Older Taxpayers’ Response to Taxation of Social Security Benefits

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I. Introduction

Social Security benefits are taxed under a complex regime that raises marginal effective tax rates by up to 85 percent. Over a range of Modified Adjusted Gross Income (MAGI),{2} affected taxpayers must include in their taxable income $0.50 of Social Security benefit for every additional dollar of other taxable income;{3} at higher income levels, $0.85 of benefits must be added, until 85 percent of Social Security benefits are included. In these income ranges, an additional dollar of other taxable income increases total taxable income by $1.50 or $1.85. At the highest income levels, this can convert a modest 25 percent statutory tax rate into a 46.25 percent marginal rate. This is much higher than the top income tax bracket,{4} but it applies to older households with relatively modest incomes.

The tax on benefits is in some ways similar to the Social Security earnings test (SSET), which reduces Social Security benefits by 50 cents for every dollar earned above an exempt amount for those younger than the Full Retirement Age (FRA, currently 66).{5} However, the taxation of benefits applies at all ages while the SSET applies only to Social

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{2} MAGI includes most of the income and adjustments reflected in adjusted gross income (AGI), but it includes one-half of Social Security benefits, rather than the taxable portion. It also includes tax-exempt interest.

{3} That is, any taxable income included in MAGI other than Social Security benefits.

{4} In 2013, the top income tax bracket is 39.6 percent and applies to households with taxable incomes over $450,000 (married) and $400,000 (single).

{5} A 33-percent reduction and a higher exemption apply to workers in the year in which they reach FRA.
Security recipients who claim benefits before reaching FRA. Moreover, unlike the benefit
tax, the SSET is not a pure tax since the reduced current benefits translate into higher
benefits once FRA is reached. In contrast, the tax on benefits has no actuarial adjustment.

While the tax on benefits could have significant effects on behavior, it has been thus
far largely ignored in the literature. This is a potentially important oversight. If taxpayers
understand the rules, one would expect them to be even more sensitive to this work
disincentive than to the SSET, which most research has found to significantly affect labor
supply. Moreover, this tax not only affects earnings but also non-labor income, so it can
influence non-labor decisions, such as when to realize capital gains. Early retirees may be
subject to both the SSET and Social Security benefit taxation, so the effective combined
work disincentive may be quite large. Further, if the tax is inefficient, reform options might
exist that could bolster the trust fund, extend older people’s attachment to the labor force,
significantly reduce tax compliance costs for older workers, and raise overall economic
welfare.

This paper investigates older taxpayers’ response to the taxation of Social Security
benefits by looking for evidence of bunching at the kink points created by the taxation of
benefits. In theory, some individuals with incomes above the taxation thresholds have an
incentive to reduce their incomes to the threshold—by working less, delaying realization of
capital gains, or using other techniques to reduce reported income. We test this hypothesis using a panel of data from individual income tax and information returns.

We find no evidence of bunching at or around the thresholds for the population as a whole, and only a very small response for single self-employed taxpayers who have previously been found to be more sensitive to changes in tax rates (Saez 2010; Chetty et al. 2011). This implies that this complicated tax does not lead to any important behavioral response and therefore imposes little or no deadweight loss.

The paper continues as follows. Section II describes the taxation on Social Security Benefits. Section III surveys the relevant literature. Section IV develops a simple theoretical model. Section V discusses the data and Section VI presents the empirical results. Section VII summarizes our findings and discusses planned future work.

II. Taxation of Social Security Benefits

Prior to 1983, Social Security benefits were not subject to income tax. In 1983, the Greenspan Commission recommended that a portion of benefits be subject to income taxation, with the resulting additional tax revenue allocated to the OASDI (Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance, or Social Security) trust fund. Legislation enacted in 1993 increased the amount of benefits included in taxable income for higher-income taxpayers, with the additional revenues allocated to the HI (Medicare) trust fund.
The formula for taxation is complex. OASDI benefits become subject to income taxation when MAGI exceeds $25,000 for single ($32,000 for married) taxpayers. Above those thresholds, the taxable portion of benefits phases in starting at a 50-percent rate. Fifty cents of benefits are included in taxable income for every additional dollar of MAGI. After a second threshold ($34,000 for singles and $44,000 for married households), the phase-in rate increases to 85 percent. The phase-in continues until 85 percent of Social Security benefits are included in taxable income.

The thresholds for taxation have been fixed in nominal terms since their inception. Since the thresholds are not adjusted for inflation, they decrease in real terms over time, unlike federal income tax brackets and many other income tax parameters. As a result, taxation of Social Security affects an increasing proportion of beneficiaries over time, pushing people into higher tax brackets. The number of returns with taxable Social Security benefits nearly tripled—from 5.3 million to 15.3 million—between 1990 and 2009 (see Figure 1). The dollar amount of Social Security benefits subject to taxation increased even more, from $33.6 million in 1990 to $174.6 million in 2009, in part because of the 1993 legislation and partly because of increases in nominal income of the elderly.
Although the levy may seem to be a tax on Social Security benefits, it is actually a large implicit surtax on all income included in MAGI.\(^6\) Taxpayers with low Social Security benefits or modest amounts of other income have MAGI below the threshold for taxation and are not affected. However, as either benefits or other income increase, effective marginal tax rates may increase quite dramatically. For example, a single person with $15,000 of non-Social Security income and $19,900 of Social Security benefits has none of her Social Security included in taxable income; her marginal income tax rate equals the

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\(^6\) Note that the tax potentially applies to taxpayers collecting disability and survivor benefits under the OASDI program, but our analysis will focus on Social Security beneficiaries.
statutory rate of 10 percent. If either her Social Security benefit or income increases by $100, her marginal tax rate would increase to 15 percent.

The taxation of Social Security benefits increases effective marginal tax rates by 50 percent in the first phase-in range and by 85 percent in the second. This is because an additional dollar of AGI (earnings or non-labor income) increases MAGI by $1.50 in the 50-percent phase-in range and by $1.85 in the higher interval, until 85 percent of Social Security benefits are included in taxable income. Figure 2 illustrates how the taxation of benefits distorts effective tax rates for a taxpayer with $20,000 in Social Security benefits in 2010. The effective tax rate schedule is marked by significant discontinuities—much larger than under the regular income tax. Over the phase-in range of income, a taxpayer would ordinarily face three marginal rates—10, 15, and 25 percent. However, because of the partial inclusion of Social Security benefits, three additional effective rates are created—22.5, 27.75, and 46.25 percent. The top effective rate, which applies to seniors with relatively modest incomes ($33,000-$39,000 in Figure 2), is actually higher than the top statutory income tax rate of 35 percent that applied to households with taxable income over $373,650 in 2010.

As shown in Figure 2, taxpayers with income just beyond the phase-in region face a marginal rate of 25 percent, which is more than 20 percentage points lower than those with
lower incomes. Taxation of benefits reduces their after-tax income, but there is no implicit surtax or marginal disincentive to work or earn other income.

The implicit tax affects not only earnings but also non-labor income. Burman (1999) points out that the taxation of Social Security can have disproportionate effects on effective long-term capital gains tax rates; it can add up to 21.25 percentage points (85 percent of 25 percent) to the statutory capital gains tax rate of 15 percent that applies to taxpayers in that income range.

If there is a behavioral response to the taxation of benefits, the substantial kinks in the tax schedule could create clustering of households at the kink points, and potentially
discourage labor supply at both the extensive and intensive margins. Although taxpayers with very low and very high non-labor income are likely to be unaffected, taxpayers whose earnings would be subject to partial taxation might be less likely to work than other similar taxpayers. Secondary earners may face especially strong disincentives if the primary earner’s income puts the second earner in the phase-in range.

The tax treatment of benefits could also affect decisions about when to begin claiming Social Security. The steeply rising marginal tax rate schedule creates an incentive for many people to claim benefits early, getting a reduced benefit over more years. Individuals born after 1942 can reduce their annual benefit by 25 percent or more by claiming at age 62 rather than the full retirement age and fully or partially avoid taxation of Social Security benefits. As a result, the adjustment for delayed retirement may no longer be actuarially fair when taxes are considered. On the other hand, some taxpayers may have an incentive to delay claiming Social Security benefits. If a worker reaches the full retirement age and expects to keep working for a few more years after which his non-Social Security income would drop significantly, he may elect to delay claiming Social Security benefits if the future drop in income means that much less of his benefits would be subject
to tax. In this case, the after-tax value of delaying retirement is better than actuarially fair, even if before tax, the trade-off is neutral.\(^7\)

Finally, it should be noted that the very complicated taxation of Social Security benefits might affect behavior much differently than predicted by a pure optimizing model. It is possible that people do not understand how the tax affects marginal tax rates, the incentives on labor supply, or the timing of benefits. If people ignore these incentives, then the tax may be a type of optimal tax—raising revenue with little or no effect on behavior. On the other hand, taxpayers may overreact to misunderstood incentives—magnifying the economic distortion.

### III. Previous Literature

While Social Security has been extensively studied, very little attention has been paid to the taxation of benefits. The closest analogue is the SSET, which reduces Social Security benefits for individuals who have not reached the full retirement age and whose earnings exceed a threshold.\(^8\) The SSET is different in several key ways. For one thing, it is much easier for individuals to determine if they are affected since it depends only on

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\(^7\) Coile \textit{et al.} (2002) model the timing of claiming Social Security. Even ignoring the taxation of social Security benefits as they do, the decision is very complicated. They present nonlinear simulations for the case of a single earner, leaving the more complex case of dual earners to later research. They find that men generally claim benefits too early compared with the optimal choice.

\(^8\) Prior to 2001, there was also a SSET at a reduced rate for individuals between the full retirement age and 69.
individual earnings and age. In another sense, though, it is more complicated because there is an actuarial adjustment. The reduced Social Security benefits translate into higher future benefits (assuming the individual lives long enough to claim them) making labor supply decisions a function not only of the tax rate, but life expectancy and discount rates. Evidence, however, suggests that older workers view the SSET as a tax with little or no awareness of the actuarial adjustment. Several studies find evidence that the SSET discouraged work among older Americans.\(^9\) Also, eliminating the earnings test for beneficiaries who had reached the full retirement age increased the likelihood that workers would claim Social Security benefits before age 70 (Song and Manchester 2007; Friedberg and Webb 2009).

The Social Security benefit formula itself impacts the implicit taxes on work. The formula is progressive, so those with high earnings get much less in additional benefits per dollar of payroll tax than those with lower incomes. For some workers, including those who expect to have fewer than 40 covered quarters of work—and are thus ineligible for benefits—or who will receive benefits based on their spouse’s earnings, the payroll tax is a pure tax. Liebman, Luttmer, and Seif (2009) find labor supply and retirement decisions of

older workers to be sensitive to the variation in the effective tax rate on earnings. Of particular relevance, this research suggests a surprisingly sophisticated understanding of complex rules. A survey by Leibman and Luttmer (2012) finds a fair amount of knowledge of some Social Security provisions and relatively less about others (including the earnings test).

We know of only three previous studies that have examined the taxation of Social Security benefits. Goodman and Liebman (2008) look at the taxation of benefits as a form of means-testing and conclude that it is sub-optimal. They do not explicitly consider the effect of taxation of benefits on economic incentives, but, citing behavioral economics research, they question whether and how individuals might respond to the tax incentives:

While this analysis shows that the taxation of Social Security benefits raises marginal tax rates for a sizable minority of Social Security beneficiaries, the complexity of these provisions raises questions about how future and current beneficiaries perceive these incentives and whether their behavior responds to them. (Goodman and Liebman 2008, pp. 17-18)

One possibility is that, overwhelmed by the complexity of the incentives, taxpayers might simply ignore the tax. Alternatively, they might apply a simple rule of thumb—e.g., on average, 4 percent of Social Security benefits are included in income—that could similarly result in little distortion. Or, Goodman and Liebman (2008) conjecture, taxpayers may misperceive the tax as applying to 85 percent of Social Security benefits. This could create
a quite large income effect—even for taxpayers with incomes so low that little or none of their benefits are taxable—although presumably it would have no effect on the perceived after-tax return to working or earning other income.

Page and Conway (2011) measure the income effect of taxation of benefits directly by exploiting the natural-experiment of introduction of the taxation in 1983, using difference-in-differences methodology with data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). They estimate that a 20 percent reduction in after-tax Social Security benefits boosts labor force participation among high income elderly by 2 to 5 percentage points. They argue that taxation of Social Security benefits increases labor supply through the income effect: people above the threshold where 85 percent of benefits are subject to tax, even before including OASDI benefits, have less after-tax income, which increases hours of work. They do not attempt to measure the marginal effect of reduced after-tax income within the phase-in range.

Burman, Coe, and Tian (2011) attempt to measure directly the effect of taxing Social Security benefits on labor force participation and earnings using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). They do not find evidence that taxation of benefits significantly affects labor market behavior, but they raise the major caveat that their estimates may be unreliable because of errors in variables and small sample size. Survey
estimates of tax information are notoriously imprecise and the HRS lacks key components of taxable income, such as capital gains.

**IV. Effects of Taxing Social Security Benefits**

If taxpayers understand how the taxation of Social Security benefits affects their budget, then we should observe bunching of MAGI near the thresholds. Taxing Social Security benefits generates convex kinks in the budget constraint at the thresholds for the 50-percent and 85-percent phase-in rates (corresponding to MAGI of $25,000 and $34,000 for single filers). In a simple model of utility maximization, taxpayers with incomes only slightly greater than the threshold will reduce their incomes to the threshold.

To see this, consider a simplified example in which there is a flat-rate income tax and only one rate of taxation of Social Security (as was the case between 1983 and 1993), which increases tax rates by 50 percent. The optimal level of MAGI will maximize utility subject to the kinked budget constraint (Figure 3). Assuming that individuals are averse to work and other activities that increase MAGI and that they value consumption (after-tax income), higher utility corresponds to indifference curves that move in a northwesterly direction on the figure.

Figure 3 illustrates three categories of taxpayers who will be affected differently by the introduction of taxation of benefits. In Panel A, MAGI in the absence of taxation of
Social Security would fall below the threshold. That individual is unaffected by benefit taxation. Panel B shows a taxpayer who before the tax change would have MAGI of $z^* + \Delta z^*$, but after introduction of the taxation regime chooses MAGI of $z^*$. Saez (2010) shows that in the case where individuals have identical preferences but differ in their ability to earn income (e.g., their hourly wage rate differs), all individuals with initial incomes between $z^*$ and $z^* + \Delta z^*$ would bunch at the kink. Taxpayers who initially have higher incomes than $z^* + \Delta z^*$ may also reduce their incomes, but their new incomes would be tangent to the new budget constraint to the right of $z^*$. Finally, Panel C depicts high-income taxpayers for whom the tax produces only an income effect.

**Figure 3. Effect of Introducing a Kink in the Budget Constraint**
With perfect information and complete ability to choose MAGI, this framework would produce bunching at the threshold $z^*$ (see Figure 4). The kink has no effect on
taxpayers with initial incomes below $z^*$, but it produces a leftward shift in the distribution of income among those with initial incomes above $z^*$. Saez (2010) extends this analysis to allow for adjustment frictions (e.g., people can only imperfectly adjust income or they have imperfect information about the location of the threshold) and shows that under certain simplifying assumptions, the amount of bunching near $z^*$ provides a measure of the compensated elasticity of taxable income. If individuals are very sensitive to taxation (high elasticity), then there will be an unusually large mass of tax returns near the threshold.

**Figure 4. Illustration of Bunching at Threshold ($z^*$) in Simple Utility Maximization Framework**

There are many contexts in which such bunching may be observed. Saez (2010) shows that self-employed individuals’ incomes tended to bunch at the level where the earned income tax credit starts to phase out. Wage earners showed no such response, which is consistent with the notion that the self-employed have more control over hours worked.
and taxable earnings, and self-employment income is not subject to third-party information reporting, making it easier to misreport on a tax return. Friedberg (2000), Song and Manchester (2007), Engelhardt and Kumar (2009), etc. observe that older workers clustered to the left of the SSET exempt threshold. Chetty, et al. (2011) examine bunching around large jumps in tax brackets in Denmark to measure elasticity of taxable income in the context of search costs.

Our hypothesis is that if taxpayers are aware of the incentives created by the taxation of Social Security benefits, there should be a bump in the empirical distribution of tax returns near the two thresholds for taxation. We would expect the bump to be more pronounced for those with income from self-employment.

V. Data

To look for evidence of bunching, we use administrative data—the 1999 IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) Individual Edited Panel, which is a longitudinal dataset drawn from individual income tax returns and information returns. The data comprise a panel of individuals from tax years 1999 to 2008. The advantage of these data is that they provide an accurate measure of what is reported to the IRS on income tax returns—and thus tax status.

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They also allow us to study the behavior of self-employed individuals; those who previous research suggests would be the most responsive. The disadvantage is that the dataset includes little demographic information, which precludes structural modeling of the response to taxation.

The panel has been augmented by matching all of the primary and secondary SSNs within the panel to the SOI-processed information returns databases for Forms W-2 (information on wages and withholdings), Forms 5498 (contributions to retirement accounts), Forms 1099-SSA (Social Security benefits), and Forms 1099-R (income from retirement accounts and pensions). Separate observations are created for primary and secondary taxpayers who were in the sample in 1999. The panel is a stratified random sample, which oversamples high-income returns. Sampling weights allow estimation of population aggregates.

We use information from several tax forms for the analysis. Our measure of gross Social Security benefit comes from Form 1099-SSA, an information return the Social Security Administration produces to report benefits for each recipient. Tax-exempt interest and the amount of Social Security benefits that are included in AGI come from Form 1040. Our dataset also includes reported self-employment income from Form 1040 Schedule SE.
Administrative data are not immune from measurement error. For example, self-employed taxpayers often misreport their income to the IRS. The data, however, accurately reflect pre-audit information that taxpayers report to the tax authorities, and the resulting tax liability. Therefore, any behavioral response to the taxation of Social Security benefits should be evident on the tax return.

The sample starts with 112,823 records in 1999, but diminishes to 106,655 by 2008 (see Table 1). We are primarily interested in the subsample of taxpayers age 62 and over, which includes 23,535 individuals in 1999 and 36,530 in 2008. The weighted sample includes 153.6 million individuals in 1999, 28.6 million of whom are age 62 and over. Attrition within the panel is primarily due to death, but taxpayers may also drop out in years in which their income falls below the filing threshold. Because our sample has been supplemented with information returns, particularly earnings from the W-2 and Social Security benefit payments from Form 1099-SSA, we will continue to observe almost all individuals who are not required to file an income tax return. The sample of interest—taxpayers age 62 and over—actually increases over time, a reflection of an aging sample population.

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11 Based on audit data, only 43 percent of nonfarm proprietor income (i.e., small business income) was voluntarily reported on tax returns in 2001 (Internal Revenue Service 2006).
Table 1. 1999 SOI Edited Panel Sample Sizes, 1999-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax Year</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>Subsample with Primary Taxpayer Age 62 or Over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unweighted</td>
<td>Weighted</td>
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<td>Unweighted</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unweighted</td>
<td>Weighted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>112,823</td>
<td>153,578,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>112,804</td>
<td>153,904,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>112,783</td>
<td>154,187,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>112,528</td>
<td>154,118,136</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>112,058</td>
<td>153,648,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>111,144</td>
<td>152,282,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>110,048</td>
<td>150,512,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>108,946</td>
<td>148,771,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>107,844</td>
<td>147,034,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>106,655</td>
<td>145,134,423</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total sample excludes returns receiving disability payments and those where the primary taxpayer is younger than 23.

All told, the panel includes 755,087 observations for married individuals and 352,546 for singles, representing multiple annual observations for most individuals (see Table 2). Applying sample weights, that represents 906.9 million married filers and 606.3 million single filers. Most of the sample is too young to qualify for Social Security benefits (see Table 1); only 21.4 percent of married individuals and 18.6 percent of singles have Social Security benefits.\textsuperscript{12}

Table 2. Summary Statistics, Pooled Sample: 1999-2008

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\hline
& Married & Single \\
\hline
\textsuperscript{12} Younger adults may qualify for Social Security disability benefits, but those individuals have been excluded from our sample.
VI. Results

Figure 5 reports the distribution of MAGI relative to the first exempt amount calculated using the IRS Panel. A value of -1,000 on the x-axis means $1,000 below the threshold. Most of the panels are restricted to the sample of taxpayers who have been claiming Social Security benefits for at least 1 year under the logic that it may take time to understand the tax rules. Results are very similar if that restriction is lifted, and also are similar at the second threshold for taxation (see Appendix). Relative MAGI is measured in 2008 dollars. All of the histograms are weighted by population weights; unweighted histograms (not shown) look similar.

Figure 5. MAGI distribution around the first threshold
To examine bunching evidence statistically, we compare the empirical density, represented by the dots in the scatter plot with smoothed distributions, indicated by the solid line, of MAGI in the vicinity of the threshold in the right panel of each figure. The smoothed distribution is fitted by a quadratic form of MAGI, excluding the observations within $1,000 of the threshold. The grey band indicates the 95 percent confidence interval, reflecting the underlying variability of the data. The simple empirical test of bunching is whether observations near the threshold fall outside the confidence band (reflecting normal sample variability).
Unlike the histograms for the SSET, EITC, or Danish tax system reported in earlier studies, there is no visual evidence of bunching near the MAGI threshold, indicated by the red line, either for all taxpayers or for the self-employed subsample.

It is possible that married and single taxpayers respond differently to the taxation of benefits. Single taxpayers have an easier optimization problem to solve so this is a cleaner test of the bunching hypothesis. Presumably singles have more control of their own MAGI than individual spouses have in managing joint MAGI. Figure 6 shows the MAGI distribution separately for married and single households. Although there is no evidence of bunching for wage earners, there is a hint of bunching to the left of the threshold for single taxpayers with income from self-employment.

All told, the evidence would seem to allay concerns that taxpayers might be over-reacting to the taxation of Social Security benefits. Responses appear to be modest, at most. There is only weak evidence of response for single taxpayers with self-employment income.
VII. Conclusion

The taxation of Social Security benefits creates high effective marginal tax rates, which gives older workers an incentive to reduce their labor and non-labor income below the taxable threshold. However, the tax rules are also quite complex. While in theory taxpayers have an unambiguous incentive to reduce income in the neighborhood of the threshold, the practical effect of these complex incentives is an empirical question. If taxpayers respond to those incentives, there could be significant efficiency costs as well as implications for Social Security’s and the nation’s finances as older workers would be
paying less income and payroll taxes. Moreover, the issue is important as the nation considers tax reform options, which might include changing the way Social Security is taxed.

This study uses administrative data from tax and information returns to examine the distribution of Social Security recipients in the neighborhood of the taxation thresholds. There is little evidence of a response. We examined married and single individuals with and without self-employment income. Only single, self-employed people show any evidence of reducing income to avoid the tax and the response is much smaller and less precisely estimated than the response Saez (2010) found to the kink in the EITC benefit schedule. Overall, the findings suggest that older taxpayers have little understanding of the incentive effects of taxing Social Security.

In future work, we plan to look at how taxation affects labor force participation and the timing of capital gains realizations; capital gains face a much larger proportional rise in tax rates than other income and the timing of capital gains realization is comparatively easy to manipulate. We also plan to look at whether the taxation of benefits affects when individuals first claim Social Security benefits.
VIII. References


Appendix. Graphical Examination of Bunching Around the Second Taxation Threshold

This appendix shows graphs of the empirical density of tax returns around the second (higher) threshold at which Social Security benefits are phased into taxable income at an 85 percent rate (increasing marginal effective tax rates by 85 percent). There is no significant evidence of bunching around this threshold for Social Security recipients.

Figure A1. MAGI distribution around the second threshold
Figure A2. MAGI distribution around the second threshold by marital status