524 - Applies to IMF Accounts Only

Important: Input of TC 972 AC 524 is limited and reserved for use by the PGLD and Wage & Investment (RICS TPP & Submission Processing Entity).

The miscellaneous field for TC 972 AC 524 reflects the reason for the reversal of TC 971 AC 524. The transaction date of the TC 972 must match the original TC 971. See the TC 972 AC 524 Miscellaneous Field chart below for the reasons and values for the MISC field.

There is currently no description available for this image. For help with this image, please call the IRS.gov Helpdesk at 1-800-876-1715.
  1. Obtain the following information:

    • Entity - SSN;

    • BOD/Function;

    • Program Name;

    • Tax Year of the TC 971 AC 524 being reversed; and

      Note:

      The tax year must match the tax year of the TC 971 AC 524 that is being reversed.

    • Transaction date of the TC 971 AC 524 being reversed.

  2. Navigate to FRM77

    • Sign into IDRS;

    • Enter ENMOD SSN, then press ENTER;

    • Enter REQ77.

    • FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.

  3. Enter the TC 972 AC 524

    • Enter the TC with 972;

    • Enter TRANS-DT (enter the transaction date of the TC 971 AC 524 being reversed);

    • Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year of the TC 971 AC 524 being reversed in the MM-DD-YYYY format);

      Note:

      IF no SECONDARY DT is present for the TC 971 AC 524 enter "12312012" for secondary date field. Many 524s were input systemically (system to system) and therefore no secondary dates are present.

    • Enter MISC (Modify the Reason Code field with the reason for the reversal). Select the Reason code that reflects the reason for the reversal from the options below; and

    • Enter REMARKS (enter your remarks).

  4. The following tables describe the TC 972 AC 524 Tax Administration Source Codes by BOD/Function and Program.

    Note:

    Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.

    Note:

    Submission Processing: will use the following for reversals as no programming is available specific to submission:
    BOD: PPDS
    Program: OPIP
    Tax Administration Source Code: IRSERR

BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 524
Tax Administration Source Code
WI PREREF IRSERR
TC 972 AC 524 Miscellaneous Field
Reason Description Tax Administration Source Code
Taxpayer Request The taxpayer requests the 971 be reversed. TPRQ
Keying or Internal Error The 971 was due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake. IRSERR
Internally Identified Negative Impact The 971 is causing a negative impact on another internal process or system, and should be reversed to discontinue the negative impact. IRSADM
False Identity Theft Claim The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be fraudulent. FALSE
Other The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the above reason descriptions. OTHER

Exhibit 10.5.3-18 
BMF Acronyms & Definitions

1. BOD

Business Operating Division Definition
AP Appeals
CI Criminal Investigation
LB Large Business and International
PG Privacy, Government Liaison, and Disclosure
SB Small Business & Self Employed
TA Taxpayer Advocate Service
WI Wage & Investment

2. Program Name

Note:

If your specific function is not listed below, elevate to your BOD/Function identity theft liaison. The liaison will contact PGLD and request an alternative until programming can be implemented for additional codes.

Function Definition
AP Appeals
RC Refund Crimes
LBI Large Business and International
IP Office of Identity Protection
ACS Automated Collection System
AM Accounts Management
ATTI Abusive Transactions Technical
AUR Automated Underreporter
CA Case Advocate
CAWR Combined Annual Wage Reporting
CE Correspondence Exam
CSCO Compliance Services Collection Operations
FC Field Collection
FE Field Exam
FLDADV Field Advisory
FRIV Frivolous Filer
FUTA Federal Unemployment Tax
FLDINSLV Field Insolvency
RICS Return Integrity & Correspondence Services
SPCLTX Employment Specialty Tax
TDI Tax Delinquency Investigation

3. BMF Tax Administration Source Codes

Term/Acronym Definition
IDTCLM Applied to the TXMOD of the applicable MFT and Tax Period when an initial claim or suspicion of BMF identity theft is supported by preliminary research.
IDTDOC Applied to the TXMOD of the applicable MFT and Tax Period when the taxpayer provides complete and legible supporting documents for a BMF identity theft issue.
CLSIDT Applied to the TXMOD of the applicable MFT and Tax Period when all identity theft issues are resolved.

Exhibit 10.5.3-19 
BMF ID Theft Indicators - TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM - Initial Allegation or Suspicion of BMF ID Theft

BMF identity theft indicators are placed on TXMOD for the MFT and Tax Period affected by identity theft. TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM is applied to accounts where identity theft is alleged or suspected but the taxpayer has not yet provided any supporting documents.

Obtain the following information:

  • EIN

  • MFT and Tax Period of the identity theft incident

  • Navigate to TXMOD for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter REQ77

FRM77 is displayed for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter the TC 971 AC 522

  • TC> Enter the TC with 971;

  • TC971/151-CD> Enter 522

  • TRANS-DT is auto populated with the current date;

  • Enter SECONDARY-DT (If taxpayer identified, enter the date of the taxpayer's allegation. If IRS identified, enter the date the IRS suspected identity theft after concluding preliminary research);

  • Enter MISC> Enter your specific BOD/Program name, refer to IRM 10.5.3-18, BMF Acronyms & Definitions followed by "IDTCLM"

    Example:

    If you are a Combined Annual Wage Reporting employee you will enter the following when you identify a BMF identity theft situation:
    SB CAWR IDTCLM

    Example:

    If you are a BMF Adjustment employee you will enter the following when you identify a BMF identity theft situation:
    WI AM IDTCLM

    ; and

Note:

If the account (MFT and Tax Period) already contains a TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM do NOT input a second code.

Exhibit 10.5.3-20 
BMF ID Theft Indicators - TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC - BMF ID Theft Documents Accepted

BMF identity theft indicators are placed on TXMOD for the MFT and Tax Period affected by identity theft. TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC is applied to accounts when the taxpayer has provided a complete and legible Form 14039-B and supporting documents.

Obtain the following information:

  • EIN

  • MFT and Tax Period of the identity theft incident

  • Navigate to TXMOD for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter REQ77

FRM77 is displayed for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter the TC 971 AC 522

  • TC> Enter the TC with 971;

  • TC971/151-CD> Enter 522

  • TRANS-DT is auto populated with the current date;

  • Enter SECONDARY-DT (If taxpayer identified, enter the date of the taxpayer's allegation. If IRS identified, enter the date the IRS suspected identity theft after concluding preliminary research);

  • Enter MISC> Enter your specific BOD/Program name, refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-18, BMF Acronyms & Definitions followed by "IDTDOC"

    Example:

    If you are a Field Collection employee you will enter the following when you identify a BMF identity theft situation:
    SB FC IDTDOC

    Example:

    If you are a BMF Adjustment employee you will enter the following when you identify a BMF identity theft situation:
    WI AM IDTDOC

    ; and

Note:

If the account (MFT and Tax Period) already contains a TC 971 AC 522 PG IP IDTDOC do NOT input a second code.

Exhibit 10.5.3-21 
BMF ID Theft Indicators - TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT - Closed and Confirmed as BMF ID Theft

BMF identity theft indicators are placed on TXMOD for the MFT and Tax Period affected by identity theft. TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT is applied to accounts when all actions to resolve the identity theft issues have been taken and posted and the taxpayer is notified.

Obtain the following information:

  • EIN

  • MFT and Tax Period of the identity theft incident

  • Navigate to TXMOD for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter REQ77

FRM77 is displayed for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter the TC 971 AC 522

  • TC> Enter the TC with 971;

  • TC971/151-CD> Enter 522

  • TRANS-DT is auto populated with the current date;

  • Enter SECONDARY-DT (If taxpayer identified, enter the date of the taxpayer's allegation. If IRS identified, enter the date the IRS suspected identity theft after concluding preliminary research);

  • Enter MISC>Enter your specific BOD/Program name, refer to IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-18, BMF Acronyms & Definitions followed by "CLSIDT"

    Example:

    If you are a Field Collection employee you will enter the following when you identify a BMF identity theft situation:
    SB FC CLSIDT

    Example:

    If you are a BMF Adjustment employee you will enter the following when you identify a BMF identity theft situation:
    WI AM CLSIDT

    ; and

Note:

If the account (MFT and Tax Period) already contains a TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT do NOT input a second code.

Exhibit 10.5.3-22 
Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators - TC 972 AC 522

If you subsequently determine an account is NOT affected by identity theft, you will need to reverse the identity theft indicators applied to the account.

Obtain the following information:

  • EIN

  • MFT and Tax Period of the identity theft incident

  • Navigate to TXMOD for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter REQ77

FRM77 is displayed for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter the TC 972 AC 522

  • TC> Enter the TC 972;

  • TC971/151-CD> Enter 522

  • TRANS-DT> Enter the transaction date of the TC 971 AC 522 being reversed);

  • SECONDARY-DT> Enter the secondary date of the TC 971 AC 522 being reversed;

  • MISC> Enter your BOD Program Code followed by the reason why the BMF Identity Theft Indicator is being reversed using the table below; and

Reason for BMF ID Theft Reversal Reversal Code
After doing completing a case analysis, you have determined ID Theft did not occur. NOIDT
The taxpayer did not respond to your request for supporting documentation. NORPLY
The BMF ID Theft indicator was applied due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake. IRSERR
The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be fraudulent. FALSE
The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the above reason descriptions OTHER

Exhibit 10.5.3-23 
BMF Identity Theft Referral Form

You may choose to include the optional Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral prior to submitting the form to your designated functional liaison. This includes:

  • A detailed explanation of the actions requested.

  • A detailed description of the research you completed and your findings

Caution:

Inappropriately developed BMF Identity Theft Referrals may be returned to the originator for additional case building, delaying case resolution.

The receiving function will be responsible for documenting the actions taken and returning the referral form to the originator.

Exhibit 10.5.3-24 
BMF Identity Theft Research Requirement

The table below was developed to assist you with some of the research needed to assist in making a BMF ID theft determination.

Action What are you looking for? Research Tools and Command Codes
Research the EIN for:
  • Date established

  • X-REF TIN (s)

  • Address

  • Filing requirements and history

  • Business Close Date

  • Business name - Primary and sort name


Date established: Compare the establishment date to the time the first return was posted
X-REF EIN: Is there a parent co. or is this possibly a mixed entity?
Address changes: If the original return posted with a different address it may be an indication of a fraudulent return. Further research or contact with the taxpayer may be necessary.
Filing requirements: Is the Form 1120 showing wages paid but the business has no 94X filing requirements? Are there returns filed where there are currently no filing requirements? Is there an unexplained change in filing requirements (e.g. the business filed as 1120S and now filed as a 1120C)?
Close date: The filing of a return after the final return may indicate a fraudulent return.
Primary name: The name may be slightly different or misspelled, it may indicate possible fraudulent return.

IDRS Command Codes
Document 6209
BMFOLE
INOLES
Entity Research
Determine if there are other businesses with the same name but different EIN.
Check business location using googlemaps. Is the address a vacant lot or in the middle of a barren stretch of desert?
Research the business on the Secretary of State website for the state in which the business is operating.

NAMEE
Google
White Pages
Yellow Pages
TRDBV
Secretary of State
X-REF TINS
BMF: Research for possible successor or parent companies, possible mixed entities
IMF:
  • Research the SSN associated with EIN (located on BMFOLE) for ID theft indicators on IMFOLE/ENMOD of x-ref SSN

  • Review for entity fabrication letter issued by RICS

  • Review the x-ref SSN for the taxpayer's age or a date of death

  • Look for IVO involvement. Refer to IRM 25.25


BMFOLE
INOLES
ENMOD
Account Research
BMF;
  • Research for open controls or ID theft case already being worked

  • Check for ID theft indicators on prior years or MFTs

  • Research for prior account assessments. CAWR, SFR, or Exam may open or closed issues. Some of these issues may be the result of default assessments/ no replies, which may indicate a possible fabricated EIN. Additional research or contact with the taxpayer may be necessary


IMF: Check the x-ref SSN accounts to see if there are any TC 971 AC134/617 or 122 on the tax year in question. RICS applies these when a return is selected by filters. This may indicate ID theft.

TXMOD/IMFOL
AMS History and Notes
6209
Payment Research
If there are forms filed and no payments, further research would be needed to determine if it is ID theft or taxpayer non-compliance
If there are payments, research payments for other possible cross-reference TINs

TXMOD
BMFOLT
RTR
IRPTR Research
BMF:
  • Payments made to the business would more than likely indicate a legitimate business

  • If there are Forms W-2 filed and no payments made, this may be an indication of possible ID theft. Further research or contact with the taxpayer may be needed

  • Look for Forms W-2 labeled fabricated EIN (EINs determined to be fictitious)


IMF: If IMF returns were filed and requested a refund using a W-2 prepared by the questionable EIN, it may help establish BMF ID theft if there are no filings under the EIN. Compare the employee's work history, address, etc. to prior filings

IRPTR
BMFOLU
PMFOL
Refund Research
Refund history offers another possible research avenue.
If all other returns show no refunds and there is suddenly a return filed with a large refund, this may indicate a fraudulent return. Further research or contact with the taxpayer may be needed.
Is the amended return requesting a large refundable credit resulting in a refund and is the address is different from what is on the account? This may indicate a fraudulent return.
Research DDPOL for bank account information

TXMOD
BMFOLT
IMFOLT
DDPOL
Document Research
BMF: Compare prior year returns for similar patterns of filing. For example, fuel tax credit was never claimed or business name does not warrant a fuel tax credit. Further research or contact with the taxpayer may be needed.
IMF: Review IMF return to determine if the taxpayer is Schedule C filer, the EIN may be listed on the return.
If Forms W-2 are filed by the business and it is deemed to be a fabricated EIN, determine if IMF returns have been filed using the fraudulent Forms W-2.
Compare direct deposit information if present to see if refunds went to the same account.

TRDBV
BRTVU
RTVUE
MeF returns

Exhibit 10.5.3-25 
Suggested Language When Acknowledging Receipt of Form 14039-B

Use the paragraph below when acknowledging receipt of Form 14039-B

We received the documentation for your identity theft claim. We are firmly committed to working with victims like you to resolve identity theft cases. Identity theft issues are complex and require complete and thorough research to resolve. It could take up to 120 days for us to process your identity theft case. We will contact you when we finish processing your claim or if we need additional information or time. You do not need to do anything further at this time. Please continue to file all your federal tax returns as you normally would. We will contact you if any issues arise with them.


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