



Suspicious Activity Reporting Guidance for Casinos

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Introduction

Suspicious Activity Reporting Guidance for Casinos is intended to provide assistance specifically written for casinos. Casinos are required to report suspicious transactions under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).¹ The BSA Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) requirements apply to all casinos that meet the BSA definitions,² including those in Nevada and certain Indian gaming operations.

This publication should be used as a supplement to the SAR form instructions, which can be found at www.fincen.gov. In addition, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), in consultation with the federal regulatory authorities, recently issued a SAR Guidance Package that consists of three parts:

Part I: *Guidance on Preparing a Complete and Sufficient Suspicious Activity Report Narrative*

Provides financial institution filers with a recommended process of organizing and writing SAR narratives.

Part II: *The Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Form*

A PowerPoint presentation providing general information about reporting requirements for the respective industries mandated to file SARs, as well as the subsequent use of those SARs.

Part III: *Keys to Writing a Complete & Sufficient SAR Narrative*

A PowerPoint presentation providing suggestions on how to enhance writing a SAR narrative.

¹ 31 U.S.C. § 5311 *et. seq.* and the regulations promulgated there under.

² See the Bank Secrecy Act definitions at 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(x), and Department of Treasury regulations at 31 CFR 103.11(n)(5) and (6). The term “casino” includes card clubs, see 31 CFR 103.11(n)(6)(i), and this meaning is incorporated into this Guidance.

Reporting Suspicious Activity

The BSA regulations³ require a casino to file a Casino SAR (SARC) for any transaction conducted or attempted by, at, or through a casino, and involving or aggregating at least \$5,000 in funds or other assets, that the casino knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect:

- involves funds derived from illegal activity or is intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activity (money laundering);
- is designed to evade the reporting or recordkeeping requirements of the BSA (structuring);
- has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which the particular customer would normally be expected to engage, and the casino knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction after examining the available facts; or
- involves use of the casino to facilitate criminal activity.

A casino has 30 calendar days to file a SARC after the date of initial detection of any suspicious transaction or pattern of suspicious transactions or activities that are required to be reported. If the casino is unable to identify a suspect on the date it initially became aware of the suspicious transaction, the filer has an additional 30 calendar days to file, but in any circumstance, a SARC must be filed within 60 calendar days.

A casino should develop and implement its SAR Program as a part of its larger Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Program.⁴ An effective AML Program is one that is developed and implemented commensurate with the risks posed by the products and financial services provided by the casino, and that is maintained and

³ 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g); 31 CFR 103.21.

⁴ Casinos must develop and implement written AML programs. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(2); 31 CFR 103.64 and 103.120(d). At a minimum, each AML program must have: (a) a system of internal controls reasonably designed to prevent money laundering and assure compliance with the BSA; (b) internal or external testing for compliance with a scope and frequency commensurate with the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing and products and services provided; (c) training of casino personnel; (d) designation of an individual or individuals responsible for day-to-day compliance with the BSA and the program; and (e) procedures for using all available information to determine the name, address, social security number, and other information, and verification, of a person when required, and to determine the occurrence of any transactions or patterns of transactions required to be reported as suspicious; and (e) for casinos that have computer systems, automated programs to aid in assuring compliance.

reasonably designed to prevent the casino from being used to facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing.

Each casino should apply the same risk-based analysis of its business to create a process for detection, analysis and reporting of potentially suspicious activity. Based upon its assessment of the risks of its business, its SAR Reporting Program may be more or less elaborate than programs of other casinos. The extent of the SAR Reporting Program should depend upon the characteristics of the customers and the casino, and the context in which the transactions occur. If the casino determines that an activity is suspicious, it must file a SARC. The casino, after investigation, may determine that the activity is not suspicious. In that case, the casino should document the basis for its determination that the transaction is not, after all, suspicious.

SARC compliance examinations will look at the whether a casino's written program is designed to address the money laundering risks of your particular business, whether the casino and its employees are following the program, whether employees are being properly trained, whether the program is being audited and the results of that audit, and whether the casino responds to red flags and other indicia that the compliance program is deficient.

Filling out a SARC

Completeness and accuracy are essential. Make sure all the required fields are filled out as fully as possible and accurately, including the correct spelling of proper names. If a casino has a middle name or middle initial for a suspect, it should be included. If the casino has no identifying information about a customer whose transactions are suspicious, the casino should provide the best possible physical description of the customer in the "narrative" portion of the SARC. A SARC is completed when all of the available information has been entered and responses such as "none" or "not available" have been entered in any blank critical field. These responses are words, phrases or codes that inform FinCEN that data for that item is unavailable or not applicable, and has not been simply overlooked by the filer. Items are considered critical when they contain important information required for law enforcement investigations, such as: subject name, subject identifying number and address, type of suspicious activity, and a detailed narrative.

The Narrative, Part VI, is critical to criminal investigators and analysts and must be completed. It is the casino's opportunity to explain why it is filing the report. Do not merely repeat information provided in Parts I and II of the form. Instead, describe why the conduct of the person or the transaction itself caused the casino become suspicious. Be specific. Be sure to include whatever details are known about the transaction, e.g., the type of monetary instrument deposited (currency, cashier's checks, traveler's checks, foreign drafts or money orders), the number on the monetary instrument, if applicable, account numbers and the banks upon

which the monetary instruments are drawn. Also identify any other financial institutions or foreign countries through which the transaction is routed.

General statements such as: “possibly suspicious activity” or “attempt to structure \$8,000” are not adequate to notify law enforcement of the precise nature of the suspicious activity.

A better example would be:

Individual described in Part I, on first visit to casino, asked if the cage could wire proceeds of his cage deposit to his accounts number 1234 at ABC Bank in Country A, account number 5678 at DEF Bank in Country B and account number 9101 at GHI Bank in Country C. The cage deposit of \$175,000, in cash, was made on 4/25/2003. A CTR was filed for the deposit transaction and ID is on file. Records show he drew down only \$5000 before he made the request to wire the funds. When his request was refused, he started shouting and said that all the other casinos let him do this. Additional documentation is available along with videotape of the incident at the cage.

This example clearly states who was involved, what happened, why the filer concluded the actions of the suspect were suspicious, the amounts involved and indicates that the filer has backup with detailed information. Providing details about the amount of currency, negotiable instruments, checks, cash equivalents, chips or tokens involved in the transaction is important because large amounts may be of particular interest to investigators and law enforcement. The backup information may be retained in either hard copy or electronically, on magnetic media, digital format, or any other form of mass document storage.

As was done in the above example, if there is additional information a casino believes will be helpful to investigators, it should state this in the Narrative Section. However, the casino should not include the backup materials with the SARC form when it is filed. Cancelled checks, credit reports, spreadsheets, photos, charts, other casino records, extra pages, etc. should not be attached to the SARC. Information contained on SARC forms is entered into a computer system, so only data that can be typed can be accepted and included in the database. Any backup materials are “deemed to be filed” with the SARC, and those materials should be retained with the casino’s copy of the SARC so that investigators or law enforcement officials can request and review the materials.

If a customer engages in the same suspicious activity every time he or she comes to the casino, the casino should file a SARC each time the customer engages in the suspicious activity. Nothing in the BSA or the implementing regulations requires a casino to exclude a customer from gaming, even if the casino has filed multiple SARCs on that customer. However, depending on the circumstances, the casino should consider whether, in its business judgment, risk that the customer actually is engaged in money laundering or terrorist financing activities warrants exclusion of the customer from the casino.

What makes a transaction suspicious?

A casino is required to file a SARC if you “know, suspect or have reason to suspect “ an activity or transaction is suspicious. It is not required to have proof of any illegality, nor is it required to form a legal opinion. It is the responsibility of the appropriate governmental agencies to analyze the SARs received from all reporting financial institutions and to investigate possible violations of the law. The BSA contains a “safe harbor” providing broad protection from civil liability to casinos, card clubs and their employees that file SARCs or otherwise report suspicious activity. The safe harbor applies whether the SARC is required or voluntary, and also protects the filer for not disclosing the fact that a SARC has been filed.

Item 26 in Part II of the form lists 16 specific types of suspicious activity. Because suspicious transactions may comprise more than one of the listed types of activities, the filer should check as many boxes as are applicable (but be sure to check at least one box).

Non-Title 31 Illegal Activities

Several of the listed activities involve illegal conduct:

- Bribery/gratuity;
- Check fraud;
- Credit/debit card fraud;
- Embezzlement/theft; and
- Misuse of position.

The Narrative should describe the illegal conduct in detail. For example:

On June 3, 2003 at 2:30 PM, customer described in Part I offered \$500 in \$100 chips to Pit Manager Jean Smith (Pit 3) to alter his player rating slip to show a smaller currency transaction. Smith alerted Security officers who removed customer from the table for interrogation. Gaming regulators were also notified. Security reports, affidavits, videotapes and other investigative materials are available with Contact listed on Part V of the SARC.

Remember that a casino is not required to file a SARC for a robbery or burglary that has been reported to an appropriate law enforcement authority.

Locally-Prohibited Activities

Other of the listed activities involve conduct that may be suspicious or prohibited in a gaming jurisdiction. For example, many jurisdictions prohibit an individual from establishing multiple accounts using an alias, nickname or other aka. Other suspicious or prohibited activities may include:

- Large currency exchanges;
- Minimal gaming with large transactions;
- Use of multiple credit or deposit accounts; and
- False or conflicting IDs.

Example:

Ron Jones, customer account # 2233445, who always plays with credit, brought \$25,000 cash in \$5, \$10, and \$20 denominations to the casino cage. He requested the full amount in \$100 bills. The cage cashier, James Patel, called for the cage supervisor, Alan Major. Major asked why Jones wanted to carry around so much cash since he always uses his credit line. Jones responded that he was a good customer of the casino and they had no right to ask him. After consulting with the casino manager, Jean Brody, the currency exchange was conducted.

Because Jones had no reasonable explanation for the large currency exchange of small bills, never previously used cash, and his credit records showed that he owned a large non-cash business, the casino believes that the transaction may be suspicious. All cage transactions and gaming transactions for that visit are available with the copy of the SARC.

Illegal Activities under Title 31

Several of the activities listed in Item 26 of Part II involve conduct that is prohibited under Title 31:

- Money laundering;
- Structuring; and
- Terrorist financing.

Money Laundering

Money laundering is defined in 31 U.S.C. § 5340 to include the movement of “illicit” cash or cash equivalent proceeds into, out of, or through the U.S. or U.S. financial institutions. In such a case, the money has been generated by illegal means.

Structuring

Structuring is a violation of the BSA. It applies to conduct engaged in for the purpose of evading the thresholds for reporting or recordkeeping under the BSA. Its usual forms are the breaking up of a transaction into two or more smaller transactions. *See* 31 U.S.C. 5324 and 103 CFR 103.11(gg).

If a casino observes a customer engaging in multiple cash transactions that are divided into amounts low enough to avoid the filing of a CTR or other BSA recordkeeping requirements, but which added together, would trigger one of these requirements, that customer's conduct should raise a "red flag" that the customer may be "structuring" his/her transactions. Examples include repeated wires under \$3,000 that add up to over \$3,000 (to evade the wire transfer identification/recordkeeping rule), or multiple cash payments or withdrawals in amounts under \$10,000 that in the aggregate would be over \$10,000 (to evade the currency transaction reporting requirement). Structuring can occur over multiple days; for example, the same person may repeatedly come in with \$9,000 in cash over a number of days. Structuring can be engaged in by multiple persons; for example, a group of persons could each wire funds of \$2,990 from or to the same account. Remember that structuring does not depend on the illegality of the proceeds that are structured. Structuring itself is a crime and is reportable on a SAR even if the structured funds are legally obtained.

In the Narrative, it is essential to describe the activity that leads the casino to suspect that the transaction is reportable. For example:

Over the period from 5/20/03 to 7/31/03, Joe Smith would buy-in with cash at the craps tables for amounts just under \$10,000 per gaming day. He always made hotel reservations with two other men who declined to be rated or accept comps. They played at the same tables and followed his bets, also buying -in just under \$10,000. The marketing rep, Joe Shark, asked Smith for information about his companions but he refused to provide any. On several occasions Smith was observed handing cash to the others prior to and during play. Based upon all these activities, we believe that Joe Smith and his companions may be structuring. The SARC contact person has backup data, including videotapes and incident reports completed by the marketing rep and pit personnel.

Terrorist Financing

Terrorist financing does not necessarily involve criminal proceeds. It is the means by which terrorist groups transfer funds around the world. Examples may include:

- customer requests suspicious wire transfers to financial institutions in countries known as friendly to terrorism;
- customer requests wire transfer to charity that is unfamiliar to the casino or appears to have links to countries that are friendly to terrorism;
- fund transfer to a customer or from a customer that is routed through multiple financial institutions or jurisdictions in an apparent attempt to disguise their origin; or
- a customer may ask for airplane tickets, jewelry or other non-cash gifts (easily converted to cash) to be comped to a friend or to an unknown party.

If the casino knows, suspects or has reason to suspect that a customer may be linked to terrorist activity against the United States, the casino should immediately call FinCEN's Financial Institutions Terrorist Hotline at the toll-free number: 1-866-556-3974. Similarly, if any other suspected violation -- such as ongoing money laundering schemes -- requires immediate attention, the casino should notify the appropriate law enforcement agency. In either case, the casino must also file a SARC if the casino is subject to mandatory reporting.

“Unusual Use” and “No Apparent Business Purpose” Activities

Finally, several of the activities listed in Item 26 of the SARC require subjective analysis of the conduct involved in the transaction to determine if the transaction is an “unusual use” or one that has “no apparent business or lawful purpose.”

- No apparent business or lawful purpose;
- Unusual use of negotiable instruments;
- Unusual use of wire transfers; and
- Unusual use of counter checks or markers

Examples:

A customer requests several separate casino checks for his cash winnings, each for amounts under \$10,000. When asked why, he responds that he wants to put the money into different bank accounts.

Comments:

Here, the casino asked for a reasonable explanation and received an answer suggesting that the customer may be attempting to structure the cash. This conduct involves several of the types of suspicious activities listed in Item 26 – no apparent business or lawful purpose, unusual use of negotiable instruments, and structuring – and the casino should check each of these boxes on the SARC form.

A first-time customer wires a large amount into the casino cage from a bank in the US. After minimal gaming, he requests that the proceeds be wired to a joint account in a high-risk country.

Comments:

This conduct may involve minimal gaming with large transactions and unusual use of a wire transfer to a high-risk country.

Examples of Actual Casino SARC Narratives

Following are examples of actual SARC Narratives recently filed by casinos. The comments following each example explain why they are, or are not, sufficient. The Narratives have been edited to remove identifying information.

Example #1

Customer A, Casino account # xxxxx, approached the casino cage at approximately 11:40 PM on 0/0/00 asking about reportable transactions. The cashier noticed that he had two brown chips (\$5000. denomination) in his hand but didn't cash them. He returned to cash-in \$2800. in small denomination chips.

At 5:15 AM, a man named B came to the cage to cash in \$10,000 in brown chips but there was no verification of him having played. It was decided to cash him out. The pit personnel saw him walk to Customer A and hand the cash to A.

At 5:30 AM a woman named C came to the cage to cash in one brown \$5000 chip. Again, no verification of play was found and the customer acted uneasy. The pit allowed the cash-out and again noticed C walk directly to A and hand him the cash. It is the belief of the pit and the cage, as a result, that Customer A was structuring the transaction and using paid agents to circumvent reporting requirements.

Customer B-name, address, dob, id description
Customer C-name address, dob, id description

Comments:

This Narrative is helpful to law enforcement and regulators because it fully describes the activities, provides specific identifying details about each customer involved in the suspicious transaction, and explains why the activities were suspicious. The example provides observations of the pit and cage employees about the actions that caused them to become suspicious. It also shows that the casino attempted to verify whether customers B and C had legitimate reasons for cashing-in large value chips. The SARC then concludes, based upon the activity described in the Narrative, that a violation of Title 31, specifically structuring, had occurred.

Example #2

A SARC dated 11/03/2002 was previously filed on John Doe because of excessive wire transfers and minimal gambling activities. This supplemental report details recent suspect activities in which John Doe has engaged at Bob's Casino with other associates, Jack Doe and Jim Doe, which may indicate possible money laundering. The SARC is being filed based on numerous suspicious factors: 1. John Doe's excessive wire transfer activity; 2. John Doe's association with other players who

are identified by the casino as having excessive incoming wires used to purchase chips; 3. Pass-off chips by Jack and Jim Doe to John Doe which are cashed out and deposited back into John Doe's account; and 4. Surveillance of Doe and associates which indicate minimal play by all parties.

Specifically, the following wire transfers and patters appeared suspicious. Between 10/12/2002 through 1/06/2003, John Doe has transacted wire transfers totaling \$73,850 to Jane Doe, ABC Bank, Acct. # 12345678. The source of these funds was cashed-in chips. During the same time period, Jack Doe received four incoming wire transactions totaling \$30,000 from Albert Doe, Bank of Good Fortune, New York, Acct # 76543210. Jim Doe also received \$40,000 from Albert Doe, Bank of Good Fortune, New York, Acct. # 765463210. Cash was taken from Jack and Jim Doe's accounts for the purchase of chips. On five occasions as follows, all three subjects were observed by Bob's Casino Security blackjack together at the casino: 10/12/2002, 10/20/2002, 11/02/2002, 11/03/2002, 12/17/ 2002 and 1/06/2003. Prior to the visit, Jack and Jim Doe received wire transfers from Arnold Doe which were used to purchase chips in increments of \$6,000 to \$8,000. John Doe purchased chips, using a smaller balance maintained on his account, that usually ranged between \$3,000 to \$4,000. The blackjack pit supervisor indicated each of the players did not extensively play but each took losses when they played between \$300 to \$500 a time they visited. The blackjack supervisor has observed John Doe receiving chips from Jack and Jim Doe during some of their visits. The casino's surveillance of the subjects also confirmed observing the same type of activity between the customers. John Doe normally deposited between \$14, 000 to \$17, 000 in chips that he identified as winnings to pit clerks. Funds were usually wire transferred to Jane Doe on the day after John Doe visited the casino.

This matter has been referred to the State Gaming Commission and State Police. The investigation is ongoing.

Comments:

This Narrative provides a detailed overview of the suspicious activity and acknowledgement that a previous SARC was filed on the suspects. The conclusion of the narrative provides a clear disposition of the case in describing what the casino has done, and is continuing to do, in tracking the suspicious activities of the suspects.

Example #3

Floorperson J. Jones went to pay a taxable jackpot on location #210, machine # 111 for \$1250. She asked the customer, (ID information in Part I) for ID and social security number. Jones said the customer pulled out several social security cards, went through them, and handed one to Jones. Jones saw a few of the cards that had the same name but did not see if they had the same social security number.

Comments:

This Narrative is incomplete because it does not describe subsequent events. Was the slot jackpot paid? If paid, was it paid in cash or check? What other steps did the casino take regarding this customer? Was the customer known to the casino?

Example # 4

Subject was cashing in chips at the main cage. He had approximately \$9000 to \$11,000 in purple. He was trying to structure his cash out to avoid being tracked by CTR. He asked how much he would have to cash-in in order to avoid showing ID. At this point he was getting very agitated about having to show ID. I told him he could cash his chips in and during that time, I told him I was contacting Surveillance. I contacted Security and asked if Ron would come out and ID the guest. After completing the transaction, Ron ID'd the guest and had a short conversation with him. Signed, Jack Black, Security Supervisor.

Comments:

This Narrative is incomplete because it does not indicate when the transaction occurred, does not adequately identify casino personnel involved (such as main cage cashier), does not indicate who "Ron" in Security. Moreover, it does not provide the substance of the conversation between "Ron" and the customer and does not indicate whether the customer was known to the casino or whether the "\$9,000 to \$11,000 in purple" was gaming proceeds.

Example #5

On June 27, 2003, Jane Smith came up to the third main cage and cashed out \$5000 in chips. She proceeded to hold purple chips (looked to be about \$5200) stating that she was going to keep those chips until later. While waiting in line, Ms. Smith was talking to another customer about the CTR reporting process and basically telling him how to avoid a CTR. She was explaining how the cage, table games, and slots compare their amounts and fill out a CTR when someone gets \$10,000. Ms. Smith told the other customer that's why she pulls some of her chips back so she will not have to pay taxes. She and the other gentleman walked out together.

Ms. Smith has visited our casino over the last month, usually once a week. Her winnings were minimal until last week when on June 20, 2003 she cashed out \$5000 in chips one day. She returned the following day and cashed out an additional \$5000 in chips. We have maintained a copy of Ms. Smith's winnings over the last month and also a copy of her driver's license. Today, Ms. Smith was informed that she was barred from our casino after she was heard instructing another customer on how to avoid a CTR.

Comments:

This Narrative provides specific information related to the actions by the customer, including dates and amounts of her transactions and her comments to other persons that indicate her knowledge of the BSA currency reporting requirements and support a conclusion that the customer was structuring her transactions to evade a CTR filing.

Example #6

It appears that John Doe may have circumvented currency reporting procedures.

Comments:

This Narrative is deficient because it fails to provide any information to support the stated conclusion.

Disclosure of SARC Reports and Underlying Facts

31 U.S.C. 5318(g)(2) requires that, if a financial institution files a SAR with a government agency, the financial institution may not notify any person involved in the transaction that the transaction has been reported. Questions have arisen about how a casino should respond to a civil, administrative or criminal subpoena; request from local regulator or similar situation.

The casino is prohibited from complying with any subpoena requesting disclosure of a SARC or disclosing the fact that a SARC was filed. If you receive such a request, you should immediately notify the Office of Chief Counsel at FinCEN ((703) 905-3590). The SAR regulations do not prohibit disclosure of documents, internal records or other information describing the transaction for which the SAR was filed pursuant to a validly issued subpoena or document request. A casino may choose to adopt a standard response to such subpoenas, but only if and so long as the standard response is used for all subpoena responses, whether or not the casino is refusing to produce a filed SARC. An example of a standard response could be:

“Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5318(g)(2), [casino] can not confirm nor deny the existence of any Suspicious Activity Report for Casinos that might have been filed by [casino] and that would be responsive to your subpoena, if in fact such a report was ever filed. If such a report was filed, the casino would be prohibited from producing such report under 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5318(g)(2).”

Under the regulations, SARCs may be provided to FinCEN or “an appropriate law enforcement or supervisory agency” regardless of whether the request is made through FinCEN or directly to the casino or whether the request is made by civil, criminal or grand jury subpoena. If a casino is unsure whether or not a particular agency is an appropriate requestor, the casino should call FinCEN for clarification.

If the casino has a separate state, local or tribal suspicious activity reporting obligation, or an obligation to provide SARC information to state local or tribal regulators, the casino may provide the SARC or the information contained therein to those regulators pursuant to state law. For example, if state law requires a casino to inform the state gaming regulator that the casino has received a request to produce a SARC, the casino may do so. Compliance with the state, local or tribal gaming requirements will not relieve the casino of its responsibility to comply with federal BSA requirements (so in the above example, the casino also would have to notify FinCEN that the casino has received a request to produce a SAR).

In general, a casino may not provide a copy of a SARC to another financial institution. However, FinCEN has been requested by casinos that have money

services businesses (MSBs) on the premises, which provide services to the casino customers such as money transmission, check cashing, and currency exchange, whether the casino and the MSB could file a joint SARC on suspicious activity of a casino customer that involves the MSB's services. The filing of a joint SARC in such circumstances is permissible. In all such joint filings, only one of the filing institutions should be identified as the "filer" in the filer identification section of the SARC. The narrative of the joint SARC must include the words "joint filing" as well as the identifying information of the other filer or filers. Each filer should keep a copy of the filed SARC form for its records. In the case where a casino is, itself, an agent of an MSB, the casino, in its capacity as agent, may share with its principal any SARCs that it files as an agent of the MSB.

In addition, a casino may share information about a transaction or a customer (but not the SARC form itself) with other financial institutions under the protection of a safe harbor from civil liability pursuant to FinCEN's rule (found at 31 CFR 103.100) promulgated under section 314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act, provided that they both file the required notices with FinCEN. The notice is available on the FinCEN website. Such sharing must be for the purpose of complying with the requirements of the BSA.

REMEMBER:

Deadline: A casino has 30 calendar days to file a SARC after the date of initial detection of any suspicious transaction or pattern of suspicious transactions or activities that are required to be reported. If a casino is unable to identify a suspect on the date it initially became aware of the suspicious transaction, it has an additional 30 calendar days to file, but in any circumstance must file a SARC within 60 calendar days.

Liability: When a casino reports suspicious activity, the law provides protection from civil liability.

The Role of the Casino: Casinos are not being asked to accuse customers of criminal activity – they are only required to file a SARC if they believe the activity is suspicious and involves or aggregates \$5,000 or more.

Urgency: If a situation seems to require immediate attention, a casino should contact the appropriate law enforcement authority immediately; then file a SARC. If a casino wishes to report suspicious transactions relating to terrorist activities, it should call the Financial Institutions Terrorist Hotline at 1-866-556-3974; then file a SARC.

Confidentiality: It is illegal to notify any person involved in the transaction that a SARC has been filed.

For Further Information

BSA Forms

To download BSA forms: Visit the FinCEN website at www.fincen.gov
or IRS website at: www.irs.gov

To order BSA forms: Call IRS Forms Distribution Center at: 1-800-829-3676

General Casino BSA Information

To download: Visit the FinCEN website at www.fincen.gov

To order: Call 1-800-386-6329

Answers to Questions about Filing of Form

Call IRS-Detroit Computing Center Hotline at 1-800-800-2877

Interpretation of BSA Regulations

Call FinCEN's Regulatory Helpline at 1-800-949-2732

Report Terrorist Related Financial Activity

Call Financial Institutions Hotline at 1-866-556-3974