Return Integrity Verification Operations (RIVO) strengthens the integrity of the tax system by:

Refer to the following:

The Return Integrity Verification Program Management (RIVPM) has responsibility for information in this IRM. Information is published in the IRM on a yearly basis.

The Director of RIVPM is responsible for the policy related to this IRM.

The Chief of RIVPM Policy & Analysis is responsible for ensuring this IRM is timely submitted to publishing each year.

The program has reports to track the inventory, including receipts and closures.

A quality control program is in place to review all processes to ensure accuracy and effectiveness.

Acronyms used throughout the Fraud and Referral Evaluation (FRE) Procedures for Return Integrity Verification Operations (RIVO) IRM are listed alphabetically in the table below:

The related resources listed below may be utilized for account research and issue resolution. These related resources may be accessed through the IRS Intranet-Servicewide Electronic Research Program (SERP) site.

The following IRMs should be used in conjunction with IRM 25.25.12:

Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS) restricted access accounts are accounts where a user must request special permissions to access the account through IDRS. Follow IRM 21.2.1.3.2, Authorized IDRS Access.

The Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TBOR) lists rights that already existed in the tax code, putting them in simple language and grouping them into 10 fundamental rights. Employees are responsible for being familiar with and acting in accord with taxpayer rights. See IRC 7803(a)(3), Execution of Duties in Accord with Taxpayer Rights. For additional information about the TBOR, see https://www.irs.gov/taxpayer-bill-of-rights. Under these rights taxpayers have the right to receive prompt, courteous, and professional assistance in their dealings with the IRS, to be spoken to in a way they can easily understand, to receive clear and easily understandable communications from the IRS, and to speak to a supervisor about inadequate service.

Pattern matching is used to analyze returns en masse, not one by one. Utilize Selections aNd Analytics Platform (SNAP) to create and run assigned queries and adjust as applicable based on internal and external information.

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Research query results to identify a pattern (this list is not all inclusive).

Once a pattern has been identified:

Research patterns obtained through SNAP queries in EFDS.

Research IP addresses based on the Average Refund, smallest to largest:

Look for additional patterns within original pattern and utilize SNAP to identify additional returns:

Identify new inventory in Process Status (PS) 30 using the disposition date:

Run SNAP query "PS 30 Daily Inventory"

For returns that meet the PS 30 criteria, determine the refund freeze process and initiate the appropriate freeze actions. Remove from PS 30 those returns not meeting the criteria.

Identify the appropriate TPP marker (e.g., TC 971 AC 124 or TC 971 AC 129), prior to the weekly master file cutoff deadline by taking the following actions:

Ensure the Masterfile template is placed on the server by 10:00 AM ET Thursday. Send an e-mail to the BPL POC to inform them the template was updated. The e-mail must include the full filename and number of records.

The database is used for monitoring current year process status 30 inventory. Queries can be run on the following processes:

Pull the 972/129 from the TPP database on a weekly basis. Mass push all confirmed IDT cases to scheme as CT Cat 7. Refile anything that is confirmed Non IDT with no 971/052 CANT VERIFY. Case with the 971/052 have the income verified per IRM 25.25.2.17 , Process Status (PS) 30 Identity Theft False Positive Screening Process.

For accounts where the paper check is returned to the IRS as undeliverable (TC 740) and appears on the Business Objects (BOE) Report, FRE is to take the following actions when the S- freeze is still on the account after 60 days:

Security Breach Leads - The IRS receives notification of specific security breach incidents from various sources related to a data breach. This information is received from Electronic Products & Services Support (EPSS), Cyberfusion and various software providers. The Fraud Referral and Evaluation (FRE) analysts provide ongoing analysis of the information received and protect IRS revenue of potential identity theft returns through the referral process.
Security Breach Lead Analysis:

Leads are external information and communications about questionable tax refunds identified by a variety of stakeholders, including national banks, state banks, savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, credit unions, financial institutions, brokerage firms, government and law enforcement agencies, state agencies, tax preparation entities and various other sources. Bank Leads may involve treasury checks, direct deposits/ACH, refund anticipation loans or checks, and pre-paid debit cards.

Leads from financial institutions are voluntarily submitted through the External Lead Mailbox Process. Reference IRM 25.25.8.2, External Lead Mailbox Process for more information. The bank leads from this mailbox are imported into the "RICS Lead Management System" (LMS). These leads are all post refund returns. The FRE Bank Leads Program utilizes the lead data within the LMS to search for revenue protection and fraud trend identification opportunities.

The FRE Bank Leads Program uses the lead information to identify revenue protection opportunities on additional questionable returns currently in the processing stream. The FRE Bank Leads Program also uses these leads to identify new fraudulent filing patterns and trends. New trends are monitored for additional activity. Any identified returns are assigned to the appropriate processing streams. New filter rule suggestions are periodically forwarded to the appropriate teams in RICS/RIVO for consideration.

Lead Research:

Lead Actions:

Electronic Filing Identification Numbers (EFINs) and Preparer Tax Identification Numbers (PTINs) are vulnerable to identity theft, breaches, and hijacking. Some cases involve EFINs or PTINs established with identity victims' names and social security numbers (SSNs). Other cases involve EFINs or PTINs originally established by legitimate return preparers or practitioners and then misused by thieves in filing identity theft (IDT) returns. Yet other cases involve a compromised EFIN, under which the IRS receives both a bona fide return from the legitimate owner of the EFIN and an IDT return from a thief. Electronic Product and Services Support (EPSS) and Return Integrity Verification Operations (RIVO) have been working together to identify suspicious EFINs, research them, and inactivate them, when applicable.

Abusive return preparers have been a problem for the IRS and for taxpayers for many years. These preparers prepare returns that contain fraudulent/abusive items (for example, income, withholding, dependents, and refundable credits). Abusive return preparers create a problem for the IRS because these returns cost the government revenue and cost the taxpayers money when they are audited. It is often difficult to discern the abuse because some taxpayers collude with these preparers while others do not.

Return Integrity Verification Operations (RIVO) has implemented a streamlined referral process to direct Abusive Preparer cases to the Lead Development Center (LDC) and to the Return Preparer Coordinators (RPCs) office using specified criteria. This includes Exam functions that focus on the fraudulent items indicated in the referral.

There is a process to refer these abusive preparer cases to LDC and the RPC. After thoroughly researching and developing the referrals, refer only the most egregious preparers. If the criteria is not egregious enough to warrant a referral, forward all leads to the Return Preparer’s Office (RPO) to be filed as a complaint only.

RICS/RIVO/FRE employees are in a unique position to identify these abusive preparers. This identification supports their mission of fraud detection and revenue protection. In addition, they have access to return data that is not generally available elsewhere in the IRS. This frequently results in identifying pockets of questionable returns that are prepared by the same individual and allows for case building on preparer fraud not captured elsewhere.

A FRE Point of Contact (POC) is assigned at each site. A POC review must be completed before any lead can be referred to the Industry Fraud Leads Mailbox. Forward all referrals to the FRE POC’s e-mail address with a CC to their back up.

Program Case Research:

Refer the abusive preparer cases to the LDC (for abusive preparers filling more than 500 returns) and to the RPCs (for abusive preparers filling fewer than 500 returns) and to the RPO, if the referral is not egregious enough and needs to be filed as a complaint only.

Lead Actions:

As part of the Security Summit Initiative, lead reports are received from American Coalition of Taxpayer Rights (ACTR) members as well as other participating software partners. The returns referred as part of these lead reports are reviewed and analyzed for possible identify theft characteristics. If a return is thought to be questionable, it is processed accordingly by the IRS to ensure revenue protection. Higher level analysis is then performed to aid in identifying additional returns and any filing patterns or trends that can be used in the future.

Industry Lead files are received on the server through a secure data transfer process. A lead consists of two separate files:

Lead Research

The State Leads Program is a program within RICS that receives referrals from various State taxing agencies relating to fraudulent/IDT returns being filed at the State level. RICS uses these leads to identify questionable returns being filed at the federal level and to identify new fraudulent filing patterns and trends.

Lead Research

The Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) assists with the Treasury Offset Program (TOP) Offset Reversal process by supplying a file of Social Security numbers associated with accounts where TOP offsets were generated from suspect returns (possibly not filed by the true taxpayer). The file OCSE delivers is missing the tax period associated with the TOP offset which the Tax Examiners (TEs) need in order to complete the TOP Offset Reversal Process.

Research is completed with the use of batch tools and databases to find the following information:

Lead Research:

The Information Security Analysis Center (ISAC) Industry Participants send leads and alerts to the IRS through the ISAC Portal. The alerts contain information related to revenue protection and potential EFIN/ERO/preparer fraud. The referred lead reports are reviewed and analyzed by FRE for possible identify theft or fraud characteristics. If a return is thought to be questionable, it is processed accordingly by the IRS to ensure revenue protection. Higher level analysis is then performed to aid in identifying additional returns and any filing patterns or trends that can be used in the future.

ISAC Lead files are reviewed by FRE through the ISAC Portal. A lead consists of two separate files:

Lead Research and Actions:

The National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA) manages the administration, development, and governance of the ACH network, which is the electronic system that facilitates the movement of money in the United States. Beginning in January 2013, an Opt-In Program was developed by the IRS, Department of Treasury Bureau of Fiscal Services (BFS) and the National Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA) and allows financial institutions to reject questionable refunds back to the IRS for review.

The External Leads NACHA Group pulls a listing of NACHA rejects using Control D. The NACHA Group Point of Contact (POC) sends FRE a semi-weekly list of NACHA rejects, broken down into tabs for R17, R19 and R23 for FRE to work as follows:

Step 1: Combine all three reject tabs into a single file

Step 2: Check IDRS IMFOLT for the following:

Step 3: Based on the IDRS IMFOLT data, mark the NACHA rejects as follows:

Step 4: Run a SNAP query on the remaining DLNs to pull Current Year and Prior Year filing data. Mark the rejects as follows:

Step 5: Compare all remaining R17 and R19 NACHA rejects to IRP to identify returns that verify within the wage and withholding tolerances or underreported their wages. Mark these rejects as follows:

Step 6: After marking all returns using the steps above, compile a list of returns marked for PS30 (TPP). Forward the list to the FRE Pattern Matching TEAM Point of Contact (POC) for disposition and additional research as needed.

Step 7: Compile a list of all returns marked for Refile and complete the following:

Step 8: Place an updated NACHA inventory listing in the Shared Drive folder: S:\RICS\IVI\Shared\AUS\TAP\Misty\Reports\FRE IRP Report

Step 9: Send the sorted file back to the External Leads NACHA Group POC for the TEs to screen all returns needing manual review

Pull the following SSRS Reports posted weekly from the TPP - TPP RIVO Monitoring folder:

FRE performs the following actions:

Use the MFT 32 Clean-up Report to identify the STARS Category 7 inventory that needs to be reviewed for final resolution.