25.23.9 BMF Identity Theft Processing

Manual Transmittal

September 14, 2018

Purpose

(1) This transmits revised IRM 25.23.9, BMF ID Theft Processing.

Material Changes

(1) IRM 25.23.9.1.(3) updated name of AM director

(2) IPU 18U0830 issued 05-17-2018 IRM 25.23.9.4, IRM 25.23.9.8.2, and IRM 25.23.9.8.3 added OUO restrictions to the IRM

(3) IPU 18U0830 issued 05-17-2018 IRM 25.23.9.2.1 added information for data breach

(4) IRM 25.23.9.2.1 (4) 4 updated Equifax number

(5) IPU 18U0051 issued 01-03-2018 IRM 25.23.9.4 added the need to research all income documents filed under EIN when research ID theft cases

(6) IPU 18U0830 issued 05-17-2018 IRM 25.23.9.4.1 added new information for RICS filters and correspondence

(7) IPU 18U0830 issued 05-17-2018 IRM 25.23.9.4.2 added link to Exam Employment Group Code Contacts

(8) IPU 18U0682 issued 04-20-2018 IRM 25.23.9.6 added no filing requirements to TC 971 AC 524 to chart

(9) IPU 18U0682 issued 04-20-2018 IRM 25.23.9.6.4 Locking Accounts - TC 971 AC 524 added section for ID theft indicator

(10) IPU 18U0830 issued 05-17-2018 IRM 25.23.9.6.5 added requirement to annotate AMS/CIS for reason for indicator reversal

(11) IPU 17U1602 issued 11-16-2017 IRM 25.23.9.7 added Form 4442 by TAC for ID theft

(12) IPU 18U0682 issued 04-20-2018 IRM 25.23.9.8 added paragraph of information written on a referral

(13) IPU 17U1602 issued 11-16-2017 IRM 25.23.9.8.1 added procedures to ensure all account actions are taken prior to the locking of the account and need to input TC 971 ac 504 on XREF SSN

(14) IPU 18U0051 issued 01-03-2018 IRM 25.23.9.8.1 removed requirement to input last 4 digits of EIN from email subject line

(15) IPU 18U0682 issued 04-20-2018 IRM 25.23.9.8.1 added input of second name line and clarified referral procedures

(16) IPU 18U0830 issued 05-17-2018 IRM 25.23.9.8.1 updated new IP contact information

(17) IRM 25.23.9.8.1 (6) #OUO# updated IP contact information

(18) IPU 18U0051 issued 01-03-2018 IRM 25.23.9.8.4 removed requirement to input last 4 digits of EIN from email subject line

(19) IPU 18U0682 issued 04-20-2018 IRM 25.23.9.8.4 updated to add criteria for fabricated EIN referrals

(20) IRM 25.23.9.8.4 (3) #OUO# updated IP contact information

(21) IPU 17U1602 issued 11-16-2017 IRM 25.23.9.10 clarified the need to complete all account actions and reverse collection actions if deemed ID theft

(22) IPU 17U1602 issued 11-16-2017 IRM 25.23.9.10.1 added section- Duplicate /Amended Return Research.

(23) IPU 17U1602 issued 11-16-2017 IRM 25.23.9.10.2 added section- Bad Return Posted First and Good Return (Refund or Zero Balance)

(24) IPU 17U1602 issued 11-16-2017 IRM 25.23.9.10.3 added section-Posted Return on Either a Fabricated EIN or Inactive Account

(25) IPU 17U1602 issued 11-16-2017 IRM 25.23.9.10.4 added information on ASED

(26) IPU 17U1602 issued 11-16-2017 IRM 25.23.9.10.5 added section- Statute Implications

(27) IPU 18U0830 issued 05-17-2018 IRM 25.23.9.10.7 updated Entity addresses do ramp down of Cincinnati

(28) IRM 25.23.9.10.7 (3) table updated Ogden BMF IDT address

(29) IPU 18U0051 issued 01-03-2018 IRM 25.23.9.11 Added new IRM section Providing Copies of Tax Returns or Income Documents Where ID Theft is Suspected or Proven

(30) IPU 18U0051 issued 01-03-2018 IRM 25.23.9.11.1 Added new IRM section Sending Redacted Information

(31) IPU 18U0051 issued 01-03-2018 IRM 25.23.9.11.2 Added new IRM section Redacting Information

(32) IPU 18U0830 issued 05-17-2018 Exhibit 25.23.9-7 Added new research procedures

Effect on Other Documents

IRM 25.23.9, BMF ID Theft Processing effective as 10-1-2017 is superseded. This IRM includes IRM Procedural Updates (IPUs): 17U1602 issued on 11-16-2017, 18U0051 issued on 1-03-2018, 18U0682 on 04-20-2018 and 18U0830 issued 5/17/2018.

Audience

The provisions in this manual apply to all divisions, functional units, employees, and contractors within the IRS working BMF identity theft cases.

Effective Date

(10-01-2018)

Karen Michaels
Director, Accounts Management
Wage and Investment Division

Program Scope and Objectives

  1. Purpose: This manual provides general case procedures for use in working Business Masterfile (BMF) identity theft inventory and providing assistance to victims of identity theft.

  2. Audience: The primary users of the IRM are all IRS employees in Business Operating Divisions (BODs) who are in contact with taxpayers by telephone, correspondence, or in person with business related ID theft.

  3. Policy Owner: Identity Protection Strategy and Oversight (IPSO) owns the policy relating to BMF ID theft under the directorship of Karen Michaels.

  4. Program Owner: Identity Protection Strategy & Oversight is the internal organization that is responsible for the administration, procedures, and updates related to BMF identity theft.

  5. Program Goals: The provisions in this IRM are specific to quickly and effectively resolve Business Masterfile (BMF) accounts where ID theft is claimed or identified. This IRM outlines the steps to provide relief to those taxpayers whose accounts have been affected by ID theft.

Background

  1. BMF Identity Theft can involve the use of business’s information to file fraudulent returns to support IMF ID theft or to obtain refunds from BMF accounts. An individual's stolen personal information can also be used to obtain an Employer Identification Number (EIN) which is used to file false BMF tax returns and income documents. BMF accounts include the following entity types: sole proprietorship, limited liability company (LLC), corporation, partnership, estate, trust, exempt organization, or government entity.

Authority

  1. Policy Statement 10-1, Assisting Taxpayers who Report they are Victims of Identity Theft

Responsibilities

  1. Any employee who handles cases where the taxpayer states they are a victim of BMF ID theft or the employee identifies BMF ID theft, is responsible for following the procedures set forth in this IRM.

Acronyms/Definitions

  1. Acronyms

    • AMS- Accounts Management Services

    • BMF- Business Master File

    • BOD- Business Operation Division

    • CC- Command Code

    • CI- Criminal Investigation

    • CIS- Correspondence Imaging System

    • EIN- Employer Identification Number

    • IMF- Individual Master File

    • LLC- Limited Liability Company

    • OAR-Operations Assistance Request

    • PII- Personally Identifiable Information

    • RICS- Return Integrity and Compliance Services

    • SFR- Substitute For Return

    • SLA- Service Level Agreement

    • SSN- Social Security Number

    • TAS- Taxpayer Advocate Service

  2. Definitions

    • Fabricated EIN- This is an EIN that has been established for a business. The associated PII information is usually stolen personal data. The creation of this business can be used to defraud the government or used for other illicit activities not related to the filing of federal tax returns or other forms.

    • Tax impact- The ID theft has caused a direct effect to the taxpayer’s account. This can include the filing of fraudulent tax returns and/or income documents.

    • Non-Tax impact- The business’s information has been stolen but currently there is no direct effect on the taxpayer’s account.

    • Fraud- Fraud is when a true owner of the EIN or authorized party attempts to file false tax documents to receive a refund, reduce a tax liability, or receive other tax benefit to which they are not entitled.

    • BMF Identity Theft- Is defined as creating, using or attempting to use a business’s identifying information without authority to obtain tax benefits.

BMF Identity Theft - Overview

  1. Prior to validating BMF identity theft, extensive research MUST be performed to support the ID theft determination. BMF identity theft cases are extremely complex in nature and may require the research and analysis of both the business account and any individual accounts associated with the EIN. Cases may frequently involve multiple BOD/Functions as well. Refer to IRM 25.23.9.4, BMF Identity Theft Research and Exhibit 25.23.9-7,BMF Identity Theft Research Requirement, for additional information.

    Note:

    The BMF ID theft tracking indicator, TC 971 AC 522, identifying the case as a BMF ID Theft issue is not to be input until all research has been completed and research shows there is a high probability of ID theft or there is sufficient information to make the determination that BMF ID theft has occurred. The ID theft indicators will be input on the TXMOD for all accounts and MFTs where ID theft is suspected. The criteria for determining BMF ID Theft will be based on the guidance provided by each function’s IRM. See IRM 25.23.9.6, BMF Identity Theft Tracking Indicators.

  2. BMF ID theft procedures must be followed when there is a tax related impact. Tax impact would include (this list is not all inclusive):
    1. Fraudulent returns filed. This includes original or amended returns
    2. Fraudulent income documents filed. This would include Forms W-2, Form 1099, etc.
    3. Fraudulent filing of Form 2848 and Form 8821

  3. For procedures for non-tax related ID theft see IRM 25.23.9.2.1,Non-Tax Related ID Theft.

  4. Generally, IMF identity theft victims contact the IRS concerning their tax refunds. BMF taxpayers are often unaware their identities have been compromised until a notice or bill from the IRS is received. Taxpayers may contact IRS when they receive an unexpected notice regarding an inactive EIN or a levy notice relating to an EIN they never applied for or for a business they closed years ago.

  5. In some instances, taxpayers must provide documentation to establish the fact that they are truly victims of identity theft. The Form 14039-BBMF Identity Theft Affidavit, will be utilized to obtain additional information from the taxpayer to support the ID theft claim. The Form 14039-B, BMF Identity Theft Affidavit, will be sent to the taxpayer only if internal/external research cannot validate the claim of identity theft. Refer to IRM 25.23.9.7, Form 14039-B, BMF Identity Theft Affidavit for additional information on when to send the form.

  6. BMF Identity theft cases will be prioritized and worked expeditiously within established time frames.

  7. Identity theft can affect tax administration in several ways, for example (the following list is NOT all inclusive):

    • Employment tax returns are filed to substantiate income and withholding on individual returns -This occurs when the identity thief uses the victim’s SSN/EIN to obtain an EIN. This new EIN is used by the perpetrator to file fraudulent employment tax returns (Form 941 or Form 944) in support of fabricated Form W-2 or Form 1099. The identity thief uses the fraudulent forms to substantiate individual returns claiming refunds.

    • Refundable Credits -This occurs when the identity thief uses an EIN to file tax returns to claim refund of refundable credits. The EIN may be fabricated, belong to an inactive entity that is not aware of the misuse of their EIN, or belong to an active entity unaware of the misuse

    • EIN Requests -Identity thieves will use the PII of another individual to request an EIN from IRS. The request can be made electronically using an automated system or by filing Form SS-4 . The identity thief uses the EIN received using another person's PII to file false returns

Non-Tax related ID Theft

  1. If the taxpayer states they are a victim of ID theft and research determines there is no tax related impact from the theft, guidance will be provided to the taxpayer as to what actions they may want to take.

  2. If the business has experienced a breach of employee or client data, and the taxpayer is seeking assistance for their employees or clients, see IRM 25.23.1.9 (1) Data Breach- Business Entities Whose Employees or Clients PII was Breached.

  3. If the taxpayer has been a victim of a data breach, see IRM 25.23.1.10,Taxpayers who are Victims of a Data Breach. Advise the taxpayer to complete a Form 14039 only for IMF related issues. A Form 14039 is not needed for BMF ID theft.

  4. If the taxpayer is seeking advice for the business, ask the taxpayer as to the type of information breached:

    1. If a business or payroll company contacts IRS to report a data loss which includes Forms W-2 information, advise them to go to IRS.gov and search using key word ”Identity Theft”. Click on “Identity Protection: Prevention, Detection and Victim Assistance”. In the chart under “Businesses” click on “Form W-2/SSN Data Theft: Information for Business and Payroll Service Providers”. This link provides the information on various agencies and how to contact them to report the loss.

    2. If a business or payroll company contacts IRS to report a theft in their office that could potentially lead to a data breach but does not include W-2 information, advise them to contact their local stakeholder liaison. The stakeholder liaison listing can be found on irs.gov, search keywords “Stakeholder Liaison” then click on “Stakeholder Liaison Local Contacts IRS”. The liaisons are listed by state. The liaison will notify CI and other functions on their behalf. Advise the caller that they need to contact the liaisons as quickly as possible so the IRS can take steps to prevent the filing of fraudulent returns.

    3. Advise the taxpayer they may want to contact the Federal Trade Commission or the Social Security Administration at:

      Contact Web Address Contact Number
      Federal Trade Commission (FTC) https://www.identitytheft.gov 877-438-4338
      Social Security Administration (SSA) www.ssa.gov search “Identity Theft” 800-772-1213
    4. Advise the caller they may want to contact one of the major credit bureaus. They may be able to assist them in obtaining information needed to pursue issue relating to the loss of the business’s PII information.

      Credit Bureau Web Address Contact Number
      Equifax http://www.equifax.com/business/ 800-525-6285
      Experian http://www.experian.com/business-services/business-services.html 888-397-3742
      Transunion http://www.transunion.com/business 800-680-7289
    5. Advise the taxpayer they may want to file a report with their local or state police and contact their state Attorney General’s office. Provide the web site information for a list of state Attorney General, http://www.naag.org/

    6. Provide the taxpayer the irs.gov website advising them to search for “business ID theft” to obtain additional ID theft information.

BMF Identity Theft Liaisons

  1. BMF cases can be complex in nature and will at times cross functional lines. All functions have established BMF ID theft liaisons to assist in the coordination and working of BMF ID Theft cases. The list of liaisons can be found on the SERP IRM Supplement Tab on the BMF Identity Theft page. See BMF ID Theft Liaison Listing.

  2. BMF ID theft liaisons play an important role in resolving complex cases when the cases cross functional lines.

  3. The liaisons act as their respective BOD/Function's key point of contact on matters outside the scope of the referring functions or when technical assistance is needed to either make an ID theft determination or to resolve an ID theft case.

  4. The liaisons will coordinate with each other to resolve the issue when functions cannot agree about case assignment or resolution.

  5. Referrals to the functional liaisons should be made on Form 14566 BMF Identity Theft Referral. See IRM 25.23.9.8 BMF ID Theft Referrals. Referrals will be liaison to liaison only. All referrals must be sent through the referring function’s liaison prior to being sent to another function. The referrals will be sent via secure e-mail to the appropriate liaison. Follow functional guidelines for referral procedures when forwarding cases to your function’s liaison.

  6. When working paper cases, if the entire case is being transferred, the referring function WILL NOT close their case until the receiving functional liaison acknowledges receipt and accepts the case into their function’s inventory. This is to prevent cases from being lost in the referral process.

  7. The BMF ID theft liaisons will:

    • When receiving a case referral:
      1. Review BMF ID theft referral to ensure all required research has been completed and documented on Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral. If the liaison determines the initial research is incomplete or the case does not belong in their inventory, they will reject the referral and return it to the referring liaison within three business days of receipt.
      2. Prior to the referral being accepted, review the case to ensure its completion which includes case documentation. If the case is being referred to be worked or requesting assistance, AMS/CIS (if available) will be documented by the referring function with the required information. If the information is not present, reject the referral.
      3. Acknowledge receipt of the referral and advise the referring function the case has been accepted into their inventory within three business days and assign to the appropriate function for resolution. If the referral is for assistance, the receiving function will have 30 days to respond to the assistance request.
      4. If the acceptance or assistance request will take more than the specified time frame, acknowledge receipt of the referral within three business days and provide the referring function with the expected time frame for the response. The case will remain open in the referring function until notification that the case is accepted into the receiving function’s inventory. If the referral is for assistance, the control will remain open until case is resolved.

    • When referring case to another function:
      1. Review referral to ensure all research has been completed, the control base is still open if appropriate and the case is documented with the required information.
      2. Return referral to the employee within three business days if referral is made in error or incomplete.
      3. Monitor case for acknowledgement of receipt by the receiving function.
      4. If acknowledgement is not received within three business days, send a follow up e-mail to request the status of the determination.
      5. Send a follow up e-mail if a response to the assistance referral is not received within 30 days.
      6. Return the referral to the employee within three business days when the requested assistance has been provided, the case is accepted or the referral is rejected.

    Note:

    The Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) will use their Operations Assistance Request (OAR) process to direct the OAR to the appropriate BOD/Function Liaison. TAS OARs should not be sent through the functional liaisons; follow normal functional procedures for processing the OARs. OARs will be reviewed prior to leaving the TAS Organization. As with all BMF ID theft referrals, all required research will be completed before the OAR is sent to the appropriate liaison. To be considered complete, the OAR must outline all completed research, the facts supporting the ID theft determination and all taxpayer documentation. Per the SLA: "If the W&I Business Unit Liaison/employee determines additional research or documentation is required on an OAR, contact the assigned TAS employee within one (1) workday of the determination, and within one (1) workday of the receipt of the OAR in the case of expedite processing OARs, to obtain information and to negotiate the requested completion date. If the assigned TAS employee cannot provide the information within three (3) workdays of the request, the W&I Business Unit Liaison may return the OAR to TAS and the case will be closed out of the unit inventory. W&I may provide TAS additional time to obtain the information, where appropriate."

BMF Identity Theft Research (Inquiry received via paper or phones)

  1. The required research must be performed once the taxpayer advises you or the employee suspects possible ID theft. This research is to be completed prior to taking any actions on the account, referring the case, transferring the call (this includes accounts in stat 22) or advising the taxpayer to complete a Form 14039-B. The research and determination is vital to ensure the case is placed in the appropriate ID theft treatment stream as soon as possible. Never Assume Identity Theft.

    Caution:

    If a Form 14039-B is received, the case must be moved into the ID theft stream immediately and an acknowledgement letter sent to the taxpayer within 30 days of receipt. Due to the time frame for sending an acknowledgement letter, a control will be opened by the function receiving the Form 14039-B and the appropriate ID theft indicators input. See IRM 25.23.9.6 BMF Identity Theft Tracking Indicators. Complete account research will then be completed to determine which function should be handling the case. If the case will not remain in the receiving functions inventory, refer the case to the appropriate function liaison following procedures in IRM 25.23.9.3BMF Identity Theft Liaisons.

  2. The depth of the research will be dependent upon the scope of understanding of the employee. This means, if the employee performs in depth IDRS research to perform their job, the same level of research is expected to be performed prior to referring the case to another function’s ID theft treatment stream. The employee must research TXMOD/AMDISA to determine if the case originated in Exam function by locating the TC 300 Primary Business Code (PBC). Based on the PBC, the case should be referred to the appropriate liaison for Field Office or Campus Exam. If the case belongs in the employee’s inventory, but some of the research is outside their scope and ID theft is highly probable, the employee will send a referral to the appropriate liaison to request assistance with researching the case. The case will remain in the referring employee’s control and be worked after the research is completed.

  3. When the inquiry is being handled on the phone, thorough probing must take place to assist in determining if ID theft is involved. This includes (this list is not all inclusive):

    1. Has the business changed to a different type entity? For example, the business has changed from a sole proprietorship to an LLC. There may be a second EIN and this may be a case of the returns being filed under an incorrect EIN.

    2. Has the company changed payroll companies? Many times, if a payroll company has been changed, the old company may still file a return or submitted Forms W-2.

    3. If there are payments present, did the taxpayer make any payments? Payment research may provide another EIN or entity information.

    4. Was the business sold or closed? Was a final return filed?

    5. If the taxpayer states they never applied for an EIN, has the taxpayer had any ID theft tax related issues under their SSN?

  4. Perform all required research to rule out a mixed entity (where the inadvertent use of one taxpayer’s TIN is used to file another taxpayer’s return) or successor corporation, and to locate any possible cross-reference TIN. Refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-7, BMF Identity Theft Research Requirement to assist you with case building. The required research must be performed to assist in making an ID theft determination. Research should include (this list is not all inclusive):

    1. All related IMF and BMF accounts. Research the EIN (both the Entity and TXMOD/BMFOL) and look for any cross-reference SSN or other business relationships. Research using CC NAME, FINDE for a business with a similar name at a different address, etc. to determine if there was a mixed entity or successor corporation. When IRS establishes an EIN, BMFOLE should reflect an XREF TIN/ITIN or SSN for the individual or entity requesting the EIN assignment. Preliminary research will include reviewing all cross-reference TINs, ITINs, and SSNs.

    2. Research any payments to assist in determining if the return in question was a result of a mixed entity situation. Generally, identity thieves do not make payments. DO NOT LEAVE payments that do not belong to the taxpayer on the account. Follow functional procedures to determine if payment needs to be moved to another account or to excess.

    3. Review the returns via on-line resources prior to ordering the documents. Conduct research of all returns involved using CC TRDBV or MeF. If unable to review the needed documents on-line, request the document using CC ESTAB. It may contain information needed to determine if ID theft exists. Follow functional procedures when requesting a document from files. Search returns, schedules, forms and attachments. Review and compare the following with information provided by the taxpayer.

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    4. Use CC IRPTRI to view any Forms W-2 and all related income documents filed under the EIN. If there were income documents filed under the EIN, it may be necessary to review the IMF accounts associated with these documents. If there are fraudulent returns filed under these SSNs, it may help with the BMF ID theft determination.

      Example:

      The taxpayer stated the business changed entities and new EIN was issued. No returns should be filed for the old number and the taxpayer suspects ID theft. Research shows returns were filed for the last quarter and CC IRPTRI shows Forms W-2 filed. Research of the IMF accounts shows duplicate Forms W-2 were filed for each employee, one under each EIN. This is probably not ID theft but an internal error made by the company or payroll company.

    5. Review all case history such as AMS/CIS to review all prior contacts made by the taxpayer.

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    7. Consult your functional IRM for additional research requirements when working ID theft cases.

    8. Carefully review any documentation the taxpayer has provided in support of their claim.

  5. Upon receipt/assignment of an identity theft case, an initial cursory review must be performed to identify all taxpayer issues. Identifying issues at the beginning of the case provides a higher level of customer service and reduces the potential for unresolved problems.

    Reminder:

    If there is an unpaid balance due, suspend collection and notice activity until the identity theft issue is resolved. Refer to functional IRMs for additional guidance.

  6. If after all research is completed and it is determined ID theft does not exist, follow normal procedures for handling the account.

  7. If the employee has AMS or CIS access, document AMS/CIS with all related information. This documentation is to include the research completed, the information supporting the ID theft determination, if and where a Form 14566 was sent and closing actions.

BMF Returns Selected for RICS (Return Integrity and Compliance Services) Review

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  2. In 2016, if a return was selected, the return was allowed to post but any refund was held with a -R freeze. There will be an open control on these cases assigned to 1486988888, category TPPI with a history showing potential IDT.

  3. If a paper case is received and there is an open control for this project, forward case to the Frivolous Return Program, Ogden Service Center, Stop 4450. They are assisting RICS in the resolution of these cases.

  4. For returns selected under a RICS BMF program, RICS will send either a 5263C or 6042C to verify the business entity. If there is an X-REF SSN showing on CC BMFOLE, a letter will be sent to the X-REF. If there is no X-REF the letter will be sent to the address shown for the business.

    Note:

    As of June 2018, letter 6042C will replace the 5263C.

  5. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

  6. RICS stops these returns from posting to the account if selected by the filters. Returns meeting the criteria will be suspended instead of being allowed to post. When a return comes in and is selected by the filters, a TC 971 AC 711 is posted to the account. The posting of the TC 971 AC 711 will cause the return to post as a TC 973 and it will remain suspended until the taxpayer validates the return. The TC 971 AC 711 can be generated by:

    1. The return being caught in a filter or

    2. the return contains a CCC E

  7. The return posting as the TC 973 will be suspended for a period up to one year from the posting date. If the return has not been validated within that year, it will be deleted.

  8. If a second return is filed and it does not hit the filters, it will be allowed to post as a TC 150. If a second return is filed and it also hits the filters, a second TC 973 will post to the account. There can be more than one TC 973 on the module.

  9. If the taxpayer calls and there is a TC 973 on the module but the taxpayer states they did not receive a letter, send a Form 4442 referral to RICS advising them to reissue the notice. Include any information provided by the taxpayer on the referral. Explain to the taxpayer the return is under review and they need to provide IRS with the additional information requested in the notice.

  10. If the taxpayer responds and validates the return, a TC 971 AC 712, with the DLN of the TC 973 that is deemed the good return, will be input. This will allow only the return with the matching DLN to post.

  11. If the taxpayer responds and validates the return but there are auditable items on the return, the return will be allowed to post, a TC 971 AC 713 with the matching DLN will be input. The TC 971 AC 713 posts the return but will freeze any refund with a -R freeze.

  12. If the taxpayer responds after the return has been deleted:

    1. If the return was electronically submitted, the EUP return will be printed and sent to be processed as paper using the original receive date

    2. If the return was paper the TC 973 will be ESTAB’d and sent for processing

      Reminder:

      In both situations, the original DLN will be crossed out and forwarded for processing and a new DLN to be assigned.

    Example:

    1 - Return is identified as a potential IDT case. RICS issues letter and suspends their case for 45 days.

    No reply to letter is received. RICS closes potential IDT case as no reply. One year later there still has not been a reply from the business.

    1. Return was selected by filters and a TC 971 AC 711 is generated on the account.

    2. BMF MF sees the TC 971 AC 711 and posts the return as a TC 973. The return is placed into suspense on the SCRS (Service Center Replacement System) for one year.

    3. Taxpayer doesn’t respond to the notice sent.

    4. One year after the posting date, the return is deleted.

    Example:

    2- Return is identified as a potential IDT case. RICS issues letter and suspends their case for 45 days.

    No reply to letter is received. RICS closes potential IDT case as no reply. Business replies passing authentication and verifies return filing 9 months after TC 973 posted to the account. Further classification of the return shows no auditable items that would require the refund to be held.

    1. Return was selected by filters and a TC 971 AC 711 is generated on the account.

    2. BMF MF sees the TC 971 AC 711 and posts the return as a TC 973. The return is placed in suspense on SCRS.

    3. TP validates the return and a TC 971 AC 712 is input with the DLN of the TC 973 it is reversing.

    4. Returns posts as the TC 150 and refund released.

  13. If a call is received questioning the notice or asking for assistance, advise the caller they need to reply to the notice and provide the information requested. If the taxpayer has no knowledge of the business advise the taxpayer to submit a signed statement with a copy of their letter to the address provided on the letter. They may also fax the information using the fax number shown on their letter. DO NOT advise them to submit a Form 14039 or 14039-B. When they respond to the notice, RICS will ensure all the appropriate account actions are taken on the account. Advise the taxpayer they should hear from IRS within 30 days from the receive date of their information.

Individual Taxpayers Reporting to be Victims of Business-Related Identity Theft

  1. Identity thieves sometimes use the personally identifiable information (PII) of individuals to establish fabricated businesses. Many times, the fabricated business is used to support the filing of fraudulent IMF returns.

  2. "If the taxpayer calls advising they received correspondence relating to a BMF ID theft issue and claims to have no affiliation with the business, take the appropriate steps to ensure ID theft has occurred. DO NOT advise the caller to submit a Form 14039 on any IMF or BMF toll free line claiming possible BMF ID theft"

  3. If the taxpayer does file a Form 14039 to advise the IRS of ID theft relating to a business/BMF issue, the receiving function will send the appropriate acknowledgment letter.

  4. Employees will verify the IMF taxpayer’s association with the EIN and determine if potential BMF ID theft exists prior to marking the IMF account with a tracking indicator.

    Example:

    Jane Smith calls an IMF related toll-free line to report she believes her personal identity has been stolen. She received an IRS notice demanding payment for unpaid employment taxes on Janes’ Flowers located in Florida (Jane lives in the Northwest). Jane has never owned a business and never resided in Florida. Jane provides the CSR with her SSN and the EIN on the notice.

  5. Research MUST be completed to determine if there is a potential BMF ID theft issue prior to marking an account and referring or transferring the case/call to another area. Researching the account will allow for the employee to determine if the case should be referred to the BMF ID theft inventory or moved/transferred into the regular BMF inventory following normal procedures.

    1. Research CC BMFOLE (the business entity module) to determine if the taxpayer’s SSN is associated with the EIN. BMFOLE contains a XREF-SSN field that will provide the associated SSN. The format for CC BMFOLE is:
      BMFOLEXX-XXXXXXX.

    2. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    3. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
      ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    4. ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡

    Caution:

    IMF employees DO NOT advise the taxpayer to submit a Form 14039-B. This form is sent to the taxpayer by BMF employees only.

  6. Once the research is completed and it is determined there is potential ID theft, research CC IMFOLE to determine if there is an existing TC 971 AC 504 SPCL2. If there is currently no ID TC 971 AC 504 SPCL2 marker, the SSN entity must be marked on CC ENMOD using CC REQ77 as indicated in IRM 25.23.2.18.1.2TC 971 AC 504- Miscellaneous Field Code SPCL1, SPCL2, RPM and EAFAIL for additional information. Input the XREF EIN in the XREF-TIN section on the REQ 77 to post with the TC 971 AC 504.

  7. Potential identity theft case needs to be referred to the appropriate BMF ID theft Liaison. The following will assist in determining to which liaison the referral should be sent.
    ♦ CAWR assessment- CC TXMOD will show a TC 290 assessment in blocking series 55
    ♦ Exam assessment- CC TXMOD will show a TC 300 assessment or open Exam freeze (-L). Identify the PBC code and refer to the appropriate Field or Campus Exam liaison.
    ♦ 6020b assessment- CC TXMOD will show the literal “6020b” at the end of the TC 150 assessment and RCC “4”
    ♦ SFR assessment- CC TXMOD will show the literal “SFR at the end of the TC 150 assessment.
    ♦ Field Exam- CC AMDISA will show Primary Business Code (PBC) See Exam Employee Group Code (EGC) Contacts. Click on the Employee Group Code (EGC) listing Contacts to see the who is working on the case based on the PBC code.
    ♦ Field collections- CC TXMOD will show service center status 26
    ♦ ACS- CC TXMOD will show service center status 22
    ♦ Accounts Management- Any case that does not meet other account criteria
    ♦ Criminal Investigation (CI) – If associated tax period or entity is controlled to CI with an unreversed Transaction Code (TC) of 914, 916, or 918"

  8. Use Form 14566 BMF ID Theft referral or equivalent (i.e., Form 4442) to send the referral via secure email to the appropriate BMF ID Theft Liaison. The listing can be found on the BMF ID website. For additional information, see the referral procedures in IRM 25.23.9.3BMF ID Theft Liaisons. Document AMS/CIS, if available, to reflect the referral sent, advise if the Form 14039 was submitted, the suspicious EIN and where the referral is being sent.

    Example:

    Referral e-mailed to the BMF ID theft CAWR Liaison, the history would read:
    TP submitted 14039 under SSN. TP states no involvement with EIN XX-XXXXXXX. (Include any other information deemed important.)

  9. If there is no indication of potential BMF identity theft and there is a TC 971 AC 504 on the account, reverse with a TC 972 AC 504 SPCL2. Refer to IRM Exhibit 25.23.2-5IMF Only TC 972 AC 504 — Reversal of TC 971 AC 504. Route the case per normal procedures.

Identity Theft Case Building- BMF

  1. Once BMF ID theft is either confirmed or it is determined there is a high probability of ID theft, the case will be moved into the ID theft treatment stream. All information provided by the taxpayer and research completed should be documented on the case (AMS/CIS if available).

  2. Once the case is placed into the ID theft treatment stream, an IDRS control must be opened and the ID theft indicator input. See IRM 25.23.9.5.1Controlling BMF ID theft Cases and IRM 25.23.9.6BMF Identity Theft Tracking Indicators

    Exception:

    If a Form 14039-B is received the case must be moved into the ID theft stream immediately and an acknowledgement letter sent to the taxpayer within 30 days of receipt. Due to the time frame for sending an acknowledgement letter, a control will be opened by the receiving function, the appropriate ID theft indicators input and the Letter 5316C sent. See IRM 25.23.9.6 BMF Identity Theft Tracking Indicators. Complete account research will then be completed to determine which function should be handling the case. If the case will not remain in the receiving functions inventory, refer the case to the appropriate function liaison following procedures in IRM 25.23.9.3BMF Identity Theft Liaisons.

  3. When working the ID theft case, if the information provided by the taxpayer tends to show the potential for ID theft but additional information is needed, the taxpayer may need to complete the Form 14039-B. Refer to IRM 25.23.9.7Form 14039-B, BMF Identity Theft Affidavit. The Form 14039-B, Business Identity Theft Affidavit is not available on-line to taxpayers. If a Form 14039-B is needed to validate a claim of identity theft, you must send the Form 14039-B to the taxpayer.

  4. Employees working phones will not advise the taxpayer to complete the Form 14039-B or send them a form, unless there is an open control and the case is being worked in their function. If there is an open control to another function, send a referral to that function’s ID theft liaison documenting the taxpayer’s explanation and completed research supporting their claim of ID theft. If there is no open control and the employee has completed the required research and the potential for ID theft exists, send a referral to the appropriate function liaison for the case to be placed in their ID theft inventory. If additional information is needed the controlling function will send the Form 14039-B to the taxpayer.

  5. If the case is being retained in your function but assistance is needed in resolving the case, a referral for assistance can be requested. The case will remain open while assistance is being requested. See IRM 25.23.9.8Referral of Out of Scope Issues.

  6. Identity theft often leaves its victims feeling helpless and distraught. Service employees should exercise empathy in dealing with victims.

  7. Identity theft cases will be prioritized and worked expeditiously and within established time frames.

Controlling BMF Identity Theft Cases

  1. Once ID theft or the possibility of identity theft has been confirmed, the case must be moved into the appropriate ID theft treatment stream and a control base must be opened if the employee has access to IDRS. The control base will remain open until ALL case issues have been resolved. If the case is originally in your function’s inventory but is being referred to another to be worked, the control will remain open until the case is accepted by the receiving function’s liaison. Refer the case following functional guidelines for referral procedures.

  2. If the contact is by phone and the case is being referred into another function’s ID theft treatment stream, the function receiving the case will open the control when the case is accepted into their inventory. Annotate on the referral “phone contact”. If your function is retaining the case, open the control based on functional guidelines.

  3. The responsible function (Collections, Examination, CAWR, FUTA, AM, etc.) will retain control from receipt to closure. All required account actions will be coordinated through the function with the open control.

  4. If additional information is needed, the controlling function will send the Form 14039-B to the taxpayer and suspend the case. See IRM 25.23.9.7Form 14039-B, BMF Identity Theft Affidavit.

  5. Accounts affected by BMF identity theft are often complex and cross functional lines. When this occurs, the controlling function will refer that portion of the case needing action by another function. The Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral was developed for that purpose but its use is not mandatory. Refer to IRM 25.23.9.8, BMF ID theft Referrals for additional information. The responsible function will put their IDRS control into "B" status to designate the case as suspended pending the referral completion.

  6. The controlling function is responsible for:

    • Issuing the required correspondence.
      1- Acknowledgment letter- When the Form 14039-B is received from the taxpayer, it must be acknowledged by sending a Letter 5316C,BMF Identity Theft Documentation Acknowledgment Letter (Form 14039-B and required documentation) within 30 days of receipt.

      Exception:

      If a Form 14039-B is received and there is no active ID theft case open, the case will be controlled by the receiving function and a Letter 5316C sent to acknowledge receipt of the form and the ID theft indicator input. Once completed, the account should be researched to determine if the case should remain in the receiving inventory or referred to another functional liaison. If the case is being referred, the control will remain open until referral is accepted by that function.


      2- Interim if required. Send Letter 5317C .
      3- Closing letters- Send Letter 5317C when ID theft issue has been resolved.

    • Suspending collection activity, as appropriate.

    • Input of the BMF ID theft indicator, TC 971 AC 522 ITDCLM. If a Form 14039-B is received input the follow up indicator TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC. See IRM 25.23.9.6,BMF Identity Theft Tracking Indicators

    • Complete research if needed or request Form 14039-B for taxpayer.

      Note:

      This list is not all inclusive.

  7. The function working the ID theft case, prior to closing, will ensure all issues are resolved and adjustments are posted prior to case closure. Input the closing TC 971 AC 522. Refer to IRM 25.23.9.6 BMF Identity Theft Tracking Indicators, for additional information.

Tracking BMF Tax-Related Identity Theft Inventory

  1. In situations where the taxpayer makes an allegation of identity theft or when the IRS initially suspects that identity theft may have occurred, and preliminary research has been completed, the IRS controlling function will apply an identity theft indicator. The identity theft tracking indicator alerts others that a claim of identity theft has been reported and provides IRS with a method to quantify the scope of BMF Identity Theft. Refer to IRM 25.23.9.6, BMF Identity Theft Tracking Indicators, for additional information.

    Caution:

    BMF identity theft indicators (unlike some of those used on IMF accounts) do NOT systemically generate any systemic notices to the taxpayer. All taxpayer notifications are manual.

  2. In most instances, for taxpayer initiated claims of identity theft, the case MUST be moved into identity theft inventory once the taxpayer has provided Form 14039-B to support a claim of identity theft. This provides victims with a treatment stream for case resolution specific to identity theft. For additional information regarding identity theft documentation, refer to IRM 25.23.9.7, Form 14039-B, BMF Identity Theft Affidavit and IRM 25.23.9.6.2Taxpayer Supporting Documentation -TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC.

  3. If after the account has been marked with a BMF Identity Theft Indicator, the employee determines identity theft did not occur, the BMF ID theft tracking indicator will be reversed by the employee assigned. This removes the case from identity theft inventory. See Exhibit 25.23.9-5, Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators - TC 972 AC 522, for additional information. All other non-identity theft issues will be resolved using normal procedures.

BMF Identity Theft Tracking Indicators

  1. BMF identity theft indicators are applied if ID theft is highly probable or the determination had been made that identity theft occurred AND the case is controlled into an ID Theft treatment stream. Each BMF ID Theft indicator is input as a Transaction Code (TC) 971 with Action Code (AC) 522 using Command Code REQ77 on the TXMOD of all accounts affected by identity theft. Input the indicators only if there is tax related impact, such as returns filed or income documents filed.

  2. Review the accounts for prior ID theft indicators before inputting the initial TC 971 AC 522. Use IDRS CC TXMODA or BMFOLT to view the posted transactions. If the account is already marked with a TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM, do not input a second code for the same MFT and Tax period even if the initial TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM reflects another BOD/Program.

  3. BMF Identity theft tracking indicators, unlike those used for IMF, are applied to all MFTs and Tax Periods affected by identity theft. IPSO established three distinctive new Tax Administration Source Codes for BMF accounts.

    Action Code Tax Administration Code Definition
    522 IDTCLM No taxpayer documentation provided. Research has established ID theft exists or there is a high probability that ID theft exists, refer to IRM 25.23.9.6.1, Allegation or Suspicion of BMF Identity Theft - TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM, for additional information. Taxpayer may still need to complete Form 14039-B.
    522 IDTDOC Taxpayer provided a Form 14039-B Taxpayer Supporting Documentation. See IRM 25.23.9.6.2,Taxpayer Supporting Documentation- TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC for additional information. If a loose Form 14039-B is received and no TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM is on the module, input only the TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC to indicate ID theft claim received from taxpayer.
    522 CLSIDT BMF ID theft case resolved. Refer to IRM 25.23.9.6.3, Closing BMF Identity Theft Issues - TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT for additional information.
    524 EINFAB EIN is fabricated or there are no federal filing requirements and the account has been locked. This TC 971 can currently only be input by IP
  4. If after the account has been marked with a BMF Identity Theft Indicator, the employee determines identity theft did not occur, the BMF ID theft tracking indicator will be reversed by the employee assigned. This removes the case from identity theft inventory. See Exhibit 25.23.9-5, Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators - TC 972 AC 522, for additional information. All other non-identity theft issues will be resolved using normal procedures.

Allegation or Suspicion of BMF Identity Theft TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM

  1. Prior to marking a taxpayer's account with a BMF identity theft indicator, all required preliminary research must be completed to rule out a possible mixed entity and the case MUST be assigned and controlled. Refer to IRM 25.23.9.4, BMF Identity Theft Research (Inquiry received via paper or phones) for additional information. Only input the indicator if there are tax implications.

    Reminder:

    The BMF indicator is to be input by the function working the case. If you are not retaining control of the case do not input the TC 971 AC 522.

    Exception:

    If the Form 14039-B is received, the receiving function will open a control, send the acknowledgement letter and input the TC 971 AC 522 prior to referring the case to another function.

  2. Place an identity theft indicator on all MFTs and tax years affected to ensure the account is moved into treatment stream. The identity theft indicator is input on taxpayer asserted BMF identity theft accounts and the IRS identified BMF identity theft cases.

  3. If the contact is by phone and the case is going to be retained in your inventory, open the control and input the TC 971 AC 522 based on functional IRM guidance.

  4. To mark the taxpayer's account involving BMF identity theft, use Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from TXMOD to input a TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM with the Tax Administration Code designated for your function. Refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-1,TC 971 AC 5XX- MISC Codes. The BMF indicators work differently from IMF indicators. Ensure the secondary date and “MISC” sections are correctly input.

    • The Secondary Date field will reflect the IRS received date of the taxpayer's inquiry or the date of the call. If the identity theft issue was internally identified, use the date you recognized the taxpayer was a victim of identity theft.

    • The MISC> field will reflect your BOD and Program name as indicated in Exhibit 25.23.9-1, TC 971 AC 5XX- MISC Codes and Exhibit 25.23.9-2, BMF ID Theft Indicators - TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM - Initial Allegation or Suspicion of BMF ID Theft.

    Caution:

    If the account is already flagged with a TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM, do not input a second code for the same MFT and Tax Year even if the initial TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM reflects another BOD/Program.

  5. Taxpayer identified BMF identity theft claims will be researched by the receiving function. If after all the required research is completed, it is determined there is a potential ID theft and the case is outside the scope of your function, refer the case to the appropriate liaison but do not input the TC 971 AC 522. The receiving function will control the case and input the TC 971 AC 522. If the receiving function is retaining the case, open the control and input the TC 971 AC 522 based on functional guidelines. Internally identified BMF identity theft accounts will be controlled and the TC 971 AC 522 input by the initiating function using date when preliminary research was completed. Refer to your functional IRM for information regarding account controls.

    Note:

    Because of the high probability of mixed entity, employees MUST perform research to rule out a mixed entity or other non-identity theft related situation. Refer to IRM 25.23.9.4,BMF Identity Theft Research (Inquiry received via paper or phones), for additional information.

  6. Once it is determined the case will remain in your inventory:

    If And Then
    After all preliminary research is completed and you are unable to verify that BMF ID theft has occurred IRM 25.23.9.4 BMF Identity Theft Research additional information is needed to verify ID theft
    1. Control and assign the case to ID theft inventory

    2. Send the taxpayer a Form 14039-B and request a response in 30 days

    3. Suspend any collection activity

    4. Input TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM on the affected tax years and MFTs.

    5. If the taxpayer does not respond, reverse the ID theft marker with a TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY, close the case, release collection holds and work any remaining issues using your normal procedures

      Note:

      Provide an additional 15 days for responses from entities with foreign addresses.

    After all preliminary research is completed and you are unable to verify that BMF ID theft has occurred You have performed all preliminary research as required and the case is NOT within functions scope IRM 25.23.9.4 BMF Identity Theft Research
    1. Complete Form 14566 BMF Identity Theft Referral and forward to your ID theft liaison for review following functional guidelines. If case is controlled leave control open until the referral is accepted.

    2. The function receiving the case will open a control, input the TC 971 AC 522 and send the Form 14039-B if appropriate.

  7. If the employee later determines identity theft did not occur, the BMF ID theft tracking indicator will be reversed by the employee assigned. This removes the case from identity theft inventory. All other non-identity theft issues will be resolved using normal procedures. See Exhibit 25.23.9-5Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators - TC 972 AC 522, for additional information.

Taxpayer Supporting Documentation -TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC

  1. This follow up code will only be applied to accounts when IRS receives a completed Form 14039-B, Business Identity Theft Affidavit from the taxpayer. Refer to IRM 25.23.9.7Form 14039-B, BMF Identity Theft Affidavit, for specific information about the Form 14039-B.

  2. After verifying the Form 14039-B and associated taxpayer documents are complete and legible, you will need to mark the taxpayer's account to reflect IRS receipt.

  3. From TXMOD, you will use Command Code (CC) REQ77 to input a TC 971 AC 522.
    The Secondary Date: field will reflect the IRS received date of the taxpayer's documents
    The MISC>: field will be input to reflect your BOD and Program.
    Refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-1TC 971 AC 5XX- MISC Codes and Exhibit 25.23.9-3 BMF ID Theft Indicators- TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC-BMF ID Theft Documentation for additional information.

Closing BMF Identity Theft Issues-TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT

  1. Case Closure Analysis: The input of the TC 971 AC 522 MISC CLSIDT signifies there was ID theft and all account actions have been completed and the case closed. If it was determined that no ID theft has occurred, you must reverse the TC 971 AC 522. See IRM 25.23.9.6.5 Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators for more information. Perform case closure analysis to ensure all identity theft related issues have been addressed and resolved. This includes but is not limited to:

    • Review both prior (a minimum of three prior years) and subsequent years for apparent evidence of unresolved identity theft issues

    • Release notice or enforcement holds as appropriate

    • Ensure the victim received their appropriate refund if one is due

    • Verify and update the taxpayer's address

    • Close down fabricated EIN

    • If the EIN is not active, delete filing requirements

    • Move payments not belonging to the taxpayer based on functional guidelines. If out of scope, refer to the appropriate area to have the payment moved. Do not close the case until all actions have been taken by assisting function.

    • Take all required account actions

    • Send closing letter to taxpayer

    Reminder:

    If it is determined ID theft does not exist, the TC 971 AC 522 must be reversed not closed. See IRM 25.23.9.6.5Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators

  2. Other outstanding account issues identified during case closure analysis should ONLY be referred to another function when the case cannot be resolved within your function.

  3. The employee assigned the case will close the identity theft issue by marking the account with a TC 971 AC 522 with the Tax Administration Source Code for their BOD and Program. Refer to IRM 25.23.9.6 BMF Identity Theft Tracking Indicators.

    Note:

    Refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-4BMF ID Theft Indicators- TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT- Close and Confirmed as BMF ID Theft for additional information.

Locking Accounts- TC 971 AC 524

  1. We currently have the capability to lock accounts. An account can be locked in the following situations:

    • A Fabricated EIN

    • A Business no longer has any federal filing requirements

  2. If ID theft has been determined and the taxpayer states they have no association with the business the account can be locked to prevent the filing of any returns or allow for the usage of the EIN on any IMF filings. IRM 25.23.9.8.1.Fabricated EIN Procedures, for working these cases.

  3. In situations where the taxpayer has stated the business is closed and the EIN has been used to either file fraudulent BMF filings or income documents, the account can be locked for no filing requirements. In these situations, you will need to send a referral to IP to have the account locked. Follow the procedures in IRM 25.23.9.8.4Referrals to Lock the Account.

  4. Accounts will currently only be locked in situations where there is confirmed ID theft and in the situations of a closed business or the EIN has been deemed as fabricated.

  5. If the account has been locked in error, send a referral following the same procedures in IRM 25.23.9.8.4Referrals to Lock the Account and request the lock be reversed.

Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators

  1. BMF identity theft reversal codes provide better tracking of alleged BMF ID theft cases. If it has been determined that there is no ID theft on the account and there is a TC 971 AC 522 on the module, you must reverse the indicator. The table below provides a listing of the codes used when reversing a BMF identity theft allegation. It is imperative that the BMF identity theft indicators are reversed when BMF identity theft did NOT occur or was not substantiated by the taxpayer. This is to remove the case from the identity theft population. If reversing the indicator, you must annotate AMS/CIS with the information that supports the reversal.

    Reason for BMF ID Theft Reversal Reversal Code
    If, after completing a case analysis, you have determined ID Theft did not occur.

    Example:

    The taxpayer contacts IRS believing to be a victim of identity theft. After careful case analysis and review, the employee determines this is a mixed entity case, no identity theft occurred.

    NOIDT
    The taxpayer did not respond to your request for supporting documentation and you cannot make a determination of identity theft using internal resources. NORPLY
    The BMF ID Theft indicator was applied due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake. IRSERR
    The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be fraudulent. FALSE
    The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the above reason descriptions. OTHER- Case history(AMS/CIS) explaining the reason for the reversal.

Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators - TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY

  1. An account will be marked with a TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY when a request has been made to a taxpayer to submit additional information to support the identity theft claim has not been received. This request for additional information is issued when the determination cannot be made based on internal/external research.

  2. Use Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from TXMODA to input a TC 972 AC 522 reflecting a Tax Administration Source Code NORPLY in the "MISC" field. Refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-5, for additional information.

  3. If the taxpayer contacts IRS after the TC 971 AC 522 is reversed due to a no reply, a new TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM needs to be input using the secondary date of the original TC 971 AC 522.

Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators - TC 972 AC 522 NOIDT

  1. In situations where it is determined no identity theft occurred, a reversal of the BMF identity theft indicators present on the tax module(s) must be completed. Document on AMS/CIS the reasoning behind the determination that no ID theft exists.

    Example:

    The taxpayer receives a balance due notice from the IRS and suspects identity theft. After performing the required research, you determine the balance due was not a result of identity theft but rather a result of a return processed to an incorrect account. This is not identity theft.

  2. Use Command Code (CC) REQ77 initiated from TXMODA to input a TC 972 AC 522 reflecting a Tax Administration Source Code NOIDT in the "MISC" field. Refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-5, for additional information.

Form 14039-B, BMF Identity Theft Affidavit

  1. Form 14039-B,Business Identity Theft Affidavit, is an internal form sent to the taxpayer by IRS to gather taxpayer information vital to making an identity theft determination. Request supporting documentation from the taxpayer only when you cannot make the identity theft determination based solely on internal research. This form is not available on-line to taxpayers. In situations where you determine Form 14039-B, BMF Identity Theft Affidavit is required, you will need to suspend your case and provide the taxpayer a time frame in which to respond with the completed form and supporting documents.

    Caution:

    Taxpayer Assistance Center (TAC) employees will NOT provide a taxpayer with Form 14039-B. This form is ONLY requested from taxpayers when ALL the required research listed in Exhibit 25.23.9-7BMF Identity Theft Research Requirement has been performed by the employee assigned to and working the case from end to end. As TAC employees do not work cases from end to end, providing a Form 14039-B is not within their scope. If ID theft is suspected, send Form 14566 BMF ID theft referral or Form 4442 to the appropriate liaison. Phone assistors will complete the required research prior to sending a referral to the appropriate ID theft liaison and will only send the taxpayer a Form 14039-B if the case is remaining in their function’s inventory.

  2. Form 14039-B supporting documentation consists of the following three items: Evidence of Identity Theft, Authentication of Identity, and Evidence of Business Operation.

    1. Evidence of Identity Theft - a copy of a police report or Form 14039-B, Business Identity Theft Affidavit. Form 14039-B is available electronically only to IRS employees.

      Note:

      The Form 14039-B must be signed and notarized to be considered complete.

    2. Authentication of Identity - a copy of a valid U.S. federal or state government issued form of identification (examples include a driver’s license, state identification card, social security card, or passport).

    3. Evidence of Business Operation - a copy of a utility bill, invoice, mortgage/rent receipt or other documentation.

      Note:

      If the claimant did not request an EIN and has no knowledge of the EIN, they will not need to provide evidence of business operations.

      Note:

      The Business Identity Theft Affidavit, Form 14039-B, is accepted from taxpayers in support of an allegation of identity theft. This form collects only the information necessary for taxpayers to attest to the IRS that they have experienced BMF identity theft. IRS only accepts the IRS affidavit or a police report for substantiation purposes.

    Caution:

    Do not mail a Form 14039-B to the taxpayer if you do not have the case assigned to you or your function. Refer to 25.23.9.6.1Allegation or Suspicion of BMF Identity Theft - TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM and 25.23.9.5.1Controlling BMF Identity Theft Cases.

  3. If the taxpayer does not provide supporting documentation within the requested time period and you cannot make a determination regarding BMF ID theft, you will close the identity theft issue by reversing the BMF Identity Theft Indicator and proceed with normal case resolution assuming the taxpayer is not an identity theft victim. Refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-5Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators.

    Reminder:

    If the taxpayer does not respond to the request for information and you are closing the identity theft issue, you MUST reverse the BMF Identity Theft Indicators.

  4. Form 14039-B must be signed by the taxpayer or someone who has a valid power of attorney for the taxpayer, (e.g., Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative).

  5. Documents must be secured and handled in the same manner as other sensitive taxpayer information. The documents must be retained and filed with the resolved case.

  6. The business unit/function that is assigned the identity theft case (relevant open control) or issued the notice/letter relating to the identity theft (CP 504 Balance Due Notice, Audit Notice, etc.) is responsible for collecting supporting documentation in a timely, accurate, and secure manner.

  7. After the receipt of the taxpayer's documentation, you will need to research the case to verify the taxpayer's claim. If it is later determined that identity theft did not occur, reverse the TC 971 AC 522, refer to IRM 25.23.9.6.5Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators.

  8. If a Form 14039-B is received an acknowledgement letter must be sent to the taxpayer to verify receipt within 30 days. If the case is not already controlled to an ID theft treatment stream, the receiving function will send the acknowledgement letter, open the control and input the TC 971 AC 522. If the case is being transferred to another function’s inventory, the case control will remain open until the acceptance by that function is received. If there is an open control in another function’s ID theft treatment stream, refer the form to the appropriate function. They will send the letter and input the TC 971 AC 522.

    Caution:

    Receipt of documentation from the taxpayer does not validate an identity theft claim. Proper research MUST be performed prior to reaching an identity theft determination.

  9. The Form 14039-B is not available to the public. If you have completed preliminary research and ruled out mixed entity but are unable to determine if BMF identity theft occurred, print and mail Form 14039-B to the taxpayer.

    If the taxpayer alleges identity theft And Then request the taxpayer complete form 14039-B and provide the following
    Claims to have no knowledge of applying for an EIN there is a high probability ID theft exists
    A clear copy of one of the following documents:
    • Valid state issued driver's license

    • Valid passport

    • Other valid U.S. Federal or State government issued identification (For example, Visa)

    Has an active or inactive sole proprietorship there is a high probability ID theft exists
    A clear copy of one of the following documents:
    • Valid state issued driver's license

    • Valid passport

    • Other valid U.S. Federal or State government issued identification (For example, Visa)


    AND if the taxpayer is an active sole proprietorship, the taxpayer must provide a clear copy of one of the following documents:
    • Utility bill

    • Mortgage/Rent Statement

    • Other documentation to support business operations

    Has an active or inactive Corporation, Partnership LLC, Exempt Organization, or Trust there is a high probability ID theft exists One document from the list below and a copy of CP 575 Notice of EIN Assignment, if the claimant has a copy available.
    • Articles of incorporation

    • A written statement by the officer or director on corporate letterhead stationery, to the effect that he/she has authority to legally bind the corporation

    • Articles of organization

    • Trust or estate document

Complete and Legible Documents

  1. When a taxpayer submits Form 14039-B, the Form 14039-B and associated document(s) must be reviewed to determine if they are legible and complete.

    Note:

    A Form 14039-B that is not signed and notarized is considered incomplete.

  2. A document is considered legible when the copies provided are clear and easily read. Once you have determined the documentation provided is complete and legible, initiate taxpayer contact to notify the taxpayer the information requested has been received.

    Caution:

    Acknowledgement of receipt of the Form 14039-B is required within 30 days of receipt unless the document is received face to face.

  3. When the documentation is NOT legible/complete:

    Note:

    If the documentation provided is not complete or legible but you can make a determination using internal research, resolve the identity theft issue. Do not request the documents again. Once all issues are resolved, input of the TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT. Refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-4BMF ID Theft Indicators - TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT - Closed and Confirmed as BMF ID Theft, for additional information.

    If And Then
    You have completed preliminary research and suspect the taxpayer is a victim of BMF identity theft and:
    • There is no identity theft indicator on TXMOD or BMFOLT, Or

    • the indicators have been reversed

    No other relevant controls in another function
    1. Input TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM indicating an initial allegation of identity theft has been made by the taxpayer. Refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-2 .BMF ID Theft Indicators - TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM - Initial Allegation or Suspicion of BMF ID Theft

    2. You will suspend the case and request the taxpayer provide legible and complete documentation within 30 days and place the case in suspense for 45 days.

    3. If you do not receive a taxpayer response within 45 days from the date of request, close identity theft issue and resolve/address remaining issues as appropriate. Input TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY

    Note:

    Provide an additional 15 days for responses from entities with foreign addresses.

    There is already a TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM identity theft indicator on TXMOD or BMFOLT There is an IDRS control in another function with an earlier IRS received date
    1. Refer the taxpayer documents to the function with the open control via the ID theft referral process.

    2. The employee in the function with the open control will suspend the case and request the taxpayer provide legible and complete documentation within 30 days and place the case in suspend for 45 days.

    3. If the receiving function does not secure a taxpayer response within 45 days, close identity theft issue and resolve/address remaining issues as appropriate. Input TC 972 AC 522 NORPLY

    Note:

    Provide an additional 15 days for responses from entities with foreign addresses.

  4. Once documents have been verified as complete and legible, you will mark the account with a TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC and the Tax Administration Code designated for your BOD/Program. Refer to IRM 25.23.9.6.2, Taxpayer Supporting Documentation -TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC for additional information.

    Note:

    Refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-3BMF ID Theft Indicators - TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC - BMF ID Theft Documents Accepted, for additional information.

BMF ID Theft Referrals

  1. BMF Identity Theft cases can be located in any IRS function. Due to the complex nature of these cases, it is highly likely that a single case will cross functional lines and require the technical skill and systems access of another function or the case needs to be transferred to another function’s ID theft treatment stream to be worked. In these situations, a referral to that function will be required. When a referral is sent for case assistance the function working the ID theft case will retain control of the case throughout the referral process.

  2. IPSO developed Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral to assist employees in capturing required data when a referral to another function is needed. While Form 14566 is not mandatory, use of the form will facilitate case processing.

  3. When sending the referral, you must include a detailed explanation as to what factors contributed to the ID Theft determination. Include all relevant research information and clearly state facts of the case.

  4. If contact is received by phone, once the research is completed, and ID theft is probable, refer the case to the appropriate function, annotate the referral with “phone contact” to make receiving function aware there will be no open control on the case.

  5. If the case is being transferred to another function’s inventory, the case control will remain open until the acceptance into the other function is confirmed.

  6. When a referral is required for case assistance, the originating function will complete the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral, and send with supporting documentation to the designated Identity Theft Liaison for processing via secure E-mail providing a 30-day completion time frame. Refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-6 BMF Identity Theft Referral Form. The BMF Identity Theft referral can be done via secure E-mail or by fax to the appropriate BMF ID theft liaison. Document on AMS/CIS if a referral was sent, along with the details of the request. If working a case on CIS, attach the referral to the CIS case when sent and acceptance or guidance is received.

  7. The BMF Identity Theft Liaison will acknowledge receipt of the referral within three business days.

  8. If an assistance referral is sent, the receiving function’s employee will take requested actions and return the BMF Identity Theft Referral via secure E-mail to the originator’s liaison within 30 days of receipt.

    Note:

    If the originating and receiving functions disagree over the requested action or the time frame for completion, the BMF ID Theft Liaisons work together to determine the correct procedures to follow. If the Liaisons are unable to work through their differences, the liaison will elevate through their management chain for resolution.

  9. Once all requested actions have been taken, the functional employee will return the BMF Identity Theft Referral to their liaison via secure E-mail or by fax to their liaison. The liaison will then send it through the originator’s BMF ID Theft liaison and they will return it to the employee. The functional employee providing assistance will document all the actions taken on the BMF Identity Theft Referral Form and AMS/CIS if available.

  10. If the contact with the taxpayer is on the phone, the CSR will research the account thoroughly to determine if there is a high probability of ID theft. If the CSR feels the account needs to be placed in the ID theft treatment stream of another function, complete the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral and forward to the appropriate ID theft liaison. For phone situations where the case is not already in an active inventory, the control base will not be opened by the phone CSR but by the function who retains the case in their inventory. The phone assistor will update AMS to reflect the research completed, the sending of the referral and to which function it was sent. If the case does not meet the criteria of the referral function, that function’s liaison will return to the sending function’s liaison. If the case will remain in their function, follow normal functional procedures for placing the case in the function’s ID theft treatment stream.

Fabricated EIN Procedures

  1. A fabricated EIN is an EIN that was established for the sole purpose of defrauding the government through the filing of IMF and BMF false refund returns or income documents.

  2. You will need to perform all research detailed in IRM 25.23.9.4BMF Identity Theft Research and Exhibit 25.23.9-7 BMF Identity Theft Research Requirement, to assist you in determining the validity of the EIN.

    Note:

    Research may include contacting the cross-reference SSN on ENMOD/BMFOLE to determine if that individual has any knowledge of the EIN cross-referencing their SSN if it cannot be determined if the EIN is fabricated.

  3. Research IRPTRI to determine if the BMF entity filed Forms W-2. It will be necessary to research the IMF accounts if Forms W-2 were filed to determine if:

    • the recipients of the Forms W-2 filed tax returns reporting that income

    • there is any evidence of identity theft on the accounts of the W-2 recipients

    This information is necessary to determine if a referral is needed to be made for further research of the IMF filings and actions taken on the IMF accounts.

    Note:

    Document this information on the referral.

  4. All account actions must be taken prior to requesting the account be locked. See IRM 25.23.9.10.3Posted Return on Either a Fabricated EIN or Inactive Account for the required account action needed.

  5. Take the following actions once the EIN has been determined to be for a fabricated business.

    1. Back out any returns posted to the account. This includes any penalties assessed, such as civil penalties (IMF and BMF side).

    2. Ensure there are no credits remaining on the accounts. This includes any levy payments on the account. If the taxpayer is eligible for a refund of those payments, the payment should be moved to excess or moved to another account.

    3. Update the BMF sort line to include “Identity Theft”. This is to advise SP that this EIN has been deemed “fabricated” and it should not be re-opened if a return is received.

    4. If the XREF SSN is not associated with the business, input TC 971 AC 504 MISC SPCL2 with EIN as XREF TIN. If there is a TC 130 on the IMF account relating to the ID theft situation, reverse the TC 130.

    5. Complete a referral to IP, RICS and CI. You can use Forms 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral
      a. Referral to IP is to have the account locked with a TC 971 AC 524 MISC BMF IP EINFAB.
      b. Referral should include all research performed and document reason it was determined the EIN is for a fabricated business.
      c. Once the TC 971 AC 524 is input, the referral will be returned to the originator stating the input has been completed.

  6. All referrals should be sent to your BMF ID theft liaison to be forwarded to the appropriate function.

    1. Send the completed referral form to your BMF Identity Theft liaison for referral to the Entity Fabrication (EF)Team in RICS. Be certain to include the referral form with all appropriate research completed and explain the IMF implications.

    2. Send the completed referral form to your BMF Identity Theft liaison for referral to CI. Be certain to include the referral form with all appropriate research completed and explain the IMF implications.

    3. Send the completed referral form to your BMF Identity Theft liaison for referral to Identity Protection (IP).

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    Reminder:

    Incomplete referrals will be returned to the originating liaison.

Referrals to Return Integrity and Compliance Services (RICS)

  1. The RICS organization maintains a database of abused, bogus and fabricated EINs as they relate to IMF/BMF filings. After exhausting all BMF and IMF research and a determination cannot be made as to the authentication of the EIN, it may be necessary to request assistance from RICS to have them check the EIN and related SSNs against their database. The Form 14566, BMF ID Theft Action Request will be used for this purpose.

  2. Referrals to RICS for this purpose will be limited to situations where additional information is needed to confirm the existence of BMF ID Theft.

    Example:

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  3. After documenting all your findings and research on the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral, forward the referral to your BMF ID Theft Liaison. The liaison will review the form and if the form is complete, the liaison will send it to RICS using secure E-mail to: *W&I EF Referrals. In the Actions Needed Section of the Form, request RICS provide information confirming if this EIN was used to file fraudulent returns or if they have already flagged this EIN as fabricated, bogus or abused.

  4. The Entity Fabrication (EF) Team will review your referral and respond within 30 days by returning the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral, via secure E-mail. The EF team will respond that the account has been added to their scheme list or rejected as not involving BMF ID theft.

  5. If there are questionable IMF returns filed with what has been determined to be a fabricated EIN, complete the referral form with all information pertaining to the EIN to RICS. They will initiate research into the IMF accounts. Document the sending of the referral on AMS/CIS if a referral was sent, along with the details of the request. The control base will remain open while awaiting RICS response.

  6. If in your research you determine the EIN is a fabricated EIN, prior to closing the case send a referral to RICS per IRM 25.23.9.8.1Fabricated EIN Procedures. Document all research and information on the referral. Document AMS/CIS with the pertinent information.

Referrals to Criminal Investigation (CI)

  1. CI will receive BMF ID Theft assistance referrals under the following circumstances:

    • A request that CI research their scheme listing for a particular entity

      Note:

      CI maintains a database of IMF/BMF accounts under investigation. You may request CI check the EIN and related SSNs against their database after you've exhausted all BMF and IMF research options and still cannot authenticate the EIN. The Form 14566, BMF ID Theft Action Request, will be used for this purpose.

    • Notify CI that you have made a BMF identity theft determination

      Example:

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  2. After documenting all your findings and research on the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral, forward the referral to your BMF ID Theft Liaison. The liaison will review the form and if the form is complete, the liaison will send it to the CI liaison. Document the sending of the referral on AMS or CIS if a referral was sent, along with the details of the request.

    Note:

    In the Actions Needed Section of the referral form, document the type of referral: A search request of CI's scheme database or notification of a BMF ID Theft determination.

  3. CI will review your referral to determine if there is an open investigation related to the EIN and respond within 30 days by returning the referral form via secure E-mail with the appropriate response.

    Reminder:

    Incomplete referrals will be returned to the originating BMF ID Theft Liaison.

  4. The control on the case will remain open while awaiting CI’s response.

Referrals to Lock the Account

  1. Beginning January of 2017, after determining an EIN is fabricated, refer the case to your BMF ID theft Liaison using the Form 14566 BMF Identity Theft Referral, to request a TC 971 AC 524 be applied to the EIN. Be sure to document all your findings and research on the Form 14566.

  2. The input of the TC 971 AC 524 will cause the posting of a TC 020 locking the account. The TC 020 will post one cycle after the TC 971 AC 524. The TC 020 is only visible using CC BMFOLE. A TC 020 with a prior TC 971 AC 524 will prevent the entity from being deleted but will prevent the posting of anything to the account.

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    Note:

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  4. Prior to sending the referral to have a fabricated EIN locked, ensure:

    1. The EIN was never used for a legitimate business

    2. There are no balances remaining on the account

    3. There are no credits on the module

    4. The sort line is changed to “Identity Theft”

  5. Do not close the case until the TC 971 AC 524 is posted on the account and all other account actions have been taken.

Referrals to Combined Annual Wage Reporting (CAWR)

  1. In situations where identity thieves filed false income documents, you will need to contact the CAWR function to alert them to the false income documents.

  2. Document all your findings and research on the Form 14566, BMF Identity Theft Referral and forward it to your BMF ID Theft Liaison. Be sure to include all pertinent documentation. Your BMF Liaison will forward the referral to the CAWR Liaison using secure E-mail. Document the sending of the referral on AMS or CIS if a referral was sent, along with the details of the request.

    Reminder:

    If you are requesting an adjustment action, all required forms and documentation must be included with your request.

  3. CAWR will acknowledge receipt of your referral within 30 days by returning the BMF ID Theft Referral Form, via secure E-mail.

Account Actions

  1. Once it is determined there is ID theft, it is necessary to take the appropriate account actions to balance the account. If the posted return is determined to be an ID theft return, DO NOT leave the return on the account. The account must be corrected. If the bad return is the only one posted, it must be backed out. If the EIN owner also filed a return, follow the procedures in IRM 25.23.9.10.1Duplicate/Amended Return Research

  2. It will be necessary to determine if a refund has been lost, or if there are offsets in the module, or identify other account issues affected by the filing of the ID theft return.

  3. All issues relating to ID theft MUST be completed before the ID theft case is closed. This includes any related balance due issues such as an installment agreement that may have been affected by a refund offset. If an installment agreement was full paid by an offset, reinstate the agreement once the offset is reversed. If there have been levies or liens filed relating only to the ID theft return, they must be removed following normal procedures.

  4. Research the account to ensure the address is correct. Update the address if appropriate. If the original return is deemed to be an ID theft return, the address may have been changed when the return was processed.

  5. If the “bad” return posted first, back out the first return (do not net; exceptions can be made for imminent statute issues). This will provide a clearer notice to the taxpayer reflecting the adjustment figures they had on the “good” return.

  6. Employees working the various inventories are usually the first to identify trends and schemes. If you see returns that all seem to be fitting into a pattern of questionable filings and are potential ID theft issues, forward the information to your functional BMF ID Theft Liaison for evaluation to headquarters. See The BMF ID Theft Liaison Listing located on the BMF ID Theft website.

Duplicate /Amended Return Research

  1. As ID theft incidents increase, ID thieves are constantly changing ways of obtaining fraudulent refunds from IRS. Those employees that work paper cases and answer phones are often the first to recognize a scheme or a bad return. When working any inventory, ID theft should always be in the back of your mind. When working duplicate or amended returns, it is necessary to ensure that all the returns have been filed by the true EIN owner or authorized third party.

  2. ID theft returns need to be handled differently. Returns that have been deemed ID theft will be nullified and the ‘good’ return input on separate adjustments.

  3. Prior to making any adjustments on the account, thorough research must be completed. The determination that all returns have been filed by the EIN owner or authorized third party needs to be made. There are some quick checks that should be completed to assist in determining if the return in question is potentially an ID theft return and additional research will be needed. When working duplicate or amended returns ask yourself (this list is not all inclusive):

    1. Was the original, duplicate or amended return requesting a refund? ID thieves are looking for quick money. They will use existing business accounts to file returns that will allow for refunds of either payments made or refundable credits.

    2. Is there a change of address involved for either return? The ID thief will file a return with a new address so the resulting refund will be mailed to them.

    3. Is there a request for direct deposit refund with the return in question.? ID thieves will establish unauthorized bank accounts for the business specifically to receive the ID theft refund.

    4. Is the entity information correct? Many times, the fraudulent return will show slight misspellings in the business name or address.

    If you review the return and feel the information does not follow normal BMF filings or if any of the conditions listed above exist, additional research will be needed prior to inputting any adjustments.

  4. The additional research will include comparing the information on the various returns. Businesses have tendency to be consistent in their filings. While there will always be exceptions to the rule, BMF refunds tend to be quite large and it is better to research the account to be sure the refunds are from the EIN owner’s true returns than to issue a fraudulent refund.

  5. If you have access, utilize the BMF ID Theft Research Tool (BITR), to assist in the research of the returns filed. Compare the information on the returns with previously filed returns. Review the return for anything that may be out of the norm for the taxpayer. Remember one aspect does not necessarily indicate ID theft but if there are multiple issues it is better to question the return than to issue a fraudulent refund. Look at the returns asking the following (this list is not all inclusive):

    1. On prior returns, is the preparer information different than listed on the return in question? Many businesses use the same preparer for multiple years. If the return is not prepared by the normal preparer or no preparer is listed, it may signify a fraudulent filing.

    2. Are the payment amounts entered on the return equal to what is posted on the account? ID thieves may not know the exact amount of deposits made by the taxpayer.

    3. Is this the first time a refundable credit is being claimed or are the amounts of the credit vastly different from other years? Refundable credits on specific forms are the opportunity for a thief to receive a large refund from a BMF return.

    4. Are the line entry amounts comparable to other years? While from year to year a business will have changes, but based on prior history are the differences reasonable?

    5. Is the disposition of the overpayment consistent with prior year returns? For example, on all prior returns the taxpayer has requested credit elect but the return in question is requesting a refund be issued.

    6. Are the line items on the return blank or incorrect? The thief may not know all the information to correctly complete the return so they may exclude this information on the return.

    7. Was an extension filed but the original return was received prior to or shortly after the RDD. ID thieves will attempt to file the return before the true EIN owner so they will usually file it before the due date. If the account history shows prior year returns are usually filed at the end of the extension period, the original may be an ID theft return.

  6. If the duplicate/amended return displays any of the characteristics listed above, work the case as a potential ID theft case.

Bad Return Posted First and Good Return (Refund or Zero Balance)

  1. Once It is determined that the original posted return is an ID theft return, that return is considered a nullity. This means the information on the account relating to the posted original return is not valid. This includes the Assessment Statute Expiration Date (ASED) posted on the account.

  2. Determine if the ASED needs to be addressed prior to inputting any adjustment. On duplicate returns it may be necessary to update the ASED to reflect the correct received date of the valid return. The ASED will need to be updated if it is different than the date posted on the original return on the module. The ASED will be updated to the receive date plus 3 years.

    Example:

    The return due date is 4-15-2016 and the ID theft original return posted 4-14-2016. The ASED for this return would be 4-15-2019. The true taxpayer had filed an extension on 4-10-2016. The good return was received on 8-14-2016, the ASED for the good return would need to be updated to 8-14-2019.

  3. Input the new ASED with a TC 560 using CC REQ77 as appropriate. See IRM 25.6.1.6.14 Criteria for Establishing a Statute of Limitations Period for additional information.

  4. If the original return is the ID theft return, research the account to determine if the address has been changed by the posting of the return. If the address has been updated, change the address back to the correct business address.

  5. Research the account to determine if any overpayment has offset to any other module (IMF & BMF). Reverse all offsets using the appropriate transaction codes.

    Caution:

    Input a TC 570 as a secondary transaction code on the credit side of the credit transfer to prevent the release of any overpayment in the module.

  6. Determine if the refund has been lost. If there is a TC 846/840 on the module and the refund cannot be stopped, the account must be balanced and the lost refund credited back to the account. This is done by moving credit from the 1545 account back into the module. complete Form 3809 per IRM 25.23.9.10.6Lost Refund. Request the input a secondary TC 570 on the Form 3809 to hold the credit when the TC 841 posts. Do not adjust the account until the TC 841 has posted.

  7. For Form 1120, if the refund was not issued and there was a request for direct deposit, input a TC 971 AC 850 to stop any overpayment from direct depositing to the ID thief’s account.

  8. Back out the ID theft return. Back out all transactions and item/credit references associated with the return. Input the adjustment with a HC 4. When backing out the return ensure that all associates penalties, interest and fees that have manually assessed have been included in the adjustment.

  9. Input the second adjustment to reflect the taxpayer’s good return. Post delay this adjustment 1 cycle to ensure all prior account actions have posted.

  10. If there is a TC 130 on the XREF SSN which relates only to the ID theft issue, reverse the TC 130 using CC REQ77. Research the account thoroughly to ensure that all liabilities on the account are related to the ID theft issues only.

    Example:

    Taxpayer states he closed the business in 2012 and the BMF ID theft issue is for 2016. Research shows the taxpayer has an outstanding liability for 2012 and 2016. While the liability for 2016 will be removed for ID theft, the 2012 liability is still good for 2012 and the TC 130 should not be reversed in this case.

Posted Return on Either a Fabricated EIN or Inactive Account

  1. If there is a ID theft return posted to the account and it has been determined the EIN is fabricated, the account is going to be locked down. This means that all posted transactions on the module will need to be reversed.

  2. Back out all posted returns from the involved modules. Use HC 4 on the adjustment to prevent any credits for refunding.

  3. If there are any manually assessed penalties, interest or fees associated with the assessments on the module, reverse them. Once all adjustments post the balance on the account should be “zero”.

  4. If there are payments on the account, research the payments to ensure they are not misapplied. If they are, move them to the correct account. If you are unable to determine where the payments should be applied, move the payment to excess following normal procedures.

  5. If there are offsets or payments belonging to the ID Theft victim, determine if the payments are eligible for refund. If the statute has expired on the payments move them into excess following normal procedures.

  6. If there has been collection action taken, such as a lien filing or levy situations, they must be released prior to requesting the account be locked.

  7. If there is a TC 130 on the XREF SSN which relates only to the ID theft issue, reverse the TC 130.

  8. Under the X-REF SSN, input TC 971 AC 504 MISC SPCL2 with EIN as XREF TIN.

  9. If it is determined to be a fabricated EIN, see IRM 25.23.9.8.1Fabricated EIN Procedures for additional action requirements.

Wrong/Bad Return Posted First and the “Good” Return is a Balance Due

  1. If the “wrong/bad” return posted first and the good taxpayer filed a balance due return with the balance still unpaid or was paid after the original return due date, it is necessary to properly handle the account so the FTP penalty can be systemically computed on the good taxpayer’s return.

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  4. It is imperative the account be properly handled to ensure the correct amount of FTP penalty is charged.

    1. It is necessary to completely back out the bad return, DO NOT net with the good return. Back out any associated penalties other than a bad check penalty and the FTP penalty. The FTP penalty will automatically reverse when the account is backed out.

      Note:

      Address the bad check penalty as a separate issue. Determine if the payment was made by the alleged ID thief or by the business. If payment was not made by the business follow IRM 20.1.10.4IRC 6657 Bad Checks (Dishonored Checks or other Forms of Payment) for procedures to abate the penalty.

    2. Take all other account actions needed to balance the account. This would include any offset reversals, moving of refunds or crediting lost refunds back into the account. Include all appropriate hold codes where applicable.

    3. Compute the “tax shown” on the “good” return. This is the amount of tax the taxpayer figured they owe, minus any taxpayer computed refundable and prepaid credits. Follow the instructions in IRM 20.1.2.1.6.3Wrong Return Posted First for computing “tax shown.” This amount will be entered in the adjustment using Item Reference Number (IRN) 871. The input of the IRN 871 tells the computer the tax the taxpayer expected to owe on their return and the amount of tax that will be assessed FTP penalty from the due date of the return. The computer will recognize ES payments, FTD penalty and refund reversals (TC 841) in the calculation of the FTP penalty.

    4. Determine if the ASED needs to be addressed prior to inputting any adjustment. If there is a duplicate return posted it may be necessary to update the ASED to reflect the correct received date of the valid return. The ASED will need to be updated if it is different than the date posted on the original return on the module. The ASED will be updated to the received date plus 3 years.

      Example:

      The return due date is 4-15-2016 and the ID theft return posted 4-14-2016. The ASED for this return would be 4-15-2019. The true taxpayer had filed an extension on 4-10-2016. The good return was received on 8-14-2016, the ASED for the good return would need to be updated to 8-14-2019.

    5. Input the new ASED with a TC 560 using TC REQ77 as appropriate. See IRM 25.6.1.6.14 Criteria for Establishing a Statute of Limitations Period

    6. Math verify the return and complete the normal computations for determining tax, credits and other penalty amounts to be entered on the adjustment.

    7. Input the adjustment using all applicable item reference and credit reference numbers with a Priority Code 2, Hold code 0 (zero) and the appropriate IRN 871 amount. The PC 2 allows the computer to recognize the need to compute the FTP penalty back to the RDD for the lesser of the IRN 871 amount or the “tax assessed” on the return. For example, if there is a discrepancy between what the taxpayer thinks they owe and what is calculated, such as a math error, the FTP penalty will be correctly computed. The HC 0 allows the notice to generate with the correct FTP penalty calculation. The computer will recognize any payments, credit elect, withholding and refundable payment credits applied against the tax owed and adjust the FTP penalty computation accordingly.

      Caution:

      Any tax or refundable tax credits posted prior to the priority code “2” adjustment are ignored in the FTP penalty computation. This is the reason the original return needs to be completely backed out.

    8. Input the appropriate post delay(s) on the adjustment to allow all account transactions to post prior to the adjustment.

    9. See IRM 20.1.2.1.6.3Wrong Return Posted First for additional information.

    Example:

    Bad return was filed first. The taxpayer’s good return shows a balance owed of $1,000. However, after the good return was math verified the true balance owed is $1,500. The adjustment would be a TC 290 for $1,500 using the IRN 871 for $1,000 (tax shown) with PC 2. The computer will compute the FTP from the RRD on the $1,000 (the lesser of the tax assessed or the IRN amount). Since the taxpayer was unaware of the $500 tax increase, he has the 21 days from the 23C date to pay the $500 without FTP being charged.

    Example:

    The good taxpayer had made several ES payments totaling $5,000. A bad return posts requesting a refund of $4,000. Due to the ES payments made, a refund of $9,000 is issued to the bad taxpayer. The bad return is backed out and a credit of $9,000 is moved into the module from the 1545 account, posting a TC 841 for $9,000. After all account actions are complete the account is going to now show the correct credit of $5,000. The good return is showing a balance of $2,000 after applying the ES payments made. The tax shown on the good return is $7,000 with no refundable tax credits. Since there is no discrepancy between the taxpayer’s figures and the math verified figures on the good return the TC 290 and IRN 871 figures will be the same. The adjustment to post the good return is: TC 290 $7,000 with the IRN 871 $7,000 with PC 2 and HC 0. The computer will recognize the TC 841 as cancelling the refund and will read the payments and recognize the balance owed as $2,000. In this situation, the taxpayer is going to get charged FTP from the RDD until the balance of the $2,000 is paid in full.

Statute Implications

  1. If the assessment of the taxpayer’s true return will include a tax increase and after determining the ASED for the taxpayer’s good return is within 90 days, then statute procedures must be followed. Follow procedures in the IRM 25.6.1.5 Basic Guide for Processing Cases with Statute of Limitations Issues.

  2. In situations where the taxpayer is claiming ID theft on an older year and there is a balance due, there may be payments on these accounts from offsets, levy payments, or payments made by the taxpayer to avoid collection activities. Depending on the circumstances of the case and if the payments are creating an overpayment, it is necessary to determine if the payments are refundable. Determine if the payments or offsets meet the RSED rules prior to allowing any refund from generating. See IRM 25.6.1.7.2Time when Payments and Credits are Considered to Be Made.

Lost Refund

  1. If the “bad” return resulted in a lost refund, once the bad return has been backed out it will create a balance due on the account. It is necessary to apply the credit from the 1545 account.

  2. The preparation of the Form 3809 and posting of the TC 841/700 should be completed prior to the backing out the bad return.

  3. Complete the moving of all offsets prior to moving the credit from the 1545 account.

  4. Prepare Form 3809 for a total or partial lost refund. The 1545 account will be the debit account and the taxpayer’s account the credit account.

    1. Enter in the Name and Address Box:
      a. Debit portion- “1545 Account”
      b. Credit portion- Name as shown on ENMOD (do not list the address)

    2. TIN: Credit portion only: Business EIN

    3. MFT: Credit portion only: MFT of account where refund was issued

    4. Tax Period: Enter the tax period where the refund was issued

    5. Transaction Date: Date of the lost refund both portions

    6. 1st Transaction code:
      a. Debit portion- leave blank
      b. Credit portion- TC 841 for total lost refund, TC 700 for partial refund

    7. Amount:
      a. Enter the amount of the lost refund or the portion that was lost

    8. 2nd TC: On credit side only, enter a 570 to hold the credit on the module

    9. Prepared by: Enter your initials and IDRS number and date.

  5. Forward to SP, Manual Deposit Unit, where the refund was issued.

  6. Suspend case and monitor for the posting of the TC 841/700.

Request for a New Employer Identification Number (EIN) by a Taxpayer Who Is a Victim of ID Theft

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  2. For IRS to consider the issuance of a new EIN, the ID theft must have federal tax administration impact. These would include:

    1. Fraudulent returns filed under this EIN. This would include original or amended returns

    2. Filing of fraudulent income documents. This would include forms W-2, Form 1099 series, etc.

  3. If research shows there has been tax impact on the account and the taxpayer has requested a new EIN, advise them to:

    1. Complete a new Form SS-4, Application for Employer Identification Number

    2. Complete Form 14039-B, Business Identity Theft Affidavit- This form must be sent to the taxpayer as it not available on-line.

    3. Attach the Form 14039-B to the Form SS-4 and mail to the Service center address listed below. Provide the appropriate address to the taxpayer.


    Ogden BMF Entity
    1973 N. Rulon White Blvd
    Ogden, UT 84404
    Mail Stop 6273

    Kansas City BMF Entity
    333 W Pershing Rd
    Kansas City, MO 64108
    Mail Stop C-1 6055
  4. When the Forms are received in Entity, a new EIN will be assigned and then merged with the old number. The taxpayer will receive notification when the new EIN is assigned.

  5. Take all the required account actions that need to be completed to make the account whole.

  6. In situations where the taxpayer states their EIN was stolen and used in ways other than the federal filing of returns or income documents, IRS will not issue a new EIN to the existing business.

  7. If the taxpayer insists on a new EIN even though there is no tax impact, advise the taxpayer they will need to shut down the current business to obtain a new EIN. They will need to:

    1. File final returns for all open filing requirements. This will close out the current business.

    2. Contact the state for approval of the new business name.

    3. Submit a new Form SS-4 with a new business name or apply on-line. If submitting the Form SS-4, advise the taxpayer to check the “Other” box under line 10 and specify the reason for the new EIN. They will also need to supply the old EIN on line 18. This will help to prevent the research from showing a duplicate EIN if the new name is similar to the old.

    4. Advise the taxpayer to send the completed Form SS-4 to:
      Internal Revenue Service
      201 W. Rivercenter Blvd.
      Covington, KY 41011

    5. They will receive notification (CP 575) when the new EIN is assigned.

Providing Copies of Tax Returns or Income Documents Where ID Theft is Suspected or Proven

  1. The taxpayer may request copies of tax return and/or information documents associated with potential or confirmed ID theft issues. The IRS will honor these requests under specific circumstances. The information on these returns is considered to contain information that belongs to both the true taxpayer as well as the ID thief. Only the information that applies to the true taxpayer can be disclosed. This consists of only the information that can be utilized to determine tax liability. Requests can be for copies of:

    1. Tax Returns

    2. Income Documents

    Reminder:

    In both situations, it is important to remember that only the information that can be used to determine liability can be disclosed in situations where ID theft is suspected or confirmed. Information such as other TINs, banking information, and addresses cannot be disclosed. See IRM 25.23.9.11.2Redacting Information, for additional information.

  2. Prior to releasing any information, it is necessary to determine:

    1. If the taxpayer’s ID theft is related to a legitimate business (active or inactive).
      OR

    2. If the taxpayer’s issue is related to a fabricated EIN situation where the taxpayer claims’ their personal information was stolen and used to obtain the EIN.

  3. If it is a legitimate business (active or inactive):

    1. The taxpayer may be disclosed information about any questionable filings to assist in the determination as to whether the filings are in fact fraudulent. This goes for both tax return and income documents information.

    2. The return and/or income document information remains with the business even if it is later determined that the return or income information is fraudulent. If the determination has already been made, the taxpayer is still entitled to the information because at the time of filing all the information represented a possible liability for the business.

    3. See IRM 25.23.9.11.2Redacting Information, to determine what information must be redacted

  4. If the business is fabricated:

    1. If the taxpayer states they have no association with the business and it is determined that the taxpayer’s personal information was stolen to establish the EIN, no return or income documents information can be disclosed to the taxpayer. This is because the taxpayer does not have individual liability for the business and the information contained within any of the documents is not considered as belonging to the taxpayer. Under no circumstances should any information be shared if the taxpayer is claiming no association to the business.

Sending Redacted Information

  1. If a taxpayer suspects BMF ID theft they may contact us by phone or in writing. In either case all responses to these requests will be mailed ONLY to the address of the business. If the return in question changed the taxpayer’s “good” address, complete research to determine the current address of the business. Utilize outside resources if necessary, such as GOOGLE or GOOGLE Maps to verify the address.

  2. Phone Contact- If the taxpayer contacts us by phone and after complete research there is potential ID theft, the taxpayer may want copies of the return or forms in question to verify the non-filing of the information. Document on AMS with the caller’s name, and what documents were sent.

  3. Paper case- If the request is received by paper, ensure the taxpayer has provided all the needed information to complete the request. This would include the EIN, forms in question and Tax periods.

  4. In either request type, it is not necessary to redact and send all requested items if the number of documents is too large. For example, the number of Forms W-2 filed may exceed 1,000 forms. Redact and send only enough of the information for the taxpayer to make the determination that they did not file the information. In this situation, advise the taxpayer they will be receiving only a portion of the information because the volume is too large to redact.

Redacting Information

  1. If the taxpayer is requesting copies of potential ID theft returns or income documents, obtain the documents using the information available TDS, IDRS or MeF for electronically filed returns. For employees utilizing the BITR tool, information from the screens can be printed by going to either the print icon or “file” for the print option. Once the information is accessed:

    1. Print the information as a PDF file- use the CIS number as the case name and save to your SBU folder. (Hint: Check your SBU folder prior to closing the file to ensure the file is saved).

    2. Once the PDF file opens, click on “Tools”. On the right side of the document a group of drop downs will appear.

    3. Click on “Protection”.

    4. Another drop down will appear. Under “Black Out & Remove content” click on “Mark for redaction”. If a dialog box appears just click OK. Once that disappears your cursor will change to what looks like an open book. Put your cursor over the beginning of the area to be redacted and then move it to the end of the redacted area. This will create a box around the area to be redacted.

    5. Once all the areas you want redacted have been selected, go back to the drop down and select “Apply Redaction”. Another dialogue box will appear, click OK. The boxed areas will then turn black for the redaction. The page can now be printed normally and sent to the taxpayer.

  2. What needs to be redacted- While the information that pertains to the determination of tax liability can be disclosed, information not relating to the computation of liability cannot be disclosed. It is necessary to determine which information must be redacted prior to sending the taxpayer the requested documents. Information that needs to be redacted is (these lists are not all inclusive):

    1. Tax Forms
      • TINs- this includes all identifying identification numbers listed on the return or attached schedules if different from the EIN owner’s
      • Business or Corporation names- All names listed on the return or attached schedules if different for the EIN owner’s
      • Addresses- All addresses listed on the return or attached schedules if different from the EIN owner’s
      • Preparer information- Name, PTIN, phone number, etc.
      • Telephone number if not the number recorded on the account
      • Banking information- this includes the routing and account numbers if present
      • IP address if present
      • Software information if present

    2. Income Document
      • Employer/Payer address if different from the EIN owner’s
      • Employer/Payer name if different from the EIN owner’s
      • Taxpayer/Recipient/Filer name- May leave the first four letters of the recipient’s last name or business name
      • Taxpayer/Recipient/Filer address if different from the EIN owner’s
      • Taxpayer/Recipient/Filer TIN (Identification number)- May leave the last four digits
      • Employer/Filer State ID number if different from the business’s federal number
      • Account number
      • PSE’s name and telephone number- Forms 1099-K

  3. If the case is being work through CIS, attach a copy of the redacted print to the CIS case.

TC 971 AC 5XX- MISC Codes

1. BOD

Business Operating Division Definition
AP Appeals
CI Criminal Investigation
LB Large Business and International
PG Identity Protection Strategy & Oversight (IPSO)
SB Small Business & Self Employed
TA Taxpayer Advocate Service
TEGE Tax Exempt Government Entities
WI Wage & Investment

2. Program Name

Note:

If your specific function is not listed below, elevate to your BOD/Function identity theft liaison. The liaison will contact IPSO and request an alternative until programming can be implemented for additional codes.

Caution:

Field Assistance employees are not profiled to input identity theft indicators on BMF accounts. Field Assistance employees will refer the case to the appropriate functional liaison for research and the marking of the accounts in question.

Function Definition
AP Appeals
RC Refund Crimes
LBI Large Business and International
IP Office of Identity Protection
ACS Automated Collection System
AM Accounts Management
ATTI Abusive Transactions Technical
AUR Automated Underreporter
CA Case Advocate
CAWR Combined Annual Wage Reporting
CE Correspondence Exam
CSCO Compliance Services Collection Operations
EXCISE Excise Tax
FC Field Collection
FE Field Exam
FLDADV Field Advisory
FRIV Frivolous Filer
FUTA Federal Unemployment Tax Act
FLDINSLV Field Insolvency
RICS Return Integrity & Compliance Services
SPCLTX Employment Specialty Tax
TDI Tax Delinquency Investigation
TEFRA Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982

3. BMF Tax Administration Source Codes

Term/Acronym Definition
IDTCLM Applied to the TXMOD of the applicable MFT and Tax Period when an initial claim or suspicion of BMF identity theft is supported by preliminary research.
IDTDOC Applied to the TXMOD of the applicable MFT and Tax Period when the taxpayer provides complete and legible Form 14039-B and supporting documents for a BMF identity theft issue.
CLSIDT Applied to the TXMOD of the applicable MFT and Tax Period when all identity theft issues are resolved.

BMF ID Theft Indicators - TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM - Initial Allegation or Suspicion of BMF ID Theft

BMF identity theft indicators are placed on TXMOD for all MFTs and Tax Periods affected by identity theft. TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM is applied to all accounts when identity theft is alleged or suspected but the taxpayer and research verifies the probability of ID theft. The taxpayer has not yet provided any supporting documents and the case is assigned and controlled.

Obtain the following information:

  • EIN

  • MFT and Tax Period of the identity theft incident

  • Navigate to TXMOD for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter REQ77

FRM77 is displayed for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter the TC 971 AC 522

  • TC> Enter the TC with 971;

  • TC971/151-CD> Enter 522

  • TRANS-DT is auto populated with the current date;

  • Enter SECONDARY-DT-If taxpayer identified, enter the IRS receive date or the date of the call. If IRS determined, enter the date the IRS suspected identity theft after concluding preliminary research. The date cannot be the current date, it must be before the current date. (you can use yesterday's date.)

  • Enter MISC> Enter your specific BOD/Program name, refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-1TC 971 AC 5XX- MISC Codes.

    Example:

    If you are a Combined Annual Wage Reporting employee you will enter the following when you identify a BMF identity theft situation:
    SB CAWR IDTCLM

    Example:

    If you are a BMF Adjustment employee you will enter the following when you identify a BMF identity theft situation:
    WI AM IDTCLM

Note:

If the account (MFT and Tax Period) already contains a TC 971 AC 522 IDTCLM do NOT input a second code.

BMF ID Theft Indicators - TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC - BMF ID Theft Documents Accepted

BMF identity theft indicators are placed on TXMOD for the MFT and Tax Period affected by identity theft. TC 971 AC 522 IDTDOC is applied to all accounts when the taxpayer has provided a complete and legible Form 14039-B and supporting documents.

Obtain the following information:

  • EIN

  • MFT and Tax Period of the identity theft incident

  • Navigate to TXMOD for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter REQ77

FRM77 is displayed for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter the TC 971 AC 522

  • TC> Enter the TC with 971;

  • TC971/151-CD> Enter 522

  • TRANS-DT is auto populated with the current date;

  • Enter SECONDARY-DT -Enter the IRS received date of the documents provided by the taxpayer in support of the identity theft allegation.

  • Enter MISC> Enter your specific BOD/Program name, refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-1TC 971 AC 5XX- MISC Codes

    Example:

    If you are a Field Collection employee you will enter the following when you identify a BMF identity theft situation:
    SB FC IDTDOC

    Example:

    If you are a BMF Adjustment employee you will enter the following when you identify a BMF identity theft situation:
    WI AM IDTDOC

Note:

If the account (MFT and Tax Period) already contains a TC 971 AC 522 MISC IDTDOC do NOT input a second code.

BMF ID Theft Indicators - TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT - Closed and Confirmed as BMF ID Theft

BMF identity theft indicators are placed on TXMOD for the MFT and Tax Period affected by identity theft. TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT is applied to all accounts when all actions to resolve the identity theft issues have been taken and posted and the taxpayer is notified.

Obtain the following information:

  • EIN

  • MFT and Tax Period of the identity theft incident

  • Navigate to TXMOD for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter REQ77

FRM77 is displayed for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter the TC 971 AC 522

  • TC> Enter the TC with 971;

  • TC971/151-CD> Enter 522

  • TRANS-DT is auto populated with the current date;

  • Enter SECONDARY-DT -Enter the date the identity theft issues were completely resolved. The date cannot be the current date, it must be before the current date. (you can use yesterday's date.

  • Enter MISC>Enter your specific BOD/Program name, refer to Exhibit 25.23.9-1TC 971 AC 5XX- MISC Codes

    Example:

    If you are a Field Collection employee you will enter the following when you identify a BMF identity theft situation:
    SB FC CLSIDT

    Example:

    If you are a BMF Adjustment employee you will enter the following when you identify a BMF identity theft situation:
    WI AM CLSIDT

Note:

If the account (MFT and Tax Period) already contains a TC 971 AC 522 CLSIDT do NOT input a second code.

Reversing BMF Identity Theft Indicators - TC 972 AC 522

If you subsequently determine an account is NOT affected by identity theft, you will need to reverse all the identity theft indicators applied to the account.

Obtain the following information:

  • EIN

  • MFT and Tax Period of the identity theft incident

  • Navigate to TXMOD for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter REQ77

FRM77 is displayed for the selected MFT and Tax Period

Enter the TC 972 AC 522

  • TC> Enter the TC 972

  • TC971/151-CD> Enter 522

  • TRANS-DT> Enter the transaction date of the TC 971 AC 522 being reversed

  • SECONDARY-DT> Enter the secondary date of the TC 971 AC 522 being reversed

  • MISC> Enter your BOD Program Code followed by the reason why the BMF Identity Theft Indicator is being reversed using the table below

Reason for BMF ID Theft Reversal Reversal Code
If, after completing a case analysis, you have determined ID Theft did not occur.

Example:

Taxpayer contacts IRS believing to be a victim of identity theft. After careful case analysis and review, the employee determines this is a mixed entity case, no identity theft occurred.

NOIDT- Document on AMS/CIS why ID theft is not indicated.
The taxpayer did not respond to your request for supporting documentation. NORPLY
The BMF ID Theft indicator was applied due to a typographical mistake or another internal mistake. IRSERR
The original identity theft incident claim was determined to be false/untrue. FALSE
The reason for the 971 reversal does not meet any of the above reason descriptions OTHER- Document AMS/CIS the reason for the reversal.

BMF Identity Theft Referral Form

You may choose to include the optional Form 14566 BMF Identity Theft Referral, prior to submitting the form to your designated functional liaison. This includes:

  • A detailed explanation of the actions requested.

  • A detailed description of the research you completed and your findings

Caution:

Incomplete or inappropriate BMF Identity Theft Referrals may be returned to the originator for additional case building, delaying case resolution.

The receiving function will be responsible for documenting the actions taken and returning the referral form to the originator.

BMF Identity Theft Research Requirement

The table below was developed to assist you with some of the research needed to assist in making a BMF ID theft determination.

Action What are you looking for? Research Tools and Command Codes
Research the EIN for:
  • Date established

  • X-REF TIN (s)

  • Address

  • Filing requirements and history

  • Business Close Date

  • Business name - Primary and sort name


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BMF ID Theft Research tool (BITR)
Document 6209
BMFOLE
INOLES
Entity Research
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Research all X-REF TINS
BMF: Research for possible successor or parent companies, possible mixed entities
IMF:
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BMFOLE
INOLES
ENMOD
IMFOL
FTBOL
Account Research
BMF;
  • Research for open controls or ID theft case already being worked

  • Check for ID theft indicators on prior years or MFTs

  • Research for prior account assessments. CAWR, SFR/6020b, or Exam may open or closed issues. Some of these issues may be the result of default assessments/ no replies, which may indicate a possible fabricated EIN. Additional research or contact with the taxpayer may be necessary


IMF: Check the x-ref SSN accounts to see if there are any ID theft or IVO indicators for the tax year in question on the entity. . This may indicate ID theft.

TXMOD
BMFOL/IMFOL
AMS History and Notes
6209
Payment Research
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TXMOD
BMFOLT
RTR
EFTPS
BMFOLP
IRPTR Research
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IRPTR
BMFOLU
PMFOL
Refund Research
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TXMOD
BMFOLT
IMFOLT
DDPOL
Document Research
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Note:

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TRDBV
BRTVU
RTVUE
MeF returns

https://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Tax-Practitioner-Guide-to-Business-Identity-Theft