An Action on Decision (AOD) is a formal memorandum prepared by the IRS Office of Chief Counsel that announces the future litigation position the IRS will take with regard to the court decision addressed by the AOD.

The following list initially presents these documents in reverse chronological order, from the present back to calendar year 1997.

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Number Decision Issue Release Date
1999-04 Oshkosh Truck Corporation v. United States 123 F.3d 1477. Reflects the Service's acquiescence that a presumed markup percentage must be used in computing the vehicular excise tax on automotive articles sold to the United States directly by manufacturers when there are no retail sales outlets for such automotive articles. 03/03/2000
1999-05 St. Jude Medical, Inc. v Comm, 34 F. 3d 1394 (8th Cir. 1994). Reflects the conclusion by the Eighth Circuit that for purposes of calculating the CTI of a DISC, mandating the use of SIC categories to allocate R&D expenses is inconsistent with Congress's intent in enacting the DISC statute to allow costs to be allocated on a product-by-product basis or on the basis of product lines. The Court also stated that the mandated use of Section 1.861-8 by 03/03/2000
1999-06 Estate of Mellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 4 (1999). Reflects the Service's acquiescence in the Court's conclusion that closely-held stock held in a QTIP trust should not be aggregated, for valuation pusposes, with stock in the same corporation held in a revocable trust and includible in the decedent's gross estate. The Tax Court's decision in this case is consistent with the Service’s position regarding the valuation of minority interests passing to QTIP trusts. The proper funding of the 03/03/2000
1999-07 Vulcan Materials Commpany and Subsidiaries v. Comm. Reflects the findings of the Tax Court that the statutory language of section 902(a) and its regulations are unclear. The Court was not persuaded that the reference to "accumulated profits" necessarily meant all of the foreign corporation's accumulated profits for the year. The Court interpreted the language "on or with respect to the accumulated profits of such 03/03/2000
1999-08 Hospital Corp. of America and Subsidiaries v. Comm, 109 T.C. 21. Reflects the Service's acquiescence in the Court's conclusion, to the extent, that the Tax Court held that the term "tangible personal property," as defined under a pre-1981 ITC analysis, has continued viability under ACRS and MACRS. The issue as to whether the various disputed items are structural components or tangible personal property is a factual question. We do not agree with the court's determination with respect to the various disputed properties. We cannot 03/03/2000
1999-09 IRS v. Waldschmidt (In re Bradley), (M.D. Tenn. 1999). This Action on Decision reflects the Service's acquiescence in the Court's interpretation of amended setion 121 in light of section 1398 and declining to follow Mehr and Barden, held that a bankruptcy estate steps into the debtor's shoes for purposes of section 121. 03/03/2000
1999-10 Boyd Gaming Corporation v. Comm., 9th Cir. 1999. Reflects the Service's acquiescence in the Court's conclusion that held that the taxpayer's particular security and other business-related concerns provided sufficient justification for its policy of requiring employees to stay on the employer's business premise to satisfy "the convenience of the employer" test of section 119. In applying section 119 and Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1, the Service 03/03/2000
1999-11 James J. and Sandra A. Gales v. Comm, T.C. Memo. 1999-27 Reflects the Service's acquiescence in the Court's conclusion that the advance commissions were loans rather than income in the year received., specifically finding that on occasion repayment was demanded of taxpayer and that he personally repaid some of the advance commissions. The court relied upon Dennis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-275, where advance commissions were found to be loans because the taxpayer was personally liable for repayment at the time 03/03/2000
1999-12 RJR Nabisco, Inc. et al. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-252. Reflects the Service's nonacquiescence in the Court's conclusion that held the graphic design and advertising campaign costs incurred by petitioner are currently deductible business expenses under I.R.C. §162. The Tax Court characterized the graphic design and advertising campaign costs as advertising costs and held the costs were deductible on the ground that the Service had conceded the deductibility of advertising costs in Rev. Rul. 92-80, 03/03/2000
1999-13 Dubin v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 325 (1992) . Reflects the Service's acquiescence in the court's conclusion that held although section 6231(a)(12) expressly provides that a husband and wife who have a joint interest in a partnership shall be treated as one person, the regulations reverse that rule, stating that a husband and wife holding a joint interest should be treated as separate partners. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(12)-1T(a). The Court determined that the bankruptcy of the husband caused the partnership items on the 03/03/2000
1999-14 Mutual Assurance, Inc. v. United States, 56 F.3d 1353. Reflects the Service's nonacquiescence in the court's conclusion that held that a timely filed claim for refund that was allowed in full may be amended after the expiration of the statute of limitations for filing a claim for refund. The court relied on Bemis Brothers Bag Co. v. United States, 289 U.S. 28 (1933) which dealt with whether the original claim and the amended claim perfected after the limitations period had sufficient similarity for the amendment to 03/03/2000
1999-15 William & Helen Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C.19 (1999). Reflects the Service's acquiescence in the Court's conclusion that it was unnecessary to look to the legislative history because the language of section 6404(g) clearly granted the Tax Court jurisdiction to review the Service's failure to abate interest under Section 6404, not just subsection 6404(e). The Court then concluded that the evidence failed to establish that the interest on the employment taxes was excessive in 03/03/2000
1999-16 Conway v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 350 (1998) Reflects the Service's acquiescence in the Court's conclusion that held that the transaction was a nontaxable exchange pursuant to section 1035. Consequently, the 10-percent penalty under section 72(q), which generally applies to taxable distributions from an annuity, was not applicable to the transaction. Section 1035(a)(3) provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized on the exchange of an annuity contract for another annuity contract. See also Treas 03/03/2000
1999-17 Duke Energy Natural Gas Corporation v. Comm. Reflects the Service's nonacquiescence in the court's conclusion holding that natural gas gathering systems are property includible in asset class 13.2 and must be depreciated over a 7-year period. 03/03/2000
2000-01 McLeod v. United States, 276 F.Supp. 213 (S.D. Ala. 1967). Reflects the Service's acquiescence in the court's conclusion holding that the Department of Pensions and Security “constructively placed” the children in the taxpayer's home for adoption by presenting its favorable report to the court. Therefore, the requirements of section 152(b)(2) and Treas. Reg. § 1.152-(2)(c) were satisfied and taxpayer was entitled to the exemptions. In the Action on Decision in McLeod distributed on January 11, 1968, 1968 AOD LEXIS 75, the 03/03/2000
2000-02 Ahadpour v. Comm., T.C. Memo. 1999-9. This Action on Decision reflects the Service's acquiescence in the Court's conclusion, to the extent, that the Tax Court held that petitioners had only a conditional right to retain the escrow payments. In the court's view, the unconditional right to retain the escrow payments arose only after buyer paid the remainder of the purchase price and the deed was delivered. 03/03/2000
2000-03 Simpson v. United States, 183 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1999). Reflects the Service's nonacquiescence in the Court's conclusion, that under the plain language of TRA 86 section 1433(b)(2)(A), the statutory protection applies to transfers under trusts that were irrevocable on September 25, 1985, because Congress intended to protect trust creators who relied on the law as it existed at the time the trust became irrevocable. The district court in Simpson v. United States, 17 03/04/2000
2000-04 Smith v. Comm, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999), rev'g, 108 T.C. 412. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination that the claim against the estate should be limited to the amount actually paid. The Tax Court held that, '[w]here a claim is disputed, contingent, or uncertain as of the date of the decedent's death, the estate is not entitled to a deduction until the claim is resolved and it is determined what amount, if any, will be paid. It is this latter amount that is allowed as a deduction.' 108 T.C. at 419. 05/09/2000
2000-05 Osteopathic Medical v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. No. 26. This Action on Decision reflects the Service's acquiescence in the court's conclusion that held that the taxpayer was not required to account for inventories or to use an accrual method of accounting based on its determination that the furnishing of chemotherapy drugs was not a sale of merchandise within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1. Osteopathic Medical Oncology and Hematology, P.C. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. No. 26 (No. 11551-98 Nov. 22, 1999). 04/29/2000
2000-06 Diane Fernandez v. Commissioner, 114 T. C. No 21. Reflects the Service's acquiescence in the court's conclusion holding that when a taxpayer makes a requisite election under sections 6015(b) and/or (c) along with its request under section 6015(f), and files a timely petition with the Tax Court pursuant to section 6015(e), the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review the request for innocent spouse relief under all subsections of section 6015.The court reasoned that the statutory language gave 09/25/2000
2000-07 Kathy A. King v. Commissoner, 115 T.C. No. 8 (Aug 10, 2000). Reflects the Service's acquiescence in the Court's conclusion that held that the nonpetitionering spouse was entitled to notice and an opportunity to intervene. The Tax Court reasoned that the rationale for the notice and intervention rules of section 6015(e)(4), i.e., fairness to the nonelecting spouse to be heard in order to ensure that innocent spouse relief is granted on the merits after taking into account all relevant 09/25/2000
2000-08 John D. Shea v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 183 (1999) The Tax Court held that the burden of proof should be placed on the Commissioner with respect to the section 66(b) issue. Rather than relying on established case law for its determination as to whether the section 66(b) issue was new matter, the court incorporated section 7522 into its analysis. Section 7522 requires the Commissioner to issue a notice of deficiency which contains a description of the basis for the Commissioner's tax 11/03/2000
2000-09 Weisbart v. United States Dept of Treas. & IRS. Reflects the Service's acquiescence with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision that section 7502 treats the claim as filed on the date of mailing (August 17, 1995) because the taxpayer mailed the claim on the last day of the period prescribed for filing the claim with respect to the withheld taxes. Pointing to Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6402-3(a)(5) and 301.7502-1, the Second 11/17/2000
2001-01 Security State Bank v. Comm., 214 F.3d 1254 (10 th Cir. 2000). This Action on decisions reflects the Service's acquiescence in the Court's conclusion that neither section 1281(a)(1) nor section 1281(a)(2) were applicable to short-term loans made in the ordinary course of business. 01/29/2001
2001-02 Arnold W. Vinick v. USA, 205 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000). Reflects the Service's nonacquiescence in the First Circuit's reversal of the lower court's decision that Vinick was liable as a responsible person under section 6672 for the unpaid withholding taxes of Jefferson Bronze Company. The First Circuit held that the lower courts' findings of fact were 'based on a misunderstanding of the legal standard for what constitutes a responsible person.' The court further stated that [a]bsent a 02/27/2001