- 10.5.3.1 Background of the Identity Protection Program
- 10.5.3.2 Identity Protection Program Servicewide Identity Theft Guidance
- 10.5.3.3 IRS/PGLD Initiatives
- Exhibit 10.5.3-1 Glossary of Identity Protection Terms and Definitions
- Exhibit 10.5.3-2 References
- Exhibit 10.5.3-3 Acronyms and Definitions
- Exhibit 10.5.3-4 TC 971 AC 501 — Taxpayer Initiated Identity Theft Case Closure (Tax-Related) - TC 971 AC 501
- Exhibit 10.5.3-5 ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
- Exhibit 10.5.3-6 TC 971 AC 504 — Taxpayer-Identified Identity Theft Not Affecting Tax Administration
- Exhibit 10.5.3-7 TC 972 AC 504 — Reversal of TC 971 AC 504
- Exhibit 10.5.3-8 TC 971 AC 505 — IRS Data Loss Incidents
- Exhibit 10.5.3-9 TC 972 AC 505 — Reversal of TC 971 AC 505
- Exhibit 10.5.3-10 TC 971 AC 506 — IRS-Identified Tax-Related Identity Theft Case Closure
- Exhibit 10.5.3-11 TC 972 AC 506 Tax-Related, Reversal of Identity Theft Case Closure, No Taxpayer Provided Documents
- Exhibit 10.5.3-12 TC 971 AC 522 Tax-Related Identity Theft, Case Status (Initial Claim/Suspicion and Supporting Documents)
- Exhibit 10.5.3-13 TC 972 AC 522 - Reversal of TC 971 AC 522
- Exhibit 10.5.3-14 ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
- Exhibit 10.5.3-15 ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
- Exhibit 10.5.3-16 TC 971 AC 524 – Locking SSNs
- Exhibit 10.5.3-17 TC 972 AC 524 – Reversal of TC 971 AC 524
Manual Transmittal
February 27, 2013
Purpose
(1) This transmits revised IRM section 10.5.3, Identity Protection Program.
Material Changes
(1) IPU 12U1525 issued 08-23-2012 IRM 10.5.3.2.2 Added a note with a cross-reference to IRM 21.9.2.3.1.
(2) IPU 12U1525 issued 08-23-2012 IRM 10.5.3.2.6 (4) Added caveat that the 522 is not used when an ITIN individual reports misusing an SSN belonging to someone else.
(3) IPU 12U1525 issued 08-23-2012 IRM 10.5.3.2.11.1.1 Added notes regarding AMS histories and linking cases.
(4) IPU 12U1535 issued 08-27-2012 IRM 10.5.3.2.11.1.1 Moved first exception and note to IRM 10.5.3.2.11.1.2.
(5) IPU 12U1893 issued 11-30-2012 IRM 10.5.3.2.16 Completely revised IP PIN guidance to include 2013 programming changes.
(6) IPU 12U1893 issued 11-30-2012 IRM 10.5.3.2.16.1 Completely revised IP PIN replacement guidance to include 2013 programming changes.
(7) IPU 12U1893 issued 11-30-2012 IRM 10.5.3.2.1(4) update cross reference to IRM 21.9.2.9.
(8) IPU 9912U1978 issued 12-21-2012 IRM 10.5.3.2.16 update guidance TC 971 AC 661 posts to TXMOD of Tax Year 2011.
(9) IPU 12U1978 issued 12-21-2012 IRM 10.5.3.2.16.1 Updated IP PIN guidance and added example when IP PIN not received. Clarified IP PIN replacements issued between April 17, 2012 and December 31, 2012 are for tax year 2011.
(10) IPU 13U0088 issued 1-8-2013 IRM 10.5.3.2.16 New IP PIN indicator programming available for 2013. Updated guidance to include the new indicator.
(11) IPU 13U0088 issued 1-8-2013 IRM 10.5.3.2.16.1 New IP PIN indicator programming available for 2013. Updated guidance to include the new indicator.
(12) IPU 13U0013 issued 01-11-2013 IRM 10.5.3.2.16. - Programming for Form 1040 PR/SS was not complete for Tax Year 2012. Taxpayers filing Form 1040 PR or 1040 SS who were issued an IP PIN, must file on paper.
(13) IPU 13U0013 issued 01-11-2013 IRM 10.5.3.2.16.1 - Clarify confusion over OUO. Employees can provide eligible TPs with a replacement PIN.
(14) IPU issued to rescind 13A0045 for IRM 10.5.3.2.16 - Programming for Form 1040 PR/SS filers issued an IP PIN was completed
(15) IRM 10.5.3.1.3 Revise (j) as follows: Participating in risk assessments on IRS business processes, where appropriate.
(16) IRM 10.5.3.2 Updated cross-reference IRM section.
(17) 10.5.3.2.1. Moved Taxpayer Interaction to 10.5.3.2.2 for better flow of information.
(18) IRM 10.5.3.2.2 Moved IRS Employees Who May be Victims of Identity Theft, to 10.5.3.2.1, formerly Taxpayer Interaction for improved flow.
(19) IRM 10.5.3.2.3 Added caution regarding taxpayer authentication.
(20) IRM 10.5.3.2.4 Moved caution to 10.5.3.2.3 for better flow.
(21) IRM 10.5.3.2.5 Added caution, the tracking indicators in this IRM only apply to individual tax accounts. They cannot be used on BMF accounts.
(22) IRM 10.5.3.2.6 Clarified closing the identity theft issue with a 50X, as appropriate.
(23) IRM 10.5.3.6.1 Added: If, at the time of case closure you find the Entity module has not been flagged with a TC 971 PNDCLM, do not input this code at closing. Close the identity theft issue with TC 971 AC 50X, as appropriate
(24) IRM 10.5.3.6.2 Added: If, at the time of case closure you find the Entity module has not been flagged with a TC 971 IRSID, do not input this code at closing. Close the identity theft issue with TC 971 AC 50X, as appropriate
(25) IRM 10.5.3.2.6.1 Added authorized representatives may assert identity theft . Added link to IRM 21.3.7.5.
(26) IRM 10.5.3.2.7 Added information about Form 14039 and removed OUO restriction on the validity of taxpayer documentation for a period of three years. Added: If you are closing the case within 30 days of receipt, the closing contact will act as an acknowledgement of receipt of the taxpayer's documents. Added: Exercise caution when acknowledging receipt of documentation by mail. The address on Form 14039 may be different from the address on ENMOD. Added: Filing of 14039 is not proof of ID theft, determination of ID theft made after considering case facts and circumstances. Clarified, Form 14039 must be acknowledged within 30 days of the IRS received date.
(27) IRM 10.5.3.2.7 (10) Removed OUO restriction.
(28) IRM 10.5.3.2.7 (1) (b) Removed exception for Form 12483. This form is obsolete and no loner used on QRP cases.
(29) IRM 10.5.3.2.7.1 Added a note for when SSN ownership cannot be made and there is a prior AC 506 on the module.
(30) IRM 10.5.3.2.7.2 If Then Table Added guidance for when an employee has an open case but documents provided are incomplete and added guidance for sending/receiving employees.
(31) IRM 10.5.3.2.7.2 If Then Table. Added a note below table, if only one digit or letter is illegible on taxpayer provided documents, call the taxpayer to verify the information needed.
(32) IRM 10.5.3.2.7.2 Added a note, if SSN ownership can be determined without clear and legible taxpayer documents but can be resolve using internal information, resolve the case and close with TC 971 AC 506.
(33) IRM 10.5.3.2.7.3 Editorial change, replaced the word victim with the word taxpayer.
(34) IRM 10.5.3.7.4.1 Added new section when to update the victims address.
(35) IRM 10.5.3.2.9 Revised case closure review guidance to ensure all issues are addressed.
(36) IRM 10.5.3.2.10 Updated cross-reference IRM section.
(37) IRM 10.5.3.2.10.1 Added any tax return identified through the filtering process as potentially fraudulent will become unpostable, i.e., removed from the posting process, and routed to Submission Processing for screening to determine if the return is legitimate. If legitimate, the return will be submitted for processing. If fraudulent, the taxpayer’s account will be marked with the TC 971 AC 506
(38) 10.5.3.2.11.1.1 (d) Updated portion of Form 14027-B that should be completed.
(39) IRM 10.5.3.2.11.1.3 Corrected typo 86 C letter.
(40) IRM 10.5.3.2.11.4 Update to RICS Reorganization: IVO and TPP. Removed references to AMTAP and TPU. Added links to appropriate IRMs. Added reference to 5073 C letter. Added information about the Taxpayer Protection Program (TPP). TPP is responsible for handling potential ID Theft cases that are scored by a set of ID Theft models in DDb or selected through a query in EFDS.
(41) IRM 10.5.3.2.11.5 Updated to cross-reference IRM, editorial change.
(42) IRM 10.5.3.2.12 Updated to bullet list with editorial change.
(43) IRM 10.5.3.2.12.1 Updated cross-reference IRM section.
(44) IRM 10.5.3.2.13 Added certain cases involving egregious misuse or other PGLD determined criterion may warrant the application of the TC 971 AC 523 without necessarily meeting all of the criterion shown,
(45) IRM 10.5.3.2.14 Revised TC 971 AC 524 procedures, only used on decedent accounts.
(46) IRM 10.5.3.2.15 Revised TC 971 AC 524 reversal procedures.
(47) IRM 10.5.3.2.16 Updated IP PIN information.
(48) IRM 10.5.3.2.16.1 Updated replacement IP PIN guidance.
(49) IRM 10.5.3.2.19 Updated XREF IRM for Field Assistance employees
(50) Exhibit 10.5.3-1 Added ITAR liaison to Glossary of Identity Theft Terms and Definitions.
(51) Exhibit 10.5.3-3 Updated exhibit with additional acronyms.
(52) Exhibit 10.5.3-4 Updated exhibit and deleted note about FA employees closing cases as FA employees do not resolve and close identity theft cases.
(53) Exhibit 10.5.3-5 Updated exhibit.
(54) Exhibit 10.5.3-6 Revised format for input of 504.
(55) Exhibit 10.5.3-10 Updated exhibit with CY 2013 programming.
(56) Exhibit 10.5.3-11 Updated exhibit.
(57) Exhibit 10.5.3-12 Updated exhibit and (5) Added note for TC 971 AC 522 UNWORK.
(58) Exhibit 10.5.3-13 Updated exhibit and Added Tax Admin. Source code NORPLY for LB&I.
(59) Exhibit 10.5.3-16 Updated exhibit.
(60) Exhibit 10.5.3-17 Updated exhibit.
(61) Updated all references from MITS to IT throughout this IRM.
(62) Updated RICS Organization throughout IRM (TPU is now TPP). And Integrity & Verification Operations (IVO) formerly Accounts Management Taxpayer Assurance Program (AMTAP).
(63) Throughout IRM updated references to LB&I Operating Division
(64) Throughout IRM made editorial changes for grammar and spacing.
Effect on Other Documents
IRM 10.5.3, Identity Protection Program dated July 9, 2012 (effective 7-9-2012) is superseded. IG PGLD-10-1211-01 / IPU OS-10-1210-1757 was incorporated into IRM 10.5.3 (7-9-2012). This IRM also incorporates the following IRM Procedural Updates (IPU) - 13U0113, 13A0088, 12U1978, 12U1525, 12U1893, and 12U1535.Audience
The provisions in this manual apply to all divisions, functional units, employees, and contractors within the IRS who address identity theft related issues..Effective Date
(02-27-2013)Tracey L. Showman
Director, Privacy and Information Protection
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Purpose. This manual defines the mission, objectives, and governance structure of the Identity Protection Program. It provides the organizational framework for carrying out specific policies and procedures aimed at preventing identity theft, protecting taxpayers and providing assistance to victims of identity theft.
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Scope. The provisions in this manual apply Servicewide.
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Accountability. Safeguarding and preventing the unauthorized disclosure of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is a responsibility that is shared by all IRS employees and contractors. Lost or disclosed PII may be used to perpetrate identity theft or other forms of fraud if the information falls into unauthorized hands. See IRM 10.5.3.1.1, Definitions of Key Identity Protection Terms for a definition of PII.
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Identity Theft- A fraud that is committed or attempted, using a person's identifying information without authority.
Example:
Identity Theft: In 2010, the taxpayer filed his own return and did not use a preparer. However, unbeknownst to the taxpayer, the preparer he used in 2009, filed a return using the victim’s SSN without his permission. In 2010, the taxpayer was a victim of identity theft.
Caution:
Do not confuse preparer fraud with identity theft.
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Preparer Fraud: Return Preparer Fraud generally involves the orchestrated preparation and filing of false income tax returns (in either paper or electronic form) by unscrupulous preparers who may claim, for example:
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Inflated personal or business expenses;
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False deductions;
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Unallowable credits;
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Excessive exemptions; or
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Fraudulent tax credits such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
The preparer's clients may or may not have knowledge of the false expenses, deductions, exemptions and/or credits shown on their tax returns.
Example:
Preparer Fraud: A taxpayer used a preparer in 2009 to prepare and file Form 1040. The preparer changed the return by increasing the withholding tax claimed and diverted the resulting refund into the preparer’s personal account. This is preparer fraud, do not place an identity theft tracking indicator on the 2009 tax year.
Note:
Refer to your functional IRM for guidance on resolving preparer fraud cases.
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Personally Identifiable Information (PII). The definition of personally identifiable information is provided by OMB 07-16. For further information about PII, see the Privacy, Governmental Liaison, Disclosure (PGLD) web page called PII - What is personally identifiable information?.
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Incident - Throughout this IRM, the term “incident” refers to an occurrence or event involving identity theft as it applies to a specific tax year(s) as reported by the taxpayer.
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For a full listing of Identity Protection terms, see Exhibit 10.5.3-1, Glossary of Identity Protection Terms and Definitions.
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Federal agencies have been instructed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury to address the increasing occurrence of identity theft.
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The Identity Protection Program was created in response to these directives and recommendations and to ensure IRS compliance with the President's Identity Theft Task Force Report.
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Identity theft creates a heavy financial and emotional toll on its victims and severely burdens our economy. Because the IRS touches almost all Americans, we developed an Identity Protection Vision document to combat tax-related fraud and to assist taxpayers who are identity theft victims. The IRS is focused on prevention and assistance activities including a comprehensive approach to protecting taxpayer information. The IRS will enhance efforts through three primary goals:
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victim assistance
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outreach
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prevention
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Identity Protection - This office in Privacy, Governmental Liaison, and Disclosure (PGLD) has the following specific responsibilities related to administering the Identity Protection Program in IRS:
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Building programs to reduce incidents of identity theft
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Defining, communicating, and assigning responsibility for the IRS' substantiated identity theft incident tracking program
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Raising taxpayer awareness of identity theft techniques through outreach
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Reducing taxpayer burden and improving service options while addressing and resolving identity theft cases
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Protecting Treasury revenue by identifying suspicious filings before the refunds are generated
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Increasing operational efficiency of the IRS by detecting and processing reported identity theft incidents as early and consistently as possible
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Carrying out activities as required by the Identity Theft Advisory Council, which oversees the development and execution of the Identity Protection Program
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Identifying emerging trends and developing appropriate strategies and responses
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Developing, defining, monitoring, and executing identity theft policies and procedures
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Participating in risk assessments on IRS business processes, where appropriate
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Communicating and coordinating with both internal and external stakeholders (such as the Federal Trade Commission) to ensure consistency regarding identity theft issues
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Determining identity theft performance measures to assess the effectiveness of the program and identity theft initiatives throughout the IRS, and making recommendations for improvement as appropriate
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Overseeing the maintenance, publication, and conveyance of the Servicewide Identity Theft Guidance Internal Revenue Manual, ensuring that the information that it contains remains current
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Conduct identity theft program reviews, which include but are not limited to:
IRM reviews to verify procedural consistency; and
Closed case reviews to ensure adherence to servicewide policies and procedures -
PGLD in conjunction with IT will evaluate new technologies and assess benefits for application in identity theft initiatives
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PGLD will work with Criminal Investigation to develop a process to communicate identity theft schemes and new tactics used by perpetrators
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The Identity Protection Office supports servicewide efforts to recognize and resolve identity theft issues while striving to provide a uniform and consistent approach to victim assistance. This includes internal outreach to all Business Operating Divisions to ensure the established policies are implemented and supported servicewide.
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Identity theft occurs when someone uses an individual’s personal information, such as name, Social Security Number (SSN), or other identifying information without permission, to commit fraud or other crimes. Taxpayers may notify the IRS when they believe they may have experienced an identity theft incident. In these instances, taxpayers must provide documentation to establish that they are identity theft victims.
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Identity theft often leaves its victims feeling helpless and distraught. Service employees should exercise empathy in dealing with victims. See IRM 10.5.3.2.2, Taxpayer Interaction. Additionally, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights II (TBOR 2), grants all taxpayers important rights. See Pub 1, Your Rights as a Taxpayer.
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Identity theft cases will be prioritized and worked expeditiously.
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Identity theft can affect tax administration in two primary ways:
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Employment or Income Related - This occurs when the identity thief uses the victim’s SSN to obtain employment, resulting in what may appear as unreported income under the victim's account.
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Refund Related - This occurs when the identity thief uses the victim’s SSN to file a false federal income tax return to obtain funds. If the thief files before the victim, the victim may not receive his or her refund within a reasonable time frame.
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Non-Tax Related Identity Theft - If you think you might be at risk of identity theft due to a lost or stolen purse or wallet, questionable credit card activity or credit report, you should contact the IRS Identity Protection Specialized Unit to take steps to secure your account.
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You can call IPSU toll-free at 800-908-4490, Mon. – Fri., 7 a.m. -7 p.m. local time (Pacific Time for Alaska and Hawaii). You will need to fill out an 'IRS Identity Theft Affidavit', Form 14039.
Note:
Please be sure to write legibly and follow the instructions on the back of the form.
Note:
For additional information on non-tax related identity theft, see IRM 21.9.2.3.1, Self Identified - Non-Tax-Related Identity Theft.
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Tax Related Identity Theft -
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If you think someone is using your information to file false tax returns, you should contact the IPSU toll-free number and your local Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) office immediately, in person or by phone at 800-366-4484.
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If you receive an IRS notice that makes you think you have become a victim of tax-related identity theft, you should call the number on the notice as soon as possible.
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If you believe someone is using your information to impersonate an IRS employee, or if you suspect an IRS employee may be involved in your identity theft, you should contact TIGTA immediately.
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All taxpayers desire and expect courteous service. Taxpayers who have experienced identity theft are already victims, either emotionally or financially. IRS employees need to be aware of that impact and handle the contact with an additional level of sensitivity and understanding.
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Victims can suffer far more than the loss of their money or ruin of their credit. Loss of employment and inability to obtain housing are just a few examples of how identity theft can threaten a victim’s basic needs.
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In addition to providing the taxpayer with courteous service, you should educate the taxpayer as to how to protect themselves and where to find additional information:
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Contact the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Identity Theft Hotline;
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Contact the Social Security Administration (SSA);
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File a report with their local or state police;
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Contact their state Attorney General's office;
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Contact one of the three major credit bureaus: Equifax, Experian, or TransUnion;
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File Form 14039, Identity Theft Affidavit with the IRS;
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Review Publication 4535, Identity Theft Prevention and Victim Assistance; and
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Review the IRS website.
For additional information see IRM 21.9.2.3, Identity Theft - Telephone Interview. -
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Taxpayers meeting Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) Criteria 1-4 (economic burden), will be referred to the TAS, see IRM 13.1.7.2, TAS Case Criteria.
Caution:
If IRS can provide relief or take a substantive action towards providing relief within 24 hours, do not send the case to TAS.
Generally, IRS will refer TAS Criteria 5-7 cases to IPSU for resolution. Refer to IRM 21.9.2.9, Identity Theft Assistance Request (ITAR) - General Information, for the IPSU criteria.
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Research should be performed and documented prior to reaching a final determination of identity theft. Research using Command Codes (CC) ENMOD, IMFOL, RTVUE, NAMES, INOLE, DUPOL, FFINQ, REINF, and IRPTR.
Caution:
Consult your functional IRM for research requirements when resolving identity theft cases as the following list is not all inclusive.
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Research the TIN (valid and invalid) to determine if there was a mixed entity or scrambled case in prior years, and to locate any possible cross-reference TIN.
Note:
Research Real-Time System (RTS) in addition to IDRS research of CCs for Individual Tax Identification Numbers (ITIN). See IRM 3.21.263.8.1.2, Accessing and Logging onto ITIN RTS and IRM 3.21.263.8.4, Researching the ITIN RTS.
Caution:
See IRM 21.6.2, Adjusting TIN-Related Problems for additional information.
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Review all returns for the year(s) involved (including returns filed at other sites AND electronic filed returns). When applicable, utilize SCFTR Service Center Control File (SCCF) as a part of your research. For ITIN cases, use EUP/RTS to locate DLNs to request any relevant original Form W-7 application documents.
Note:
Prior to ordering returns from files, hard copy MFTRA prints, and NUMIDENT use CC RTVUE, TRDBV etc. to case build. Unnecessary ordering of returns, MFTRAs and NUMIDENTs may delay case resolution.
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Search returns, schedules, and forms for a different TIN. Research spouse and dependent information whenever available.
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Compare all documents and return information for:
•Name
•Social Security Number
•Address
•Occupation
•Exemptions
•Signatures (except for e-filed returns when a signature is unavailable)
•Similar tax data
•Forms W-2, etc.
•Marital status changes
•Tax preparer -
If you cannot locate a valid TIN for each taxpayer, and the common number (the taxpayer identification number used by the victim and the perpetrator) is an SSN, request MFTRA, type U, to obtain NUMIDENT information.
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Search returns and entity modules for indications of identity theft such as identity theft documentation attached to the return or a previously posted TC 971 with Action Code (AC) 501 or TC 971 with Action Code 522.
Caution:
Inadequate authentication of the identity of a caller could result in an unauthorized disclosure of return or return information. Refer to IRM 21.1.3.2.3, Required Taxpayer Authentication and IRM 21.1.3.2.4, Additional Taxpayer Authentication.
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The first step to tracking and reporting identity theft incidents is through the use of Identity Theft Tracking Indicators. Identity theft can be tax related or non-tax related. Identity theft cases can be found in virtually any BOD/Function inventory.
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In situations where the taxpayer makes an allegation of identity theft or when the IRS initially suspects that identity theft may have occurred, IRS functions will move the case into their identity theft inventory. Accounts will be marked using the appropriate identity theft tracking indicator.
Note:
Refer to your functional IRM regarding the process of inventory management for ID Theft cases.
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Moving cases into identity theft inventory provides victims with a treatment stream for case resolution specific to identity theft.
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The Identity Protection Program developed identity theft indicator codes to track identity theft incidents. Each indicator is input as a Transaction Code (TC) 971 with Action Code (AC) and is displayed on Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS) via command codes ENMOD or IMFOL with definer "E" of the affected taxpayer's account. For accounts not available on IDRS, command code IMFOLE will display the identity theft tracking indicators.
Caution:
The tracking indicators in this IRM only apply to individual tax accounts. They cannot be used on BMF accounts.
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Identity theft tracking indicators are used to mark both tax-related and non-tax related incidents of identity theft and they help us to identify open and closed cases. While some action codes are used to track the progression of inventory (522) others provide taxpayer protections (501 and 506).
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In January 2012, PGLD expanded the use of identity theft markers to facilitate Servicewide tracking and reporting of identity theft incidents. These indicators, or markers, capture identity theft inventory from the initial taxpayer allegation to account resolution. Each indicator is input as a Transaction Code (TC) 971 with an Action Code (AC) and Tax Administration Source Code.
Note:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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The AC and Tax Administration Source Code is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the case.
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An initial allegation or suspicion of identity theft can be recognized by either the taxpayer or the service. PGLD developed tracking indicators to mark taxpayer accounts when the identity theft incident is initially alleged or suspected.
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Two new Tax Administration Source codes were developed to track cases as they are initially identified:
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TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM - for taxpayer initiated allegations of identity theft.
Note:
For identity theft cases initiated as TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM, the identity theft issue will be closed with a corresponding TC 971 AC 501 reflecting the same tax year, provided the taxpayer submitted supporting documentation.
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TC 971 AC 522 IRSID - for IRS initiated suspicions of identity theft.
Note:
For identity theft cases initiated as TC 971 AC 522 IRSID, the identity theft issue will be closed with a corresponding TC 971 AC 506 reflecting the same tax year, as applicable.
Reminder:
TC 971 AC 522 does not provide taxpayer protections or prevent future occurrences of identity theft. This code is used to identify potential identity theft cases.
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Prior to marking an account with TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM or IRSID, research ENMOD/IMFOLE to ensure the account has not already been marked for the same tax year/incident. If the coding already exists, do not input a second code for the same tax year/incident.
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Do not apply the AC 522 PNDCLM or IRSID to the SSN of a taxpayer when an ITIN taxpayer reports the misuse of the SSN. See IRM 10.5.3.2.10 (1) d.
Example:
In the course of performing an audit, the employee identifies an ITIN taxpayer has been working under the SSN belonging to another individual. The SSN owner is unaware of the misuse of his SSN. Do not apply the AC 522 to the commonly used SSN.
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In situations where the taxpayer or the taxpayer's authorized representative as defined in IRM 21.3.7.5, Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative and Form 8821, Taxpayer Information Authorization Overview makes an allegation of identity theft, employees will mark the taxpayer's account using Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from ENMOD to input a TC 971 AC 522 reflecting Tax Administration Source Code PNDCLM, and the tax year of the identity theft incident. See Exhibit 10.5.3–12, for additional information.
Example:
Taxpayer calls the IRS on March 13, 2011, regarding a CP 2000 notice for 2009. He states he did not earn the income reported nor did he reside in the state in which the income was earned. He suspects he may be a victim of identity theft. He has not experienced a previous identity theft issue. He is concerned that someone may be using his SSN without his permission for employment purposes. The Customer Service Representative (CSR) will input a TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM initiating an identity theft case.
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When a taxpayer asserts identity theft, request the taxpayer provide identity theft supporting documentation. See IRM 10.5.3.2.7,Identity Theft Supporting Documentation.
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There will be only one TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM per tax year, per reported incident.
Example:
Taxpayer calls IRS on May 15, 2011, claiming to be a victim of identity theft for a 2008 audit assessment. The Customer Service Representative (CSR) requests the taxpayer respond to examination with identity theft supporting documentation and applies the TC 971 522 PNDCLM to the 2008 account. On September 12, 2011, the taxpayer calls IRS claiming to be a victim of identity theft for the same 2008 audit assessment. The CSR reviews the account and finds there is no open IDRS controls and there is an un-reversed 522 PNDCLM. The CSR will follow IRM procedures for resolving the call. The CSR will not input another 522 PNDCLM as one is already present on the entity.
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If the account reflects a TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM for a specific tax year that has been reversed (TC 972) and the taxpayer is reporting an identity theft for the same tax year, a second TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM may be appropriate.
Example:
A taxpayer alleging identity theft contacted IRS on February 2, 2012 regarding tax year 2009. The employee requested supporting documentation from the taxpayer. On May 1, 2012, the employee input a TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY as the taxpayer did not provide the documentation requested. On June 3, 2012, the taxpayer provided the requested documents. The employee input a new TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM and a TC 971 AC 522 to reflect receipt of documentation.
-
If ENMOD reflects an unreversed TC 971 AC 501 and the taxpayer is reporting identity theft in a subsequent tax year, a TC 971 AC 522 NODCRQ is appropriate. See IRM 10.5.3.2.7.4, Marking Taxpayer Accounts When Identity Theft Supporting Documents Are NOT Required (NODCRQ) -TC 971 AC 522 NODCRQ.
-
If, at the time of case closure you find the Entity module has not been flagged with a TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM, do not input this code at closing. Close the identity theft issue with TC 971 AC 50X, as appropriate.
-
In situations where the IRS suspects identity theft may have occurred, employees will mark accounts, using Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from ENMOD to input a TC 971 AC 522 reflecting a Tax Administration Source Code IRSID, and the tax year of the identity theft incident. See IRM Exhibit 10.5.3 -12 for additional information.
-
There will be only one TC 971 AC 522 IRSID per tax year, per reported incident.
Example:
Accounts Management, while working a duplicate filing condition for the 2010 tax year, suspects an identity theft incident may have occurred. The TC 976 return appears to have been filed by the SSN owner at the address of record for many years. The TC 150 reflects income not supported by IRPTR, suspicious dependents and a different address from prior year filings. The CSR will input a TC 971 AC 522 IRSID initiating an identity theft case and follow IRM procedures to resolve their case.
Note:
PGLD considers an account with a TC 971 AC 522 IRSID and no subsequent TC 971 AC 506 (indicating a completely resolved account) an open identity theft case. Subsequently, if the case is deemed NOT to be identity theft, see IRM 10.5.3.2.8, Reversing Pending Identity Theft Claims - TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY or NOIDT.
-
If, at the time of case closure you find the Entity module has not been flagged with a TC 971 AC 522 IRSID, do not input this code at closing. Close the identity theft issue with TC 971 AC 50X, as appropriate
-
Generally, employees will use internal resources to research taxpayer accounts. Internal research includes, but is not limited to, use of Command Code IRPTR, past filing history, entity research, etc. See IRM 21.6.2.3, TIN-Related Problems Research, IRM 21.6.2.4.2, Multiple Individuals Using the Same TIN, and IRM 21.6.2.4.2.3, Preliminary Research for addition information about determining SSN ownership.
-
If a determination of SSN ownership can not be made using internal research, the employee assigned may request the taxpayer provide identity theft supporting documentation. See IRM 10.5.3.2.7, Identity Theft Supporting Documentation. The employee will follow their functional IRM procedures established for requesting taxpayer information.
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In situations where you do not have the authority to work the case to resolution, follow your IRM procedures to refer the case to the appropriate function. For example, a CSR will follow their IRM 21.6.2.4.2.1, Telephone Inquiries Regarding MXEN, IDT1, IDT3, IDT8, IDT9 and Scrambled Cases and prepare a Form 4442 to refer taxpayer inquiries regarding mixed entity, identity theft, and Scrambled SSN cases.
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Taxpayers will notify the IRS when they believe they may have experienced an identity theft incident. In these instances, taxpayers alleging to be victims of identity theft will be required to provide documentation to substantiate identity theft incidents as detailed below:
Note:
In situations where the taxpayer initially asserts identity theft and provides supporting documents at the same time, mark the account with both a TC 971 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Code “PNDCLM” and a second TC 971 AC 522 reflecting documentation using the appropriate Tax Administration Source Code.
-
Authentication of Identity - a copy of a valid U.S. federal or state government issued form of identification (examples include a driver’s license, state identification card, social security card, or passport).
Note:
IRS no longer accepts Puerto Rican birth certificates issued before July 1, 2010, due to new law by the Government of Puerto Rico. Taxpayers with birth certificates issued before this date must get new documentation from the Puerto Rico Vital Statistics Record Office.
-
Evidence of Identity Theft - a copy of a police report or Form 14039, IRS Identity Theft Affidavit.
Note:
The IRS affidavit, Form 14039, is accepted from taxpayers in support of an allegation of identity theft. This form collects only the information necessary for taxpayers to attest to the IRS that they either have experienced or are at risk of harm from identity theft. IRS only accepts the IRS affidavit or a police report for substantiation purposes. The IRS affidavit is also available in Spanish, Form 14039 SP.
Note:
When taxpayers contact the IRS indicating they have lost their wallet, experienced suspicious activity on their credit report, or have a tax related issue, IRS employees should direct them to complete Form 14039. As a reminder, this is not necessary if they have already obtained a police report. The police report is a valid form of identity theft substantiation. Taxpayers who submit police reports should not be directed to complete an IRS affidavit. Requirements for proof of identity (in addition to documentation substantiating identity theft) remain the same.
-
-
Form 14039 is used to report both tax-related and non-tax related identity theft issues. The Form 14039 can be filed by either mail or fax following the instructions provided on the second page of the Form 14039.
IF the taxpayer alleges identity theft and THEN The taxpayer was unable to file his/her return electronically because the primary and/or secondary SSN was misused Advise the taxpayer to attach Form 14039 and documentation to the back of his/her paper return and submit all to the IRS location where he/she normally files. The taxpayer already filed a paper return Advise the taxpayer to submit the Form 14039 and documentation to the IRS location where he/she normally files. The taxpayer is responding to a letter or notice he/she received Advise the taxpayer to submit Form 14039 and documentation with a copy of the notice or letter to the address contained in the notice or letter. Does not have a tax related issue Advise the taxpayer to mail the Form and documentation to
Internal Revenue Service
PO. Box 9039
Andover, MA 01810-0939
Or fax the Form to (855) 807-5720.Note:
See IRM 10.5.3.2.7.2, Complete and Legible Documents for additional information.
-
If taxpayers do not provide substantiation documentation when requested, proceed with case resolution assuming the taxpayer is not an identity theft victim. See IRM 10.5.3.2.8, Reversing Pending Identity Theft Claims - TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY or NOIDT.
-
Substantiation Documentation can be accepted from the taxpayer or someone who has power of attorney for the taxpayer (e.g., Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative). Form 14039 requires a taxpayer signature. See IRM 10.5.3.2.7.2, Complete and Legible Documents for additional information.
-
Documents must be secured and handled in the same manner as other sensitive taxpayer information.
-
The business unit function that is assigned the identity theft case (relevant open control) or issued the notice/letter relating to the identity theft (CP 2000, Audit Notice, Letter 239C, etc.) is responsible for collecting substantiation documentation in a timely, accurate, and secure manner, if applicable.
-
After the receipt of the taxpayer's documentation, IRS will need to research the case to verify the taxpayer's claim. If it is later determined that identity theft did not occur, reverse the TC 971 AC 522 (see IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-13 TC 972 AC 522 - Reversal of the TC 971 AC 522).
Note:
A systemic notification letter that the substantiation is received is not sent to the taxpayer when an AC 522 is input. Refer to your functional IRM for the specific letter your function will use to notify the taxpayer that Form 14039 was received by the IRS. However, a systemic notification letter is sent once the case is resolved and the TC 971 AC 501 is applied to the taxpayer's account.
-
Acknowledge receipt of Form 14039 within 30 days of the IRS received date.
If you are closing the case within 30 days of receipt, the closing contact will act as both an acknowledgement of receipt of the taxpayer's documents and the closing contact.Caution:
Exercise caution when acknowledging receipt of documentation by mail. The address on Form 14039 may be different from the address on ENMOD.
Note:
Taxpayer notification does not apply to employees securing documentation face to face from the taxpayer.
-
Taxpayer accounts displaying a TC 971 AC 522 with any one of the following Tax Administration Source Codes:
-
INCOME
-
INCMUL
-
MULTFL
-
NOFR
-
OTHER
indicate the taxpayer provided complete and legible documentation supporting identity theft for a specific tax year. See IRM 10.5.3.2.7.3, Marking Taxpayer Accounts When Accepting Identity Theft Supporting Documents.Caution:
This excludes accounts marked with a TC 971 AC 522 reflecting "PPDS" as the BOD, "OPIP" as the Program, and "OTHER" as the Tax Administration Code.
Caution:
The submission of Form 14039 by a claimant is not proof of identity theft. Identity theft is determined only after reviewing pertinent case facts and circumstances.
-
-
A taxpayer is required to provide substantiation documentation to the IRS only once per incident. Any business unit that requires substantiation documentation for an identity theft incident should use this documentation.
Example:
A taxpayer provides substantiation documentation to Automated Underreporter (AUR). The next year, Automated Collection System (ACS) receives a call from the taxpayer about a balance due notice and indicates he or she does not owe because of identity theft related to the same incident reported to AUR. The taxpayer does not need to submit substantiation documentation again.
-
Substantiation documentation is valid for a period of three years from the date IRS receives and processes the documentation. If the taxpayer experiences a new identity theft incident after that period, the taxpayer will need to submit new substantiation documentation.
Example:
A taxpayer provides substantiation documentation to the IRS in March 2007. The taxpayer contacts IRS in 2012 with a new incident of identity theft. The taxpayer would need to provide IRS with new substantiation documentation.
Example:
A taxpayer’s wallet was stolen in 2009. He reported the incident to the IRS in June 2009 and provided supporting documentation. His account was marked with a TC 971 AC 504. In March 2012, the taxpayer contacts the IRS because someone else filed using his SSN. The taxpayer does NOT need to provide new supporting documentation as the current incident is within the 3 year period.
Note:
If the documentation received date is different from the processing date (TC 971 AC 522 date), use the most current to begin the 3 year period.
-
Substantiation documentation may be submitted for one or more tax years.
Example:
In April 2010, the taxpayer received an AUR notice for his 2008 tax account. The taxpayer suspects he may be a victim of identity theft because he was unable to electronically file his 2009 return (someone had already filed under his SSN). The taxpayer provides substantiation documentation to the IRS in May 2010 for the years 2008 and 2009.
-
Before requesting substantiation documentation review the taxpayer's account (ENMOD/IMFOLE) to determine if a TC 971 (AC 501, 504, 505, 506, or 522) identity theft indicator already exists. If any of these indicators exists, follow the chart below:
-
Reviewing ENMOD/IMFOLE is necessary to help prevent duplicative (identical) TC 971 AC 501 entries. While there may be multiple TC 971 AC 501s on an account, none should be identical, e.g., they will pertain to different tax years, arise from different tax administration sources.
IF THEN ENMOD/IMFOLE does not reflect any Identity Theft Tracking Indicators Collect Supporting Documentation per IRM 10.5.3.2.7, Identity Theft Supporting Documentation. See IRM 10.5.3.2.6, Initial Allegation or Suspicion of Tax-Related identity Theft - Identity Theft Indicators. TC 971 AC 501 is present - Taxpayer initiated tax-related identity theft incident -
See IRM 10.5.3.2.7(8), 10.5.3.2.7(9), and 10.5.3.2.7(10), Identity Theft Supporting Documents, to determine when to collect documentation from the taxpayer.
TC 971 AC 504 is present- Taxpayer initiated non-tax-related identity theft incident. -
Before requesting documentation, see IRM 10.5.3.2.7(8), 10.5.3.2.7(9), and 10.5.3.2.7(10), Identity Theft Supporting Documents.
TC 971 AC 505 is present Note:
For more information about this indicator, see IRM 10.5.4.5.1.1, Applying Tracking Indicators to IRS Data Loss Incidents
-
Collect supporting documentation.
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Notify the Identity Protection Office immediately at Outlook directory mailbox *PIPDS Identity Protection Program. Send an encrypted E-mail to the Identity Protection Office with the following information: taxpayer name, SSN, substantiation documentation used to substantiate theft and identity, and any other information available based on your contact with the taxpayer.
Caution:
Do NOT show any PII of the taxpayer on the subject line of the E-mail. Show the subject line as, "AC 501 with AC 505 on taxpayer account."
TC 971 AC 506 is present - IRS initiated tax-related identity theft incident -
If you are able to make a determination of SSN ownership using internal research, do not request supporting documents.
Note:
If you cannot make a determination using internal research and there is a TC 971 AC 522 indicating documents were previously provided, see IRM 10.5.3.2.7(8), 10.5.3.2.7(9), and 10.5.3.2.7(10).
TC 971 AC 522 with any of the following Administration Source Codes present: -
INCOME
-
MULTFL
-
INCMUL
-
NOFR
-
OTHER
-
NODCRQ
-
The taxpayer has already provided complete and legible documents. See IRM 10.5.3.2.7(9) and IRM 10.5.3.2.7(10) to determine if those documents have expired.
Caution:
This excludes accounts marked with a TC 971 AC 522 reflecting "PPDS" as the BOD, "OPIP" as the Program, and "OTHER" as the Tax Administration Code.
TC 971 AC 522 with any of the following Administration Source Codes present: -
IRSID
-
≡ ≡ ≡
-
If you are able to make a determination of SSN ownership using internal research, do not request supporting documents.
TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM is present AND there is NO TC 971 AC 522 indicating document receipt Collect Supporting Documentation per IRM 10.5.3.2.7, Identity Theft Supporting Documentation.. Note:
If more than 45 days has passed since the taxpayer mailed the documents, request the taxpayer to resubmit and annotate AMS.
-
-
When a taxpayer submits Form 14039, the Form 14039 and associated document(s) must be reviewed to determine if they are legible and complete.
Note:
An unsigned Form 14039 is considered incomplete.
-
A document is considered legible when the following elements, as applicable to document type and IRS needs in determining the true SSN owner (passport, valid driver’s license, military identification, other state issued ID, etc.), are clear and easily read:
-
Name
-
Date of birth
-
Place of birth
-
Address
-
Date of issue
-
Expiration date
If you have determined the documentation provided is complete and legible, initiate taxpayer contact to notify them the information requested has been received.
-
-
When the documentation is NOT legible/complete and:
IF THEN There is an open control in another function.
Sending Employee-
Input TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM (if there is already a TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM for the same tax year, do not input another).
-
Forward the documentation to the employee assigned in the appropriate function.
-
The sending employee will close their control after sending the case to the assigned (receiving) employee.
Receiving (Assigned) Employee-
The receiving (assigned) employee will suspend the case and request the taxpayer provide legible and complete documentation within 30 days.
-
If the receiving (assigned) employee does not secure a taxpayer response within 45 days from the date of request, the TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM will be reversed using TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY
-
The receiving (assigned) employee will close identity theft issue and resolve/address remaining issues as appropriate.
If you have an open case Exception:
AM IPSU employees will begin monitoring process. Refer to IRM 21.9.2.4.1 (7), Form 14039 or Taxpayer Correspondence with Incidental Form 14039.
-
Input TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM (if there is already a TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM for the same tax year, do not input another).
-
Contact the taxpayer and request the taxpayer provide legible and complete documentation within 30 days.
-
If you do not receive a taxpayer response within 45 days from the date of request, reverse TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM using TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY.
-
Close identity theft issue and resolve/address remaining issues as appropriate.
There is no open control in another function. -
Input TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM (if there is already a TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM for the same tax year, do not input another).
-
Return the documents to the taxpayer explaining what is needed.
-
Advise the taxpayer to respond with complete legible documents within 30 days.
-
Close identity theft issue and resolve/address remaining issues as appropriate.
Note:
Exercise caution when contacting the taxpayer by mail. If the address on Form 14039 differs from the address on ENMOD, correspond to the address on Form 14039.
-
-
Once documents have been verified as complete and legible, mark the account with a TC 971 AC 522 and the appropriate Tax Administration Source Code, see IRM 10.5.3.2.7.3, Marking Taxpayer Accounts When Accepting Identity Theft Supporting Documentation and Exhibit 10.5.3-12, TC 971 AC 522 - Substantiation Documentation Received by IRS.
Note:
If the documentation provided is not complete or legible but you can make a determination through the use of internal research, resolve the identity theft issue. See IRM 21.6.2.3, TIN-Related Problems Research, IRM 21.6.2.4.2, Multiple Individuals Using the Same TIN, and IRM 21.6.2.4.2.3, Preliminary Research for additional information about determining SSN ownership. See IRM 10.5.3.2.12, IRS Identified Identity Theft Affecting Tax Administration - TC 971 AC 506. Do not use TC 971 AC 501 when closing unless you have complete and legible documentation.
Note:
If only one digit or letter is not clear on the taxpayer provided document, calling the taxpayer to verify information is acceptable.
-
Upon receipt of complete and legible documents, mark the taxpayer's account using Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from ENMOD to input a TC 971 AC 522 reflecting an appropriate Tax Administration Source Code depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case along with the tax year of the identity theft incident. See IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-12, TC 971 AC 522 - Substantiation Documentation Received by IRS.
-
There are five Tax Administration Source Codes that apply when marking accounts to reflect receipt of acceptable documents.
-
INCOME - used when income has been reported under the taxpayer's SSN without their consent or knowledge.
-
MULTFL -used when two or more returns are filed for the same tax period under the same SSN.
-
INCMUL - used when both INCOME and MULTFL apply.
-
NOFR - used when the taxpayer is not required to file a return.
-
OTHER - used when the situation does not fit any Tax Administration Source Code Type.
Caution:
Review the Form 14039 for the year(s) affected by identity theft. Be sure to include only those years where identity theft is suspected when marking the taxpayer's account.
-
-
The TC 971 AC 522 (INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, NOFR, and OTHER) are only applied to a taxpayer's account when complete and legible substantiation documentation has been received by the IRS.
-
After receipt of the taxpayer's documentation, the employee assigned will need to research the case to verify the taxpayer's claim. If it is later determined that identity theft did not occur, reverse the TC 971 AC 522 (see IRM 10.5.3 - 13 TC 972 AC 522 - Reversal of the TC 971 AC 522). Follow your IRM procedures to notify the taxpayer of actions you took to resolve the issues.
-
A systemic notification letter that the substantiation is received is not sent to the taxpayer when an AC 522 is input. However, a systemic notification letter is sent once the case is resolved (the AC 501 is input).
-
Generally, taxpayers alleging identity theft will be required to provide supporting documents. However, in situations where the taxpayer alleges identity theft and there is a posted unreversed TC 971 AC 501, AC 506, or AC 522 Source Code INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, NOFR or OTHER taxpayers may not be required to provide substantiation documentation. In situations where identity theft is alleged or suspected and both of the following are true,
-
There is a posted/unreversed TC 971 AC 501/ 506 or TC 971 AC 522 Source Code INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, NOFR, or OTHER and
-
The posted transaction falls within the three year period as described in IRM 10.5.3.2.7(9) andIRM 10.5.3.2.7(10).
You will input a TC 971 AC 522 on ENMOD containing the Administration Source Code "NODCRQ" . The Secondary Date field will reflect the tax year of the incident:Example:
Ms. Taxpayer contacted the IRS on December 10, 2010, stating that in 2009 someone used her SSN to file a return. She provided ID theft documentation at that time. The account issues were resolved and a TC 971 AC 501 was posted to her Entity. In March 2011, she contacted IRS again because she was unable to file her 2010 return. The employee reviewed the account and found a prior TC 971 AC 501 within the three year period. The employee will mark the account using TC 971 AC 522 NODCRQ.
See IRM Exhibit 10.5.3 -12. -
-
Once you have verified that you are dealing with the victim of identity theft and confirmed he/she is the SSN owner, you will need to verify that the address posted on ENMOD/IMFOLE is the correct address. When a return filled by a non SSN owner posts to an account as a TC 150, the address on ENMOD is updated to the address on that return. To prevent letters, notices, and refunds from being issued to an incorrect address it is important to make timely entity corrections.
Exception:
Updating the address on identity theft cases does not apply to telephone assistors or Field Assistance employees. Addresses are only updated by employees assigned to research and resolve identity theft cases only after an SSN determination has been made.
-
After confirming the person you are working with is the SSN owner, correct the address as appropriate. Refer to IRM 21.2.4.3.5 , Address Change/Correction, and to IRM 21.3.4.12.2 , Taxpayer Requests for Address Change. Correcting the address as early as possible may prevent disclosure of taxpayer information. Note: The submission of Form 14039 by a claimant is not proof of identity theft and address changes should not be based solely on receipt of this form. Form 14039 should be used in conjunction with other key information to make decisions related to verifying taxpayer information. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.3, Identity Theft Research for additional information.
-
There may be situations when it is necessary to reverse a pending identity theft claim.
-
A pending identity theft claim is an account with an unreversed TC 971 AC 522 and no subsequent TC 971 AC 50X.
-
Taxpayer Does Not Respond to Requests For Supporting Documentation - NORPLY: In situations where the taxpayer alleges identity theft and has not provided the supporting documents as requested, mark the taxpayer's account using Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from ENMOD to input a TC 972 AC 522 reflecting a Tax Administration Source Code NORPLY, and the tax year of the identity theft incident. See Exhibit 10.5.3–13 for additional information.
Example:
On February 14, 2011, the taxpayer contacted SBSE Exam regarding a 2009 statutory notice of deficiency. The taxpayer claimed that he MUST be a victim of identity theft as someone else claimed his dependents. The exam employee input a TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM to flag the account as potential identity theft and requested the taxpayer provide supporting documentation within the next 30 days. The case was put into suspense for 45 days. The taxpayer did not respond. On April 18, 2011, the exam employee reversed the pending identity theft claim using TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY and continued to work the case using normal exam procedures.
Reminder:
If the taxpayer does not provide substantiation documentation when requested, proceed with case resolution assuming the taxpayer is not an identity theft victim.
-
Identity Theft Did NOT Occur - NOIDT: In the course of resolving an identity theft allegation, it is determined that identity theft did not occur, it will be necessary to reverse the pending claim. Employees will mark accounts where it is determined that identity theft did not occur, using Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from ENMOD to input a TC 972 AC 522 reflecting a Tax Administration Source Code NOIDT, and the tax year of the identity theft incident. See IRM Exhibit 10.5.3-13 for additional information. Follow your IRM procedures to notify the taxpayer of actions you took to resolve the issues.
Example:
Taxpayer asserted he might be a victim of identity theft on February 12, 2011, when he filed Form 14039 and personal identification at his local Taxpayer Assistance Center (TAC). The TAC employee verified a return was already filed for the taxpayer under his SSN and input two TC 971 AC 522s. One indicating a pending claim of identity theft (TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM) and a second indicating the documents provided were legible and complete (TC 971 AC 522 MULTFL). The TAC employee sent the return for processing. Several weeks later, the return posted to the taxpayers account as a TC 976. On May 24, 2011, the taxpayer calls toll-free and reports he made an error on his 16 year-old son’s return. The taxpayer inadvertently used his own SSN when completing his son’s return. The son’s return is posted as the TC 150 return. No identity theft occurred. The IRS employee inputs comments on AMS and makes a referral to the employee assigned the duplicate filing (DUPF) case. The employee assigned the DUPF will reverse the TC 971 AC 522 PNDCLM from taxpayer’s account by marking the taxpayer’s account with a TC 972 AC 522 NOIDT, indicating the identity theft claim has been rescinded.
-
Case Closure Analysis: Perform case closure analysis to ensure all identity theft related issues have been addressed and resolved. This includes but is not limited to:
-
Review both prior (a minimum of three prior years) and subsequent years for apparent evidence of unresolved identity theft issues;
Example:
The SSN owner filed for the first time in 2011. A review of the accounts indicates returns were filed for tax years 2009 and 2010. While the taxpayer did not include the tax years 2009 and 2010 on the Form 14039, it is clear that these years were not filed by the SSN owner.
-
Release notice or enforcement holds as appropriate;
-
Ensure the victim received their appropriate refund; And
-
Verify and update the taxpayer's address.
-
-
Issues identified during case closure analysis should ONLY be referred to another function when the case can not be resolved within your function.
-
Back-End Work - For the purpose of identity theft case resolution as described in IRM 10.5.3, back-end work consists of actions needed to finish case resolution. These actions have no affect on the taxpayer (victim of identity theft). The following outstanding issues are considered back-end work:
-
Waiting for a perpetrator's return to post to an IRSN; and
-
Transferring an assessment using TC 400 procedures.
The employee assigned will have resolved the taxpayer's (victim's) account which includes:
-
correcting the taxpayer's address;
-
adjusting the account to the taxpayer's figures;
-
advising the taxpayer of actions taken; and
-
issuing the taxpayer's correct refund.
-
-
The input of the AC 50X will not, in every case, coincide with the closing of the control base. There may be additional back-end work to be completed before the control base can be closed. Do not wait until all the additional back-end work is completed before inputting the protective TC 971 AC 501 on the taxpayer's account, for example completing TC 400 procedures.
Caution:
The importance of updating the address prior to inputting the TC 971 AC 501 cannot be stressed enough. If the address is not updated appropriately, the victim notification letter will go to the wrong address. In addition, failure to follow the appropriate sequence could result in the Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN) being sent to the ID thief instead of the ID theft victim. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.16, Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN).
The AC 501 cannot be input until the taxpayer is no longer harmed by identity theft issues impacting tax administration. The TC 501 indicates all identity theft tax administration issues have been resolved from the taxpayer's perspective.Example:
An identity thief's return posted to the victim's 2010 account first. The victim was expecting a refund for 2010. In 2007, the victim was assessed by exam for underreporting income originating from the identity theft. The victim did not have a filing requirement in 2007. Prior to marking ENMOD with a TC 971 AC 501, the employee assigned MUST:
ENSURE the victim's address has been verified and updated on ENMOD.
Adjust the 2010 account to the taxpayer's figures and issue a correct refund to the victim.
Suspend all collection activity.Note:
The correction of the 2007 account is considered back-end work. From the taxpayer's perspective, the account is resolved.
-
A case control must be maintained until all back-end work is completed.
-
Prior to moving a case into back-end casework, the outstanding issues must be cleared through the Office of Privacy, Governmental Liaison and Disclosure (PGLD) if they are not addressed in 10.5.3.2.9(3). Your Headquarters representative from your functional area will coordinate with PGLD.
-
The employee assigned the case will close the identity theft issue by marking the account with either a TC 971 AC 501 for taxpayer initiated identity theft supported by taxpayer provided documentation or a TC 971 AC 506 for IRS identified identity theft (no documentation required). These action codes (501 and 506) provide the taxpayer protection against future occurrences of identity theft.
-
To indicate resolution of a taxpayer initiated identity theft claim supported by documentation, mark the victim's account using Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from ENMOD, to input a TC 971 AC 501 reflecting an appropriate Tax Administration Source Code depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case along with the tax year of the identity theft incident. The AC 501 is applied to a taxpayer's account when all of the following occur:
-
The identity theft incident was taxpayer initiated and supported by taxpayer documentation, or the identity theft incident was IRS initiated but taxpayer documentation was required to resolve all issues.
-
All corrective actions have been taken. This includes verifying and updating the taxpayer's address on ENMOD, as applicable (excludes back-end work, see IRM 10.5.3.2.9(3), Closing Identity Theft Issues.
Caution:
Marking the account with AC 501 prior to correcting the victim's address may result in the issuance of the victim notification letter to an incorrect address and may allow an identity thief's return to post while the legitimate taxpayer's return will unpost.
Note:
See IRM 21.6.2.4.2, Multiple Individuals Using the Same TIN.
-
The taxpayer's identity theft affects tax administration.
-
The taxpayer provided complete and legible substantiation documentation.
Note:
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Perform case closure analysis to ensure all identity theft related issues have been addressed and resolved. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.9, Closing Identity Theft issues.
Note:
The input of the AC 501 will not, in every case, coincide with the closing of the control base. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.9, Closing Identity Theft issues.
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Verifying and updating the taxpayer's address MUST be done before inputting the TC 971 AC 501.
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TC 971 AC 501 can be input by any business unit delegated the authority and programmed to use this code when closing identity theft issues supported by taxpayer documentation.
Example:
A taxpayer contacts AUR about a CP 2000 notice. In the course of working the case, AUR determines the taxpayer is a victim of identity theft. The victim provides AUR with supporting documentation. AUR will verify the taxpayer's address, take appropriate action and close the case with a TC 971 AC 501.
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There can be more than one TC 971 AC 50X input or present for different functions in the same year.
Example:
Accounts Management (AM) determined there was a case of identity theft for 2008 based on a duplicate filing condition. AM inputs TC 971 AC 506 (no taxpayer documentation was secured) at case resolution. This will appear on the taxpayer's account as TC 971 AC 506 WI AMADJ MULTFL 12312008.
Later that year, an Automated Underreporter (AUR) notice (CP 2000) is created for the taxpayer. The income discrepancy is due to the identity theft. When closing the AUR case, AUR inputs TC 971 AC 501 for the underreporter issue because the taxpayer provided supporting documents as requested by AUR. The account will reflect a TC 971 AC 501 WI AUR INCOME 12312008, resulting in two TC 971 AC 50Xs for different functions during the same year. -
There can be more than one TC 971 AC 501 input or present for different tax years by the same business function.
Example:
A taxpayer provides substantiation documentation for identity theft after his or her tax year 2005 electronic return was rejected due to a duplicate filing. At case resolution, a TC 971 AC 501 was placed on the account. The following tax year (2006), there is another duplicate filing on this SSN. Another TC 971 AC 501 would be placed on the taxpayer’s account for tax year 2006, ENMOD/IMFOLE will reflect a TC 971 AC 501 for 2005 and 2006.
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If the taxpayer during his/her initial inquiry stated more than one tax year was affected by identity theft, the function working the taxpayer's issue will review the entity to ensure accounts marked with a TC 971 AC 522 have been resolved. If more than one year is affected by identity theft and resolved, the employee will enter the corresponding TC 971 AC 50X for each year. However, if it is determined that a tax-related identity theft did not occur in one of the previously reported tax years, the employee would reverse the TC 971 AC 522 using the appropriate reversal code, see IRM 10.5.3.2.8, Reversing Pending Identity Theft Claims - TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY or NOIDT.
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Notice CP 01, Identity Theft Claim Acknowledgment, is used for victim notification on identity theft issues closed with a TC 971 AC 501. CP 01 systemically generates between 2 and 12 posting cycles after the TC 971 AC 501 is input, depending upon when the taxpayer's account adjustment is completed. CP 01 contains the following information:
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Confirmation that the substantiation documentation was received and accepted
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Information about how the IRS will monitor the taxpayer's account and income tax returns
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Information about identity theft prevention and available identity theft-related resources
Note:
Letter 4445 C, Acknowledgement Notification, was previously used for victim notification for TC 971 AC 501s input through June 30, 2009. Letter 4445 C may be used in those instances where taxpayers indicate they never received Notice CP 01.
Note:
A Notice CP 01, is not applicable to, and does not systemically generate when a TC 971 AC 506 is applied to a taxpayer's account.
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The taxpayer should continue to file tax returns each tax year, as appropriate.
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The presence and date of the TC 971 AC 501 on an account should be used as a data point, along with other key information, to make case-related decisions. The existence of the identity theft indicator should not supersede or replace existing procedures for case resolution.
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In some instances, it may be necessary to manually reverse TC 971 AC 501. Reversal may be necessary because of any of the following reasons:
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The taxpayer requests reversal.
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There was a keying or internal error in the input of the TC 971 AC 501.
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The original identity theft claim was fraudulent.
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The TC 971 AC 501 has an internally identified negative affect on the taxpayer.
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There are other reasonable circumstances not listed above.
Caution:
Prior to removing the tracking indicator at the taxpayer's request be certain that you are speaking with the taxpayer. Inadequate authentication of the identity of a caller could result in an unauthorized disclosure of return or return information. Refer to IRM 21.1.3.2.3, Required Taxpayer Authentication and IRM 21.1.3.2.4, Additional Taxpayer Authentication prior to providing a replacement PIN.
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If reversal is required, see Exhibit 10.5.3-5 for TC 972 AC 501 reversal input instructions.
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Functional employees assist taxpayers who are, or may become, victims of identity theft. Some functions have unique procedures for identity theft case resolution.
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The Identity Protection Specialized Unit (IPSU) in Wage & Investment, Accounts Management, was established on October 1, 2008, to assist taxpayers who are, or may become, victims of identity theft. Part of IPSU's responsibilities include monitoring and controlling cases where taxpayers call in or write to the unit .The IPSU will refer cases via Form 14027-B,Identity Theft Case Referral, to other functions when an individual with a tax-related identity theft issue has called the IPSU. The form is used to notify functions that an IPSU caseworker will be monitoring case activity and following up on a regular basis. Form 14027-B will be routed through designated Identity Theft Liaisons (see SERP/Who/Where - Identity Theft Liaisons - Functional) and forwarded to functional employees. Refer to IRM 21.9.2.4.3, Tax-Related Identity Theft - (Andover and Fresno IPSU only).
Note:
In situations where IPSU receives a complete and legible Form 14039, the IPSU employee will mark the taxpayer's account to reflect documentation receipt. However, if IPSU did not receive Form 14039 or if the Form 14039 was incomplete or illegible, the function receiving Form 14027-B is responsible for securing Form 14039 and supporting documents from the taxpayer.
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See IRM 21.9.2.2, Identity Theft-Expanded Procedures, for additional information regarding the duties and responsibilities of the IPSU, including the monitoring of identity theft cases with open controls referred from the IPSU to other functions.
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When functional employees receive a Form 14027-B from their functional liaison, they are responsible for all of the following:
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Acknowledging receipt of the form by filling out Section V on page 2 of the form and notating receipt of Form 14027-B on IDRS or AMS. Employees with AMS/CIS access will link the two cases on CIS. Enter AMS narratives and CIS case notes as required in IRM 21.9.2.1 (4), Identity Theft General Information.
Exception:
SB Field Examiners do not use IDRS nor AMS. These examiners use their normal case history worksheet to notate receipt of Form 14027-B.
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Recording periodic history entries (every 60 days) on IDRS or AMS.
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Returning the form to the IPSU caseworker upon resolution of the case through your liaison.
Note:
If the case received in the unit is forwarded to another function for action, functional employees will return Form 14027-B, with section VI completed, to the IPSU identity theft caseworker through their liaison.
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When the case is resolved by the responsible function and the control is closed, the functional employee will complete Form 14027-B through Section VII and return it to the IPSU through their liaison.
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When functional employees receive a Form 14103, Identity Theft Assistance Request (ITAR), from the IPSU, functional employees will take the following actions:
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Acknowledge receipt of identity theft cases referred using Form 14103 within 5 business days via secured E-mail or fax number provided by the AM IPSU employee on the Form 14103, Section II, Box 3.
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Process identity theft cases referred using Form 14103 as priority.
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Review Section IV, Specific Assistance Requested, and determine whether the recommended action is appropriate and the requested completion date is reasonable.
Note:
If the negotiated completion date entered on box 3 and 4 in Section IV has elapsed, then a status update and new completion date must be provided to AM IPSU. Refer to IRM 21.9.2.10.1(10), for additional information.
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Contact the IPSU employee shown in Section II if there are questions regarding the recommended action or if additional time is required. The function and IPSU employees should reach an agreement on the substantive case issues, recommended actions, and follow-up and completion dates.
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Provide the taxpayer with official closing documents as directed in their IRM and provide copies to the AM IPSU Caseworker.
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The function employee/liaison will return the Form 14103 to the IPSU CSR with Section V and VI completed via CIS or fax when CIS is not available.
Note:
Refer to IRM 21.9.2.10 for further information regarding the Identity Theft Assistance Request.
Exception:
When AM converts their assigned case to a category code IDT 9, it will be considered an acknowledgment of the Form 14103 referral.
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As part of the Identity Theft Program, the AM IPSU Team will generally assist taxpayers whose situations meet TAS criteria 5 - 7 AND involve identity theft. Applicable cases will now be considered IPSU criteria and MUST be referred to AM IPSU. See IRM 21.9.2.10, Identity Theft Assistance Request (ITAR) - General Information, for additional information.
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Review ENMOD/IMFOLE to determine if the tax year in question has already been marked with a TC 971 AC 522. If the account has not been flagged with an identity theft tracking indicator, mark the account as appropriate. See IRM 10.5.3.2.5, Initial Allegation or Suspicion of Tax Related identity Theft - Identity Theft Indicators, and IRM 10.5.3.2.7, Identity Theft Supporting Documentation, for assistance in determining the correct identity theft tracking indicator.
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Notify the taxpayer by sending Letter 86 C, Referring Taxpayer Inquiry/Forms to Another Office, or other applicable letter to inform the taxpayer he/she can expect contact from the IPSU within 7 business days from the date of receipt.
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TC 971 AC 506 is applied to a taxpayer's account when Criminal Investigation (CI) identifies identity theft incidents that have tax administration effect. Such incidents can occur when a taxpayer's identity is stolen via phishing or refund schemes verified by CI.
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CI refers cases to Return Integrity Correspondence Service (RICS) AM Taxpayer Assurance Program (TAP) to input TC 971 AC 506 on an account regardless of the existence of any other identity theft indicator code (AC 501, 504, or 505) that may be present on the account.
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See IRM 10.5.3.2.12, IRS-Identified Identity Theft Affecting Tax Administration - TC 971 AC 506 and Exhibits 10.5.3-10 and 10.5.3-11 for more information about this identity theft indicator.
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Accounts Management inputs a TC 971 AC 501 when resolving taxpayer initiated identity theft supported by taxpayer documentation.
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Accounts Management closes an identity theft issue by inputting TC 971 AC 506 on the account of the "determined owner" of an SSN, following procedures for TIN-related problem cases. Specifically, Accounts Management (AM) conducts research to determine the owner of the SSN. If ownership is determined and research indicates that intentional misuse of the SSN is involved, AM inputs a TC 971 AC 506. See IRM 10.5.3.2.12, IRS-Identified Identity Theft Affecting Tax Administration - TC 971 AC 506 and Exhibits 10.5.3-10 and 10.5.3-11 for more information about this identity theft indicator.
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Additional guidance for procedures used by AM employees is located in the following IRMs:
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IRM 21.6.2, Adjusting TIN-Related Problems
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IRM 21.9.2, Accounts Management Identity Theft
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Effective October 11, 2009, the Accounts Management Taxpayer Assurance Program (AM TAP) was established to handle Questionable Refund Program processes that migrated from the Criminal Investigation Scheme Development Centers. AM TAP handled identity theft account work processes and conducted research to verify the validity of tax return information. In 2011, AM TAP moved to Return Integrity & Correspondence Services (RICS). In January 2013, AMTAP was renamed Integrity & Verification Operations (IVO). IVO handles identity theft account work processes and conducts research to verify the validity of tax return information. Specifically, IVO inputs a TC 971 AC 506 identity theft indicator on a taxpayer’s account when a false tax return has been identified by the IRS, and the tax return was not filed by the valid taxpayer. See IRM 21.9.1, Taxpayer Assurance Program , for additional procedures.
Note:
In October 2011, AM TAP moved from Accounts Management (AM) to Return Integrity and Correspondence (RICS) Services.
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The Taxpayer Protection Program (TPP) is responsible for handling potential ID Theft cases that are scored by a set of ID Theft models in DDb or selected through a query in EFDS. Once a potential ID Theft case is identified the return will not post, DDb will input a TC 971/121 to flag the account and either a Letter 4883 C or Letter 5071 C will be sent to the taxpayer for verification. TPP will handle taxpayer correspondence to the 4883C or 5071C letter, including phone calls and call request received from the taxpayer. Refer to IRM 21.9.1.14, Taxpayer Protection Program for additional information.
Note:
When both an IVO indicator (posted TC 971-134) and a TPP indicator (posted TC 971-121) are present on the same tax module, CSRs will handle taxpayer inquiries and account work using TPP procedures.
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RICS Taxpayer Protection Program (TPP) may issue a taxpayer a Letter 4904 C when identity theft is suspected. See IRM 21.9.1.14.5.3 , Case Resolution Procedures.
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Submission Processing inputs TC 971 AC 506 identity theft indicator on the account of a taxpayer, with an unreversed TC 971 AC 501, when the unpostable resolution meets certain conditions. See IRM 10.5.3.2.10.1.
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Additional guidance for procedures used by Submission Processing can be found in the following IRMs:
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IRM 3.12.37.14.15, Unpostable Code 147 Reason Code 1
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IRM 3.12.179.43.1, Possible Identification Theft Procedures
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IRM 3.13.5.24.1.6, Assignment of IRSN for Possible Identity Theft
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IRM 21.9.2.5, Unpostable 147 RC 1 - (UPC 147 RC 1)
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Document 6209, Section 8, Unpostable Code - IMF
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See Exhibits 10.5.3-10 and 10.5.3-11 for more information about this identity theft indicator.
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TC 971 AC 506 is applied to a taxpayer's account when the IRS identifies identity theft incidents that affect tax administration. Such incidents can result from any of the following:
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phishing
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refund schemes
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verified false returns
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mixed entity research
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certain unpostable returns
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an audit investigation before the victim becomes aware of identity theft
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Prior to marking the taxpayer's account with a TC 971 AC 506 the function MUST ensure all corrective actions have been taken which includes:
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Verifying and updating the taxpayer's address on ENMOD, as applicable.
Note:
Marking the account with AC 506 prior to correcting the victim's address may result in negative consequences for the victim. Letters and notices regarding the IP PIN may be directed to an incorrect address.
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Advising the taxpayer of actions taken.
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Issuing the taxpayer's correct refund.
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Adjusting the account to the taxpayer's figures.
Refer to IRM 21.6.2.4.2. Multiple Individuals Using the Same TIN. -
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TC 971 AC 506 is limited and reserved for use by the following functions:
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Criminal Investigation (CI);
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Accounts Management (AM);
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Accounts Management Taxpayer Assurance Program (AM TAP);
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Submission Processing (SP);
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Field and Campus Exam;
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Field Collection;
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Automated Underreporter (AUR);
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Automated Collection System (ACS);
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Compliance Services Collection Operation (CSCO); and
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Return Integrity Correspondence Services (RICS).
The TC 971 AC 506 indicator is visible on ENMOD and IMFOLE. For input instruction see IRM 10.5.3-11.
Caution:
The following BODS are NOT profiled for TC 971 AC 506: Appeals, TAS, LB&I and IT.
Note:
When TC 971 AC 506 is input on an account, IRS does not ask for or require identity theft substantiation documentation.
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The function that inputs the TC 971 AC 506 will notify the taxpayer (victim), by letter, that someone may have attempted to use his or her SSN. This victim notification letter will include:
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Information about identity theft prevention
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Information about identity theft related resources
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Information about the identity theft indicator placed on his or her account.
Note:
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Any tax return that is identified through the filtering process as potentially fraudulent will become unpostable, i.e., removed from the posting process. This unpostable return is systemically routed to Submission Processing for screening to determine whether the return is legitimate. -
In some instances, it may be necessary to manually reverse TC 971 AC 506. If reversal (TC 972 AC 506) is indicated, see Exhibit 10.5.3-11 for a description of reasons for the reversal.
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To indicate resolution of an IRS-Identified Identity Theft Case involving tax administration, mark the victim's account using Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from ENMOD to input a TC 971 AC 506 reflecting an appropriate Tax Administration Source Code depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case along with the tax year of the identity theft incident. The AC 506 is applied to a taxpayer's account when all of the following occur:
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All corrective actions have been taken. This includes verifying and updating the taxpayer's address on ENMOD, as applicable (excludes back-end work, see IRM 10.5.3.2.9, Closing Identity Theft Issues). Refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.12 IRS-Identified Identity Theft Affecting Tax Administration - TC 971 AC 506.
Caution:
If you do not have a valid address for the taxpayer, use the Service Center address to prevent an IP PIN from going to incorrect taxpayer.
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The taxpayer's identity theft affects tax administration.
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Perform case closure analysis to ensure all identity theft related issues have been addressed and resolved. See IRM 10.5.3.2.9, Closing Identity Theft Issues.
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The input of the TC 506 will not, in every case, coincide with the closing of the control base. There may be additional back-end work to be completed before the control base can be closed. Do not wait until all the additional back-end work is completed before inputting the protective TC 971 AC 506 on the taxpayer's account. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.9, Closing Identity Theft Issues.
The following rules must be adhered to:-
The TC 506 cannot be input until the taxpayer is no longer harmed by identity theft impacting tax administration.
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Verifying and updating the taxpayer's address MUST be done before inputting the TC 971 AC 506.
Caution:
The importance of updating the address prior to inputting the TC 971 AC 506 cannot be stressed enough. If the address is not updated appropriately, the victim notification letter will go to the wrong address. In addition, failure to follow the appropriate sequence could result in the Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN) being sent to the ID thief instead of the ID theft victim.
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A case control must be maintained until all back-end work is completed. See IRM
Reminder:
The procedural guidance for your functional area must be followed as to when the TC 971 AC 506 should be input. Your procedural guidance, however, must adhere to the guidelines provided in this subsection.
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Input of a TC 971 AC 506 does not generate a systemic notification to the taxpayer. To notify the taxpayer of actions taken to resolve identity theft issues, the Letter 4310 C may be used.
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See IRM 10.5.3-10 and IRM 10.5.3-11 for additional guidance.
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≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Exception:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ -
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Note:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡
≡ ≡≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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The TC 971 AC 524 is an identity theft indicator that prevents a taxpayer’s TIN (SSN or ITIN) from being used as the primary or secondary TIN on a current or subsequent year federal income tax return. Account locks can be applied both manually and systemically using internal or external information. However, input of the TC 971 AC 524 is limited and reserved for use by Privacy, Governmental Liaison and Disclosure (PGLD) Identity Protection Program (IP) and RICS Taxpayer Protection Program (RICS TPP).
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TC 971 AC 524 can be viewed on the taxpayer’s entity using command codes ENMOD or IMFOLE.
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TC 971 AC 524 is used to lock the account of deceased taxpayers.
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The identification, development, and implementation of specific population categories for the TC 971 AC 524 will be phased in by PGLD with the goal of creating a comprehensive list of taxpayers who do not have a filing requirement. Accounts locks may be initiated either manually or systemically.
Manually locking decedent accounts occurs when a date of death is present on the tax module and the account is identified by CI or Integrity & Verification Operations (IVO) as fraudulent.
Systemically locking decedent accounts occurs when a taxpayer files a final return for the year of death. -
Systemic Locking of Deceased Taxpayer accounts occurs when all of the following are true:
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A date of death is present on the tax module; and
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The taxpayer has filed a final return; and
-
Computer Condition Code A, F or 9 is placed on the account as indicated in the table below:
A final return is filed with CCC: Then a TC 971 AC 524 is applied to A The primary taxpayer F The secondary taxpayer 9 Both Taxpayers -
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Manual Locking occurs when individual accounts are identified by a business function and provided to PGLD or RICS for input using a systemic tool.
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Returns filed on decedent accounts containing an unreversed TC 971 AC 524 DECD, will be prevented from processing.
Electronically filed returnsIf the taxpayer is And the source code is Then Primary DECD Taxpayer will receive a reject code IND 901 Secondary DECD Taxpayer will receive a reject code IND 941
Paper Filed ReturnsIf the taxpayer is And the source code is Then Primary or Secondary DECD -
Return will unpost as UPC 147 RC 4
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Return will be auto- archived
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CP 01H We are Unable to Process Your Return – Identity Theft Lock is mailed to the taxpayer
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Input of a TC 972 AC 524 will reverse a TC 971 AC 524 and will “unlock” the account. Input of the TC 972 AC 524 is limited and reserved for:
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Privacy, Governmental Liaison and Disclosure (PGLD) Identity Protection Program (IP)
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RICS Taxpayer Protection Unit (RICS TPP)
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Submission Processing Entity
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-
To unlock a decedent account a taxpayer must provide information to support their request.
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If a taxpayer contacts IRS relating to a locked account and there is a Date of Death (DOD) on the account and an unreversed TC 971 AC 524 DECD is present, ALL of the following documentation MUST be provided by the taxpayer:
The original Letter SSA 2458 from the Social Security Administration showing the correction to the date of death;
A photocopy of at least one of the following:-
Passport or Driver's License
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Social Security Card
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Other valid US Federal or
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State Government issued identification;
A copy of their tax return with an original signature(s);Exception:
If the request is not related to a rejected return but is being made solely to perfect the date of death, the taxpayer does not need to provide a copy of a tax return.
Instruct the taxpayer to send all of the above information to the same service center the taxpayer used to file his or her original tax return. -
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If a taxpayer contacts IRS relating to a locked account and there is no longer a Date of Death (DOD) on the account and an unreversed TC 971 AC 524 DECD is present on the entity, refer the case to Submission Processing Entity (no taxpayer documentation is required).
See IRM 3.13.5 for additional information.
See IRM 10.5.3-17, TC 972 AC 524 – Reversal of TC 971 AC 524 for additional information -
Once a correction has been made removing the DOD, Entity will notify the PGLD IP Analyst to reverse the AC 524.
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In January 2011, the IRS initiated a pilot program to issue an Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN) to select taxpayers with an active identity theft indicator (TC 971 AC 501, TC 971 AC 504, and some TC 971 AC 506) on their account. The IP PIN is a single use identification number.
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The Identity Protection PIN is valid for the current processing year only. If the taxpayer wishes to file a TY 2011 return see paragraph (7) below.
Note:
Return processing requires an IP PIN for selected recipients whose SSN appears as the primary (first SSN on the tax return).
-
Electronic Filing - Taxpayers filing electronically will be prompted by their software to input their IP PIN. If a taxpayer was issued an IP PIN and does not use the IP PIN, or the IP PIN input is incorrect, the e-filed return will reject.
Exception:
If a taxpayer received an IP PIN and is filing as a secondary taxpayer on a joint return, the taxpayer should NOT input their IP PIN. An IP PIN is validated to the primary filer's information only.
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Filing on Paper - Taxpayers filing Individual Income Tax paper returns (Form 1040, 1040A, and 1040EZ), will place the IP PIN into the 6 boxes just to the right of the spouse’s occupation labeled “Identity Protection PIN”. Paper returns that require an IP PIN but are filed with a missing or incorrect IP PIN, will be routed to the Unpostable Unit for manual review to validate the taxpayer’s identity prior to acceptance.
Note:
Taxpayers who are filing Form 1040PR or 1040SS will be required to handwrite the IP PIN in the shaded area in the signature section of the form, just to the right of the spouse’s occupation.
Exception:
If a taxpayer received an IP PIN and is filing as a secondary taxpayer on a joint return, the taxpayer should NOT input their IP PIN. An IP PIN is validated to the primary filer's information only.
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If a taxpayer loses or misplaces the IP PIN, the IRS may provide a replacement IP PIN. See IRM 10.5.3.2.16.1, Lost, Misplaced or Non-Receipt of IP PIN.
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Tax year 2012 Returns
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In preparation for tax year 2012, the IRS issued a CP 01F notice in late October 2012 to selected taxpayers whose accounts reflected an active identity theft indicator. To determine if a taxpayer’s account was selected for an IP PIN, review both CC ENMOD and IMFOLE for a TC 971 AC 804 and Tax Administration Source Code CP01F.
Caution:
The TC 971 AC 804 CP 001F may be visible only on IMFOLE.
Example:
971 10-29-2012 20123505 XX277-756-55960-2 AC: 0804 MISC: CP 001F
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In mid December 2012, the IRS issued a CP 01A notice providing the six digit IP PIN and filing instructions. To determine if a taxpayer’s account was selected for an IP PIN, review CC IMFOLE. IMFOLE line 14 will display the literal "IP PIN: 1" if an IP PIN was generated to the taxpayer. If no IP PIN was issued, IMFOLE will display the literal "IP PIN: 0" .
Caution:
If a CP 01A was issued to the taxpayer with an IP PIN of "000000" . No IP PIN was issued to this taxpayer. IMFOLE will reflect" IP PIN:0 " . Do not issue a replacement IP PIN to these taxpayers.
Refer to IRM 2.3.51-13, Command Code IMFOL Output Display — Entity for additional information.
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The CP 01F and CP 01A notices are issued systemically and cannot be reissued if not received by the taxpayer. CP 01F and CP 01A notices are not forwarded by the US Postal Service and are returned as undeliverable to the IRS. Refer to IRM 10.5.3.2.16.1, Lost, Misplaced or Non-Receipt of IP PIN.
Reminder:
Taxpayers selected for the IP PIN program will be sent a new IP PIN every year (prior to the start of the next tax season) for as long as the identity theft indicator remains active on their account.
Caution:
If IMFOLE does not reflect "IP PIN: 1" , an IP PIN was not issued to the taxpayer.
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Tax Year 2011 Returns
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For tax year 2011, taxpayers received their IP PIN using a Letter 4869 CS. The issuance of an IP PIN for TY 2011 can be verified by the posting of a TC 971 AC 522 with a source code of OTHER in December of 2011. The TC 971 AC 522 is visible on ENMOD and IMFOLE.
Example:
PGLD issued an IP PIN to the taxpayer in December of 2011 for use on the 2011 tax return. This will appear on the taxpayers account as TC 971 AC 522 PPDS OPIP OTHER.
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If a taxpayer wishes to file a delinquent TY 2011 return between April 17, 2012 and December 31, 2012 and a replacement IP PIN is required, see IRM 10.5.3.2.16.1 (6), Lost, Misplaced or Non-Receipt of IP PIN for instructions on replacing the IP PIN.
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If a taxpayer contacts IRS stating they received a CP 01F or a CP 01A and they do not have a filing requirement, advise the taxpayer that the IP PIN will protect their account from misuse.
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Caution:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "Caution:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ " ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ " ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡
≡≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ " ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ " ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ -
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
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≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Exception:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Note:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Caution:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "
Caution:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ " ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Note:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Example:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Caution:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Note:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Note:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ -
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Caution:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ "
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ -
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Caution:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Caution:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
Caution:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡
-
-
Input of TC 971 AC 505 is limited and reserved for use by Privacy, Governmental Liaison and Disclosure (PGLD) employees. However, this indicator will be visible and available for reference on the individual’s account. See Exhibits 10.5.3-8 and 10.5.3-9 for more information about this indicator.
Note:
When a TC 971 AC 505 is input on an account, PGLD does not ask for or require identity theft substantiation documentation, as identity theft may not have occurred as of the date of the input of this action code.
-
TC 971 AC 505 is applied to a taxpayer’s account when all of the following occur:
-
A taxpayer’s PII was lost, breached, disclosed, or stolen.
-
The incident risk assessment results in a high risk of harm to the potentially impacted taxpayer.
-
The IRS notifies the taxpayer of this data loss incident.
Example:
Taxpayer case files containing PII were lost while being shipped from one location to another. Since the incident risk assessment resulted in a high risk of harm, the Incident Management Program will send notification letters to the potentially impacted taxpayers.
-
-
The taxpayer will receive a data loss notification Letter 4281 C, IM Breach Notification Letter) from the IRS advising him/her that information controlled by the IRS may have been disclosed to unauthorized individuals. The notification letter contains information related to identity protection and free credit monitoring products arranged for the taxpayer by the IRS. Note: The taxpayer must call the credit-monitoring agency in order to sign up for the services. Refer to IRM 21.9.2.8, Notification 4281C Letter to Impacted Individuals.
-
PGLD inputs TC 971 AC 505 on an account regardless of the existence of any other identity theft indicator code (AC 501, 504, or 506) that may be present on the account. In some instances, it may be necessary for PGLD personnel to manually reverse the TC 971 AC 505.
-
For information on the Incident Management Program see IRM 10.5.4.4, Responding: The Incident Management Breach Process, IRM 10.5.4, Incident Management Program. For information on the IRS data loss process, see that same IRM section, or view the Incident Management Breach Process flow chart.
-
TC 971 AC 504 is applied to a taxpayer’s account when the taxpayer contacts the IRS claiming that he or she is a victim of identity theft, and there is no known affect to tax administration.
Example:
A taxpayer lost his or her wallet on the subway and is concerned the loss may lead to identity theft in the future, or has noticed recent questionable credit card activity on one or more accounts.
-
TC 971 AC 504 will be visible for reference in the event the incident becomes a tax administration concern. See Exhibit 10.5.3-6 and Exhibit 10.5.3-7 for information regarding this indicator.
-
Input of this indicator is limited and reserved for use by the Identity Protection Specialized Unit, IPSU (see note below), which is comprised of two key functions:
-
Identity Protection Specialized Unit, 1-800-908-4490 - a unit established specifically to receive identity theft-related calls. By contacting this unit, the taxpayer will be able to access automated messages as well as customer service representatives (CSRs). This toll-free number enables individuals who have experienced identity theft, but do not have a current tax-related issue, to report the incident to the IRS.
-
Specialized identity theft caseworkers - employees who will process standard identity theft documentation and input the TC 971 AC 504 incident tracking indicator. Caseworkers will obtain identity theft substantiation documentation as referenced in IRM 10.5.3.2.8, Identity Theft Supporting Documentation.
Note:
Identity Protection Specialized Unit (IPSU). The Identity Protection Program will strive to provide a uniform and consistent approach to victim assistance as it relates to identity theft tax issues. Further, the Identity Protection Program supports the IPSU, to provide victim assistance to include taxpayers who have not experienced any problems with, or received communications from, the IRS concerning their taxes but may become victims in the future due to a data loss such as a lost or stolen purse/wallet, questionable credit card activity, etc. The Identity Protection Program also supports the Accounts Management Taxpayer Assurance Program (AM TAP), as they identify questionable returns and adjust the accounts of identity theft victims. See IRM 21.9.2, Accounts Management Identity Theft, for more information about the IPSU.
-
-
See IRM 21.9.2.2, Identity Theft-Expanded Procedures, for additional information regarding the duties and responsibilities of the IPSU.
-
If IRS employees are contacted by a taxpayer indicating a non-tax related identity theft, see IRM 21.9.2.3, Identity Theft - Telephone Overview and IRM 21.9.2.4, Identity Theft - Paper Overview. .
Exception:
Field Assistance employees should refer to their IRM 21.3.4.31.4, Non-Tax Related Identity Theft Issues for procedures on how to assist taxpayers who may walk into a Field Assistance office (Taxpayer Assistance Center) with a non-tax related identity theft issue.
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In some instances, it may be necessary to manually reverse TC 971 AC 504. If reversal is indicated (TC 972 AC 504), see Exhibit 10.5.3-7 for a description of reasons for the reversal.
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The IRS established and expanded initiatives to address identity theft in tax administration which includes:
-
The Technical Working Group for Identity Theft Victim Assistance (TWG);
-
The Identity Theft Advisory Council; and
-
Identity Theft Training
-
-
The Technical Working Group for Identity Theft Victim Assistance (TWG) is a cross-functional group that discusses unique identity theft cases where the taxpayer has been unduly burdened. The TWG was established through a collaborative effort with TAS, and is facilitated by the Identity Protection Program.
-
The overall purpose of the TWG is to provide a forum for developing recommendations on how processes and procedures can be improved to address and reduce the burden on taxpayers who are victims of identity theft. The TWG's responsibilities include:
-
Providing a medium for cross-functional discussion and data gathering on identity theft issues
-
Analyzing identity theft cases where the victim has been significantly burdened
-
Determining if there are existing procedures to address key issues
-
Discussing ideas on how related procedures can be developed and/or improved
-
Developing recommendations for process improvements
-
-
The TWG meets periodically and is comprised of representatives and subject matter experts from the various business units and functions. During the meetings, TWG participants discuss a taxpayer identity theft case and provide analysis and function-specific insight regarding existing processes and procedures pertaining to the case and taxpayer treatment. Through this discussion, the group suggests ideas to improve existing procedures and/or provides recommendations for procedures that may need to be developed.
-
The TWG provides a forum for discussing systemic and procedural issues and developing recommendations and solutions on how processes and procedures can be improved to reduce taxpayer burden with regard to issues of identity theft. The function of the TWG is NOT to address specific taxpayer related identity theft issues, but rather to deal with systemic/procedural issues.
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The TWG encourages functions to submit systemic and procedural issues of identity theft that cannot be resolved at the functional level, to the TWG. Issues identified by functions will first follow the issue escalation process of their respective organization. If an issue cannot be resolved through the functional channels, but meets the systemic/procedural issue criteria shown in IRM 10.5.3.3.1 (6) and (7) below, the functional liaison to the TWG will document the issue using the Issue Submission Template. The functional liaison will E-mail the completed Issue Submission Template to the following E-mail address: PIPDS.IPIM.TWG@irs.gov. Refer to the Identity Theft website link TWG Issue Submission Template for the template to be used for this purpose.
-
An Identity Protection staff member will monitor the issue submission mailbox regularly. The Monday before the TWG meeting (meetings held monthly), an Identity Protection staff member will review and select an issue to be presented to the TWG. As part of the issue review process, the Identity Protection staff member will review the form and may follow up with the submitter for additional clarification. The selected issue will be added to the agenda and will be discussed during the TWG meeting. The TWG will attempt to resolve the issue and submit the procedural changes via a SERP alert, interim guidance, and/or IRM changes.
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Guidelines for Selecting Systemic Issues to be Addressed by the TWG - The TWG provides a forum for discussing systemic issues and developing recommendations on how processes and procedures can be improved to reduce taxpayer burden. A systemic issue can be defined as an issue that meets any of the following criteria:
-
Can be expected to affect multiple taxpayers.
-
Is not a problem specific to an individual taxpayer.
-
Affects segments of the taxpayer population, locally, regionally or nationally.
-
Relates to IRS systems, policies, and procedures.
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Requires study, analysis, administrative changes or legislative remedies.
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Involves protecting taxpayer rights, reducing or preventing taxpayer burden, ensuring equitable treatment of taxpayers or providing essential services to taxpayers.
-
-
The TWG is focused on the issue of identity theft, therefore all systemic issues should be specifically related to incidents of identity theft. Identity theft is defined as an incident where someone uses another individual's personal information such as name, Social Security Number (SSN), or other identifying information, without permission, to commit fraud or deception. Each issue should meet one or more of the following criteria.
-
A procedural gap has been identified where no IRM exists.
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More than one IRM exists, and the guidance is not consistent, causing disparate treatment from one case to another
-
A procedural gap has been identified in a single BOD; however other BODs may be impacted
-
A procedural gap has been identified in a single BOD, and the SME would like the TWG to review the issue and provide feedback
-
A technical issue has been identified that is likely to impact multiple cases and should be addressed on a systemic level
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An issue requires expedited resolution; may be in response to an external inquiry to a prior case
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The Identity Theft Advisory Council (IDT AC) is part of a two-tiered governance process to address Servicewide identity theft efforts.
-
Sharing identity theft related information is the major role of the Council. This ensures all participants are equally informed regarding issues, trends, and identity theft initiatives. The IDT AC will make decisions about how to move forward on current and new initiatives and advise the Identity Theft Executive Steering Committee (IDT ESC) on initiatives requiring their action or decision.
-
The advisory role to the IDT ESC includes, but is not limited to, the following:
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Foster development of additional tools to further reduce taxpayer burden, protect Treasury revenue, and increase processing efficiencies;
-
Coordinate issues with business functions to assist with decision-making, such as ensuring risks and interdependencies are properly managed;
-
Monitor and report on emerging issues impacting identity theft;
-
Monitor and report on IDT inventory trends and metrics, assess business performance and recommend strategies for addressing performance; and
-
Elevate unresolved disputes to the IDT ESC.
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The Identity Protection Program shall institute measures to inform IRS personnel of their responsibilities for protecting taxpayers and employees against the loss, disclosure, or theft of their PII.
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The Identity Protection Program also supports the annual Information Protection and Disclosure Mandatory Briefing managed by the Office of Privacy, which provides information regarding identity protection.
| Access - The ability or opportunity to gain knowledge of personally identifiable information. | |
| Breach - The loss of control, disclosure, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, unauthorized access, or any similar term referring to situations where persons other than authorized users and for other than authorized purpose have access or potential access to personally identifiable information, whether physical or electronic. | |
| Federal Trade Commission (FTC) - An independent agency of the United States government, established in 1914 by the Federal Trade Commission Act, with the principal mission of promoting "consumer protection" and the elimination and prevention of what regulators perceive to be "anti-competitive" business practices. | |
| Harm - Includes any of the following effects of a breach of confidentiality, integrity, availability, or fiduciary responsibility: | |
| a) Potential for blackmail; | |
| b) Disclosure of private facts; | |
| c) Mental pain and emotional distress; | |
| d) Potential for secondary uses of the information that could result in fear or uncertainty, or the unwarranted exposure leading to humiliation or loss of self-esteem; | |
| e) Identity theft; or | |
| f) Financial loss. | |
| Identity Theft - A fraud that is committed or attempted, using a person's identifying information without authority. | |
| Identity Theft Advisory Council (IDT AC) - The IDT AC was chartered by the Identity Theft Executive Steering Committee to oversee the implementation of the Identity Theft Assessment and Action Group (ITAAG) recommendations and advise the Committee on new and ongoing initiatives to enhance the IRS identity theft programs. The primary objectives of the IDT AC are to promote a collaborative vehicle for addressing and overseeing enterprise-wide identity theft matters; and to monitor and report on the status of related IDT initiatives. | |
| Identity Theft Liaison - A listing of individuals in the business units that are the contacts for the W&I AM IPSU, when IPSU sends Form 14027-B, Identity Theft Case Referral for monitoring account activity on cases with open controls. A current listing of "ID Theft Liaisons (Functional)" can be found on SERP under the Who/Where tab. | |
| Identity Theft Assistance Request (ITAR) Liaison - A listing of individuals in the business units that are the contacts for the W&I AM IPSU. IPSU sends Form 14103, Identity Theft Assistance Request for account resolution and monitors the business units account activity on cases with open controls. A current listing of "ID Theft Liaisons (Functional)" can be found on SERP under the Who/Where tab. | |
| Incident - For the purpose of this IRM the term “incident” refers to an occurrence or event involving identity theft as it applies to a specific tax year(s) as reported by the taxpayer. | |
| Incident Management - The process of managing incidents involving the loss or disclosure of data. | |
| Information Technology - Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information by an executive agency. | |
| Loss - Any event where an item is misplaced and/or neither the official owner nor the intended recipient has possession of the item in the expected time frame. A loss may involve an IRS-owned physical asset such as a laptop, blackberry, cell phone, and/or other portable media, or electronic or hard copy data that may contain Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) data or Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such as paper or electronic taxpayer records, personnel records, or other identifying data, or a combination of a physical asset and electronic and/or hard copy data. | |
| Office of Management and Budget (OMB) - A cabinet-level office that oversees the activities of federal agencies and monitors the adherence of their assigned federal programs to presidential policies. | |
| Personally Identifiable Information (PII) - The term “personally identifiable information” refers to information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc. Please see OMB 07-16. For further information about PII, see the PGLD web page called PII - What is personally identifiable information? | |
| Risk - The level of impact on agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, or individuals resulting from the operation of an information system given the potential impact of a threat and the likelihood of that threat occurring. | |
| Risk Assessment - The process of identifying risks to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, or individuals by determining the probability of occurrence, the resulting impact, and additional security and privacy controls that would mitigate this impact. | |
| Safeguards - Protective measures prescribed to meet the privacy requirements specified for an information system. | |
| Technical Working Group (TWG) for Identity Theft Victim Assistance - A cross-functional group that meets periodically to provide a forum for developing recommendations on how processes and procedures can be improved to address and reduce the burden on taxpayers who are victims of identity theft. | |
| Unpostable - A transaction which cannot be posted to a taxpayer's account because the transaction failed certain Master File validation checks. | |
The Identity Protection Program was established to ensure Servicewide implementation of federal directives to protect citizens
and government employees . The following are the principal documents involving the Identity Protection Program:
OMB Memoranda
OMB Memoranda are available at Office of Management and Budget at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda.
Other Federal Guidance
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Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan, The President’s Identity Theft Task Force Report, April 2007
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Combating Identity Theft, Volume II: Supplemental Information, The President’s Identity Theft Task Force Report, April 2007
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President’s Identity Theft Task Force Report Summary of Interim Recommendations, September 2006
The President’s Identity Theft Task Force documents are available at http://www.idtheft.gov/
PGLD Internal Revenue Manuals
-
IRM 10.5.1, Privacy, Information Protection & Data Security Policy and Guidance
-
IRM 10.5.3, Identity Protection Program
-
IRM 10.5.4, Incident Management Program
The following tables describe the terms and acronyms used for the TC 971 AC 501, 504, and 506 identity theft indicator codes. The three tables are: 1) BOD/Function, 2) Program Name, and 3) Tax Administration Source. Not all Tax Administration Source Codes are available to all BOD/Functions. For specific BOD/Function information, refer to the applicable Exhibit for the Action Code, for example TC 971 AC 501 or AC 506.
-
BOD/Function
Term/Acronym Description AP Appeals CI Criminal Investigation LBI Large Business & International IT Information Technology OS Operations Support PPDS Privacy, Governmental Liaison & Disclosure SBSE Small Business / Self-Employed TAS Taxpayer Advocate Service WI Wage & Investment -
Program Name
Term/Acronym Description ACS Automated Collection System AM Accounts Management (IRS-identified identity theft) AMADJ Accounts Management (TP-identified identity theft) AMTAP Integrity & Verification Operations (IVO) formerly Accounts Management Taxpayer Assurance Program (AMTAP) AP Appeals ASFR Automated Substitute for Return AUR Automated Underreporter CA TAS Case Advocate CFBALDUE SB/SE: Field Collection - Taxpayer Delinquency Accounts CFDELRET SB/SE: Field Collection - Taxpayer Delinquency Investigations CONGINQ Congressional Inquiry CORR SB/SE Correspondence Exam CSCO Compliance Services Collection Operations CSIRC Computer Security Incident Response Center EXAM W&I Correspondence Exam FA Field Assistance FO Field Office FLDEXAM Field Exam LBI Large Business & International OPIP Office of Privacy & Information Protection PHSH Phishing PREREF Pre-Refund Program RC Refund Crime RFND Refund Scheme RICS Return Integrity & Correspondence Services SP Submission Processing TDI Tax Delinquency Investigation WHC Withholding Compliance -
Tax Administration Source
Term/Acronym Description DECD Taxpayer is deceased INCOME Identity theft identified and substantiated due to an underreporting of income MULTFL Identity theft identified and substantiated due to two or more tax returns filed for one taxpayer INCMUL Identity theft identified and substantiated due to both underreporting of income and multiple filings NOFR Substantiated identity theft incidents where the victim does not have a filing requirement OTHER Identity theft which cannot be identified as related to any existing Tax Administration Source types RFND Identity theft identified by the filing of a false return in order to obtain a refund ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ PRISNR Taxpayer is incarcerated
The exhibit below demonstrates how AUR inputs a TC 971 AC 501 when the identity theft involved an underreporting of income.
Input instructions for TC 971 AC 501 are as follows:
-
Obtain the following information:
-
Entity - SSN;
-
Business Operating Division (BOD)/Function (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);
-
Program Name (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);
-
Tax Administration Source (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3); and
-
Tax Year affected by identity theft (Secondary-DT Field).
Note:
The tax year affected by the identity theft cannot be the current year. For example, the taxpayer gave you substantiation documentation during the current year ( 2012), for a 2005 tax year issue. You have resolved the issues, verified and updated the address. You will input TC 971 AC 501 for tax year 2005 by entering 12/31/2005 in the Secondary-DT field on FRM77
-
-
The tables provided below display the available Tax Administration Source Codes by BOD/Function(Program). Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function (Program).
-
Navigate to FRM77
-
Sign into IDRS;
-
Enter ENMOD (SSN), then press ENTER;
-
Enter REQ77:
-
FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.
-
-
Enter the TC 971 AC 501
-
Enter the TC with 971;
-
TRANS-DT is auto populated with the current date;
-
Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year affected by the identity theft incident in the format MM-DD-YYYY);
-
Enter MISC (enter your specific BOD/Function, Program Name, and Tax Administration Source, see Exhibit 10.5.3-3); and
-
After REMARKS, enter "IDENTITY THEFT" .
-
-
Tax Administration Source Codes for use with TC 971 AC 501 - Taxpayer Identified Case Closure
Tax Administration Source Code Definition of Tax Administration Source Code INCOME Identity theft identified and substantiated due to an underreporting of income MULTFL Identity theft identified and substantiated due to two or more tax returns filed for one taxpayer INCMUL Identity theft identified and substantiated due to both underreporting of income and multiple filings OTHER Identity theft which cannot be identified as related to any existing Tax Administration Source types NOFR Identity theft identified by the filing of a false return in order to obtain a refund and the victim does not have a filing requirement DECD Deceased taxpayer PRISNR Incarcerated Taxpayer -
Do not attempt to use a Tax Administration Source Code that your BOD/Program (Function) is not profiled to use. The following table identifies the BOD/Programs and applicable Tax Administration Source Codes. Refer to IRM 10.5.3–3, Acronyms and Definitions, for definitions of the Program Name codes.
-
Appeals is profiled to use the following codes:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code AP AP INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, and DECD -
Criminal Investigation is profiled to use the following codes:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code CI FO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD CI RC INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD -
Large Business & International is profiled to use the following codes:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code LBI LBI INCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and, DECD -
IT is profiled to use the following codes:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code MITS CSIRC DECD, OTHER, NOFR, and PRISNR -
PGLD is profiled to use the following codes:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code PPDS CONGINQ INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD PPDS OPIP INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD -
SBSE is profiled to use the following codes:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code SBSE ACS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD SBSE ASFR INCOME, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and, DECD SBSE AUR INCOME, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and, DECD SBSE CFBALDUE INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD SBSE CFDELRET INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD SBSE CSCO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD SBSE CORR INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD SBSE FLDEXAM INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD SBSE TDI INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD -
TAS is profiled with the following codes:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code TAS CA INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD -
W&I is profiled with the following codes:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code WI ACS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD WI AM NCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, OTHER, NOFR, ITIN, and DECD, WI AMADJ INCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, OTHER, NOFR, ITIN, and DECD, WI ASFR INCOME, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD WI AUR INCOME, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD WI CSCO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD WI EXAM INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD WI PREREF INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD WI TDI INCOME, MULTFL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD WI WHC INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD
The exhibit below demonstrates how ACS inputs a TC 972 AC 501 when they determine identity theft was indicated by IRS in error.

Input instructions for TC 972 AC 501 are as follows:
-
Obtain the following information:
-
Entity - SSN;
-
BOD/Function (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);
-
Program Name (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);
-
Tax Year of the TC 971 AC 501 being reversed; and
Note:
The tax year must match the tax year of the TC 971 AC 501 that is being reversed.
-
Transaction date of the TC 971 AC 501 being reversed.
-
-
Navigate to FRM77
-
Sign into IDRS;
-
Enter ENMOD SSN, then press ENTER;
-
Enter REQ77;
-
FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.
-
-
Enter the TC 972 AC 501
-
Enter the TC with 972;
-
Enter TRANS-DT (enter the transaction date of the TC 971 AC 501 being reversed);
-
Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year of the TC 971 AC 501 being reversed in the MM-DD-YYYY format);
-
Enter MISC (Modify the Reason Code field with the reason for the reversal). Select the Reason code that reflects the reason for the reversal from the options below; and
-
Enter REMARKS (enter your remarks).
Note:
The exhibit above demonstrates
-
-
Tax Administration Source Codes for use with TC 972 AC 501 - Reversal of TC 971 AC 501 - are as follows:
TC 972 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code Definition TPRQ The taxpayer requests the 971 be reversed. IRSERR The 971 was due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake. IRSADM The 971 is causing a negative impact on another internal process or system, and should be reversed to discontinue the negative impact. FALSE The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be fraudulent. OTHER The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the reason descriptions above. -
The following tables describe the TC 972 AC 501 reason codes by BOD/Function and Program. Refer to IRM 10.5.3-3, Acronyms and Definitions, for definitions of the Program Name codes.
Note:
Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.
-
Appeals is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:
BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code AP AP TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER -
Criminal Investigation is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:
BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code CI FO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER CI RC TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER -
Large Business & International (LB&I) is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:
BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code LBI LBI TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER -
IT is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:
BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code MITS CSIRC TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER -
The Privacy Office is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:
BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code PPDS CONGINQ TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER PPDS OPIP TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER -
Small Business Self Employed (SBSE) is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:
BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code SBSE ACS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE ASFR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE AUR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE CFBALDUE TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE CFDELRET TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE CSCO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE CORR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE FLDEXAM TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE TDI TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER -
Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:
BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code TAS TAS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER -
Wage & Investment (WI) is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 501:
BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 501 Tax Administration Source Code WI ACS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI AM TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI AMADJ TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI ASFR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI AUR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI CSCO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI EXAM TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI PREREF TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI RICS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI TDI TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI WHC TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER
Important: Input of Action Code 504 is limited and reserved for use by the Identity Protection Specialized Unit (IPSU) in W&I, Accounts Management.
TC 971 AC 504 is displayed on IDRS command code ENMOD and consists of the following data elements:
| TRANS-DT | SECONDARY-DT | MISC | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Input date of TC 971 AC 504 | Date identity theft occurred (per taxpayer). | BOD and taxpayer impact. (See the Impact to Taxpayer table below.) | Comments |
| Impact to Taxpayer | |
|---|---|
| Term/Acronym | Description |
| ACCT | One or more personal accounts have been opened under the victim's identity or the victim reported questionable account activity. |
| BOTH | Both EMPL and ACCT. |
| EMPL | Victim's SSN Used for Employment. |
| NKI | No known impact has been identified by the taxpayer. |
| SPCL2 | Special Project # 2 |
The miscellaneous field for TC 972 AC 504 reflects the reason for the reversal of TC 971 AC 504. See the TC 972 AC 504 Miscellaneous Field chart below for the reasons and values for the MISC field.
| TC 972 AC 504 Miscellaneous Field | ||
|---|---|---|
| Reason | Description | Value |
| Taxpayer Request | The taxpayer requests the 971 be reversed. | TPRQ |
| Keying or Internal Error | The 971 was due to a typographical mistake or other internal mistake. | IRSERR |
| Internally Identified Negative Impact | The 971 is causing a negative impact on another internal process or system, and should be reversed to discontinue the negative impact. | IRSADM |
| False Identity Theft Claim | The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be fraudulent. | FALSE |
| Other | The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the reason descriptions above. | OTHER |
Important: Input of Action Code 505 is limited and reserved for use by the Office of Privacy, Information Protection & Data Security personnel.
TC 971 AC 505 is displayed on IDRS command code ENMOD and consists of the following data elements:
| TRANS-DT | SECONDARY-DT | MISC |
|---|---|---|
| TC 971 AC 505 input date | Date the data loss incident occurred. | Incident Reference Code number assigned to the data loss case. This number begins with the literal "IR" and is followed by 11 numeric digits. For example: IR20080211034 |
The miscellaneous field for TC 972 AC 505 reflects the reason for the reversal of TC 971 AC 505. See the following chart for reasons and values for the MISC field:
| TC 972 AC 505 Miscellaneous Field | ||
|---|---|---|
| Reason | Description | Value |
| Keying or Internal Error | The 971 was due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake. | IRSERR |
| Internally Identified Negative Impact | The 971 is causing a negative impact on another internal process or system, and should be reversed to discontinue the negative impact. | IRSADM |
| Other | The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the above reason descriptions. | OTHER |
The exhibit below demonstrates how SP inputs a TC 971 AC 506 when resolving IRS-identified identity theft issue involving an unpostable.
Input instructions for TC 971 AC 506 are as follows:
-
Obtain the following information:
-
Entity - SSN;
-
Business Operating Division (BOD)/Function (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);
-
Program Name (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);
-
Tax Administration Source (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3); and
-
Tax Year affected by identity theft.
Note:
The tax year affected by the identity theft cannot be the current year. For example, the taxpayer gives you substantiation documentation during the current year, e.g., 2013, for a 2005 tax year issue. Input TC 971 AC 506 on tax year 2005 only and not on 2013.
-
-
The tables provided below display the available Tax Administration Source Codes by BOD/Function(Program). Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function (Program).
-
Navigate to FRM77
-
Sign into IDRS;
-
Enter ENMOD (SSN), then press ENTER;
-
Enter REQ77;
-
FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.
-
-
Enter the TC 971 AC 506
-
Enter the TC with 971;
-
TRANS-DT is auto populated with the current date;
-
Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year affected by the identity theft incident in the format MM-DD-YYYY);
-
Enter MISC (enter your specific BOD/Function, Program Name, and Tax Administration Source; see the BOD/Function tables below); and
-
After REMARKS, enter "IDENTITY THEFT" .
Note:
See the illustration above, demonstrating how SP inputs a TC 971 AC 506 after resolving an unpostable 147 RC1 case.
-
-
Tax Administration Source Codes for use with TC 971 AC 506 - IRS Identified Case Closure
TC 971 AC 506 Definition of Tax Administration Source Code Tax Administration Source Code INCOME Identity theft identified and substantiated due to an underreporting of income MULTFL Identity theft identified and substantiated due to two or more tax returns filed for one taxpayer INCMUL Identity theft identified and substantiated due to both underreporting of income and multiple filings OTHER Identity theft which cannot be identified as related to any existing Tax Administration Source types NOFR Identity theft identified by the filing of a false return in order to obtain a refund DECD Deceased taxpayer PRISNR Incarcerated Taxpayer NKI Used by RICS Pre-Refund for CI cases with no known impact on taxpayer account IDT Used by RICS Pre-Refund for CI Cases where a bad return was filed under the taxpayer’s SSN DDb Used by RICS Pre-Refund for cases selected by DDb filter and identified as an ID Theft return SSA Used by RICS Pre-Refund for cases identified by SSA filters, but are confirmed ID Theft cases OMM Used by RICS Pre-Refund for cases selected by DDb Filter that are OMM Cases UPCMUL Input on true SSN owner’s account when a non-legitimate unpostable return with UPC147 RC 1 has been filed using the taxpayer’s SSN as identified and determined by SP UPC147 Input on the identified IRSN corresponding to the non-legitimate unpostable return with UPC147 RC 1 as identified and determined by SP OMM Operation Mass Mailing OMMGB Valid return filed by the legitimate taxpayer who was previously identified as OMM ERC027 Primary Taxpayer under 14 years old -
Do not attempt to use a Tax Administration Source Code that your BOD/Program (Function) is not profiled to use. The following table identifies the BOD/Programs and applicable Tax Administration Source Codes. Refer to IRM 10.5.3–3, Acronyms and Definitions, for definitions of the Program Name codes.
-
The following BODS are not profiled to use TC 971 AC 506: Appeals, TAS, LB&I, and IT. Important: Input of Action Code 506 is limited and reserved for use by designated functions. The BOD Tables below illustrate only those Functions/Programs authorized to use TC 971 AC 506.
Note:
At present, W&I Field Assistance (FA) is not profiled for AC 506. Until further notice when resolving IRS identified cases, W&I FA will use the following:
BOD: WI
Program: AM
Tax Administration Source Codes: INCOME, and OTHER. -
Criminal Investigation is profiled to use TC 971 AC 506 as follows:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 506 Tax Administration Source Code CI PHSH Field intentionally left blank CI RFND Field intentionally left blank CI OTHER Field intentionally left blank CI RC OMM CI RC PRISNR CI RC DECD -
SBSE is profiled to use the following codes:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 506 Tax Administration Source Code SBSE ACS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD SBSE AUR INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD SBSE CFBALDUE INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD SBSE CFDELRET INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD SBSE CORR INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD SBSE CSCO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD SBSE FLDEXAM INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD -
W&I is profiled with the following codes:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 506 Tax Administration Source Code WI ACS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD WI AM INCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, DECD, OTHER, and NOFR WI AMTAP OMM, OMMGB, RFND, OTHER, DECD, and PRISNR WI AUR INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD WI CSCO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD WI PRP INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, NOFR, NKI, DDb, IDT, OMM, SSA, OTHER, DECD and PRISNR WI RICS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, PRISNR, and DECD WI SP INCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, OTHER, and NOFR, DECD, PRISNR, ERC027, UPC147, and UPCMUL
The illustration below demonstrates how Accounts Management reverses a TC 971 AC 506 using a TC 972 AC 506.
Input instructions for TC 972 AC 506 are as follows:
-
Obtain the following information:
-
Entity - SSN;
-
BOD/Function (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);
-
Program Name (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);
-
Tax Year of the TC 971 AC 506 being reversed; and
Note:
The tax year must match the tax year of the TC 971 AC 506 that is being reversed.
-
Transaction date of the TC 971 AC 506 being reversed.
-
-
Navigate to FRM77
-
Sign into IDRS;
-
Enter ENMOD SSN, then press ENTER;
-
Enter REQ77;
-
FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.
-
-
Enter the TC 972 AC 506
-
Enter the TC with 972;
-
Enter TRANS-DT (enter the transaction date of the TC 971 AC 506 being reversed);
-
Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year of the TC 971 AC 506 being reversed in the MM-DD-YYYY format);
-
Enter MISC (Modify the Reason Code field with the reason for the reversal). Select the Reason code that reflects the reason for the reversal from the options below; and
-
Enter REMARKS (enter your remarks).
Note:
Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.
-
-
Tax Administration Source Code is entered into the Miscellaneous field and displays the reason for the reversal. See TC 972 AC 506 Miscellaneous Field chart below for reasons and values for the MISC field:
TC 972 AC 506 Tax Administration Source Code Definition TPRQ The taxpayer requests the 971 be reversed. IRSERR The 971 was due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake. IRSADM The 971 is causing a negative impact on another internal process or system, and should be reversed to discontinue the negative impact. FALSE The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be fraudulent. OTHER The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the reason descriptions above. -
The following BODS are not profiled to use TC 972 AC 506: Appeals, TAS, LB&I, and IT.
-
The following tables describe the TC 972 AC 506 reason codes by BOD/Function and Program. Refer to IRM 10.5.3-3, Acronyms and Definitions, for definitions of the Program Name codes.
Note:
Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.
-
Criminal Investigation is profiled to use TC 972 AC 506 as follows:
BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 506 Tax Administration Source Code CI OTHER TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER CI PHSH TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER CI RC TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER CI RFND TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER -
Operations Support is profiled to use TC 972 AC 506 as follows:
BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 506 Tax Administration Source Code OS PIPDS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER -
Small Business Self Employed (SBSE) is profiled to use TC 972 AC 506 as follows:
BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 506 Tax Administration Source Code SBSE ACS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE AUR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE CFBALDUE TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE CFDELRET TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE CORR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE CSCO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER SBSE FLDEXAM TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, OTHER, and FALSE -
Wage & Investment (WI) is profiled to use TC 972 AC 506 as follows:
BOD Name Program Name TC 972 AC 506 Tax Administration Source Code WI ACS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI AM TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI AMTAP TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI AUR TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI CSCO TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI RICS TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, and OTHER WI SP TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, and FALSE
The exhibit demonstrates how AUR inputs a TC 971 AC 522 when the taxpayer initially asserts identity theft.

Input instructions for TC 971 AC 522 are as follows:
-
Obtain the following information:
-
Entity - SSN;
-
BOD/Function (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);
-
Program Name (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);
-
Tax Administration Source (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3); and
-
Tax Year affected by identity theft.
Note:
The tax year affected by the identity theft cannot be the current year. For example, the taxpayer gives you substantiation documentation during the current year, e.g., 2010, for a 2005 tax year issue. Input TC 971 AC 522 on tax year 2005 only and not on 2010.
-
-
The tables provided below display the available Tax Administration Source Codes by BOD/Function (Program). Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function (Program).
-
Navigate to FRM77
-
Sign into IDRS;
-
Enter ENMOD SSN, then press ENTER;
-
Enter REQ77;
-
FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.
-
-
Enter the TC 971 AC 522
-
Enter the TC with 971;
-
TRANS-DT is auto-populated with the current date;
-
Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year affected by the identity theft incident in the format MM-DD-YYYY);
-
Enter MISC (enter your specific BOD/Function, Program Name, and Tax Administration Source) see IRM 10.5.3-3, Acronyms and Definitions, and
-
After REMARKS, enter "IDENTITY THEFT" .
-
-
Tax Administration Source codes for use with TC 971 AC 522 – Identity Theft Account Status:
INCOME Clear and legible documentation provided, Income reported under TPs SSN without their consent or knowledge MULTFL Clear and legible documentation provided, two or more tax returns filed for one taxpayer INCMUL Clear and legible documentation provided, both underreporting of income and multiple filings OTHER Clear and legible documentation provided, identity theft which cannot be identified as related to any existing Tax Administration Source types NOFR Clear and legible documentation provided, Victim does not have filing requirements PNDCLM The taxpayer makes a claim of identity theft. The taxpayer has not yet provided supporting documentation IRSID During the normal course of business, the IRS suspects identity theft may have occurred and the case is not yet resolved. Note:
FY 2012 programming for IRSID was not completed for all functions. Functions needing IRSID that are not profiled for that Tax Administration Source Code will mark accounts using BOD: PPDS, Program OPIP and Tax Administration Source Code IRSID unitl programming is completed
NODCRQ The taxpayer claims identity theft and there is a posted TC 971 AC 501 or 506. Taxpayers are not required to provide substantiation documentation UNWORK A case was internally identified as a potential identity theft incident but was not worked by the selecting function. Note:
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
-
The tables provided below display the available Tax Administration Source Codes by BOD/Function and Program. Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.
-
Appeals (AP) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Code AP AP INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK -
Criminal Investigation (CI) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Code CI FO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, and NOFR CI RC DECD, INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, IRSID, OTHER, NOFR, and UNWORK -
Large Business & International (LB&I) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Code LBI LBI INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID and UNWORK -
IT is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Code MITS CSIRC NOFR and OTHER -
Operations Support (OS) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Code OS PHSH IRSID, NODCRQ, and UNWORK -
The Privacy Office (PGLD) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Code PPDS CONGINQ INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, IRSID, PNDCLM, and UNWORK PPDS OPIP INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, IRSID, PNDCLM, and UNWORK -
Small Business Self Employed (SBSE) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Code SBSE ACS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK SBSE ASFR INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK SBSE AUR INCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, IRSID, PNDCLM, and, UNWORK SBSE CFBALDUE INCOME, INCMUL, IRSID, OTHER, MULTFL, NODCRQ, NOFR, UNWORK,and PNDCLM SBSE CFDELRET INCOME, INCMUL, IRSID, OTHER, MULTFL, NODCRQ, NOFR, UNWORK, and PNDCLM SBSE CORR INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK SBSE CSCO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, and UNWORK SBSE FLDEXAM INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK SBSE TDI INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK -
Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Code TAS CA INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK -
Wage & Investment (WI) is profiled to use the following codes for TC 971 AC 522:
BOD Name Program Name TC 971 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Code WI ACS INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK WI AMADJ INCOME, INCMUL, MULTFL, IRSID, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, and, UNWORK WI AMTAP INCOME, IRSID, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, OMM, and UNWORK WI ASFR INCMUL, MULTFL, INCOME, NOFR, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and, UNWORK WI AUR INCMUL, MULTFL, INCOME, IRSID, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and, UNWORK WI CSCO INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, and UNWORK WI EXAM INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK WI FA INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK WI PREREF INCOME, IRSID, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, and UNWORK WI RICS INCOME, IRSID, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, and UNWORK WI SP INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NOFR, NODCRQ, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK WI TDI INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK WI WHC INCOME, MULTFL, INCMUL, OTHER, NODCRQ, NOFR, PNDCLM, IRSID, and UNWORK
The exhibit demonstrates how AUR inputs a TC 971 AC 522 when no identity theft occurred.

-
Obtain the following information:
-
Entity - SSN;
-
BOD/Function (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);
-
Program Name (See Exhibit 10.5.3-3);
-
Tax Year of the TC 971 AC 522 being reversed; and
Note:
The tax year must match the tax year of the TC 971 AC 522 that is being reversed.
-
Transaction date of the TC 971 AC 522 being reversed.
-
-
Navigate to FRM77
-
Sign into IDRS;
-
Enter ENMOD SSN, then press ENTER;
-
Enter REQ77;
-
FRM77 is displayed for the selected SSN.
-
-
Enter the TC 972 AC 522
-
Enter the TC with 972;
-
Enter TRANS-DT (enter the transaction date of the TC 971 AC 522 being reversed);
-
Enter SECONDARY-DT (enter the tax year of the TC 971 AC 522 being reversed in the MM-DD-YYYY format);
-
Enter MISC (Modify the Reason Code field with the reason for the reversal). Select the Reason code that reflects the reason for the reversal from the options below; and
-
Enter REMARKS (enter your remarks).
-
-
The following tables describe the TC 972 AC 522 Tax Administration Source Codes by BOD/Function and Program.
Note:
Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.
| TC 972 AC 522 Miscellaneous Field | ||
|---|---|---|
| Reason | Description | Tax Administration Source Code |
| Identity Theft has NOT occurred | In the course of resolving an identity theft issue, the employee assigned determines no identity theft occurred. | NOIDT |
| The taxpayer did not provide supporting documents | This code is used to close a suspended case when the taxpayer fails to provide the requested supporting documentation within the time specified by the employee assigned. | NORPLY |
| Taxpayer Request | The taxpayer requests the 971 be reversed. | TPRQ |
| Keying or Internal Error | The 971 was due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake. | IRSERR |
| Internally Identified Negative Impact | The 971 is causing a negative impact on another internal process or system, and should be reversed to discontinue the negative impact. | IRSADM |
| False Identity Theft Claim | The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be fraudulent. | FALSE |
| Other | The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the above reason descriptions. | OTHER |
The following tables describe the TC 972 AC 522 reason codes by BOD/Function and Program. Refer to IRM 10.5.3-3, Acronyms and Definitions, for definitions of the Program Name codes.
Note:
Do not attempt to use Tax Administration Source Codes not listed for your BOD/Function.
Appeals is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:
| BOD Name | Program Name | TC 972 AC 522 |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Administration Source Code | ||
| AP | AP | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
CI is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:
| BOD Name | Program Name | TC 972 AC 522 |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Administration Source Code | ||
| CI | FO | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| CI | RC | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
LB&I is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:
| BOD Name | Program Name | TC 972 AC 522 |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Administration Source Code | ||
| LBI | LBI | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, and OTHER |
IT is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:
| BOD Name | Program Name | TC 972 AC 522 |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Administration Source Code | ||
| MITS | CSIRC | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
Operations Support is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:
| BOD Name | Program Name | TC 972 AC 522 |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Administration Source Code | ||
| OS | PHSH | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
PGLD is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:
| BOD Name | Program Name | TC 972 AC 522 |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Administration Source Code | ||
| PPDS | CONGINQ | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| PPDS | OPIP | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
SBSE is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:
| BOD Name | Program Name | TC 972 AC 522 |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Administration Source Code | ||
| SBSE | ACS | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| SBSE | ASFR | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| SBSE | AUR | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| SBSE | CFBALDUE | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| SBSE | CFDELRET | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| SBSE | CORR | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| SBSE | CSCO | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| SBSE | FLDEXAM | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| SBSE | TDI | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
TAS is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:
| BOD Name | Program Name | TC 972 AC 522 |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Administration Source Code | ||
| TAS | TAS | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
WI is profiled to use the following codes to reverse a TC 971 AC 522:
| BOD Name | Program Name | TC 972 AC 522 |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Administration Source Code | ||
| WI | ACS | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| WI | AMADJ | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| WI | ASFR | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| WI | AUR | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| WI | CSCO | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| WI | EXAM | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| WI | FA | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| WI | PREREF | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| WI | RICS | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| WI | SP | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, OTHER, NOIDT and NORPLY |
| WI | TDI | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
| WI | WHC | TPRQ, IRSERR, IRSADM, FALSE, NOIDT, NORPLY, and OTHER |
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
≡
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
| ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ |
|---|---|---|---|
| ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ |
| ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ |
| ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ |
| ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ |
≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
| ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ | ||
|---|---|---|
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Important: Input of TC 971 AC 524 is limited and reserved for use by the Office of Privacy, Information Protection & Data
Security and RICS-.
The TC 971 AC 524 is displayed on IDRS command code ENMOD and consists of the following data elements:
| TRANS-DT | SECONDARY-DT | MISC |
|---|---|---|
| Input date of TC 971 AC 524 | Tax year of date of death | BOD, Function, and Program that input the TC 971 AC 524. (See the Miscellaneous Field table below.) |
| TC 971 AC 524 Miscellaneous Field | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Description | BOD / Function | Program Name | Tax Administration Source |
| Deceased Taxpayer | PPDS | OPIP | DECD |
| Deceased Taxpayer | WI | PREREF | DECD |
Important: Input of TC 972 AC 524 is limited and reserved for use by the PGLD and Wage & Investment (RICS TPP & Submission Processing Entity).
The miscellaneous field for TC 972 AC 524 reflects the reason for the reversal of TC 971 AC 524. The transaction date of the TC 972 must match the original TC 971. See the TC 972 AC 524 Miscellaneous Field chart below for the reasons and values for the MISC field.
| TC 972 AC 524 Miscellaneous Field | ||
|---|---|---|
| Reason | Description | Value |
| Taxpayer Request | The taxpayer requests the 971 be reversed. | TPRQ |
| Keying or Internal Error | The 971 was due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake. | IRSERR |
| Internally Identified Negative Impact | The 971 is causing a negative impact on another internal process or system, and should be reversed to discontinue the negative impact. | IRSADM |
| False Identity Theft Claim | The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be fraudulent. | FALSE |
| Other | The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the above reason descriptions. | OTHER |
